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PUBLIC REPORT OF REVIEW OF U. S. SUBMISSION 2012-01 (HONDURAS) 
Executive Summary 
 
U.S. Submission 2012-01 (Honduras) 
 
This report responds to U.S. Submission 2012-01 (Honduras) (“The Submission”), filed by the 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and 26 
Honduran unions and civil society organizations on March 26, 2012, with the Office of Trade 
and Labor Affairs (OTLA).
1
  The Submission alleges violation of the Labor Chapter of the 
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), 
which has been in force between the United States and Honduras since April 1, 2006.
2
   
 
In response to the Submission, the OTLA conducted a thorough and detailed review of all 
information obtained related to the allegations in the Submission. This report presents the 
OTLA’s findings and recommendations based on the information obtained, in accordance with 
OTLA’s Procedural Guidelines.3 The report concludes that the OTLA has serious concerns 
regarding the protection and promotion of internationally recognized labor rights in Honduras, 
including concerns regarding the Government of Honduras’s enforcement of its labor laws.  
 
Throughout the review process, the Government of Honduras has demonstrated a willingness to 
engage the U.S. government concerning the issues raised in the Submission and the actions 
needed to remedy the problems identified.  In addition to this engagement and open 
communication with the OTLA, the Government of Honduras took the important step of 
launching a dialogue and holding regular meetings with representatives from unions and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) interested in the Submission.  While the OTLA welcomes 
the Honduran government’s efforts and engagement with civil society, there has not yet been 
measureable systemic improvement in Honduras to address the concerns raised.  
 
The report recommends consultations under Article 16.4 of the CAFTA-DR and a meeting of the 
CAFTA-DR Labor Affairs Council as appropriate next steps for the U.S. government to engage 
constructively with the Government of Honduras on these critical labor rights issues.  The United 
States believes that the development and implementation by the Government of Honduras and 
the U.S. government of a Monitoring and Action Plan based on the recommendations in this 
report and ongoing engagement with civil society would be an important step in addressing the 
concerns identified in this report and strengthening the protection of labor rights throughout 
Honduras. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 U.S. Submission 2012-01 (Honduras), Formal Public Submission, March 26, 2012 (Submission), available from: 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/HondurasSubmission2012.pdf. 
2
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), available from: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-
dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta.   
3
 71 Fed. Reg. 76691 (Dec. 21, 2006), available from: 
http://webapps.dol.gov/FederalRegister/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=12492. 
 ii 
 
Summary of U.S. Submission 2012-01 (Honduras) 
 
The Submission alleges that the Government of Honduras has violated its commitments under 
the CAFTA-DR Labor Chapter, including those under Article 16.2.1(a) not to "fail to effectively 
enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner 
affecting trade between the Parties."   
 
In large part, the Submission alleges that the Government of Honduras has failed to effectively 
enforce its labor laws as defined under CAFTA-DR Article16.8 with respect to: 
 the right of association;  
 the right to organize and bargain collectively;  
 the minimum age for the employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of 
the worst forms of child labor; and 
 acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and 
occupational safety and health.   
 
The Submission specifically asserts such failures with respect to seven factories in the apparel 
and auto parts manufacturing sectors, nine plantations or farms in the agricultural sector, and 
enterprises at the Port of Cortés.   
 
Findings 
 
The OTLA conducted a thorough and detailed review of all information obtained related to the 
allegations in the Submission, focusing the analysis on events after April 1, 2006, when the 
CAFTA-DR entered into force in Honduras.  The OTLA found evidence of labor law violations 
in nearly all of the cases in the Submission in which the identified companies remained in 
business as of the drafting of this report and has serious concerns regarding the Government of 
Honduras’s enforcement of its labor laws in response to evidence of such violations.4   
  
The OTLA review identified cross-cutting issues in the labor inspection process that undermine 
efforts by the Secretariat of Labor and Social Security (Secretaría de Trabajo y Seguridad 
Social, STSS) to enforce Honduran labor laws, as defined under CAFTA-DR.  While individual 
inspectors expressed a general willingness to execute their duties, the OTLA has serious 
concerns with respect to:  
 responding to inspection requests alleging labor law violations;  
 gaining access to worksites; 
 inspecting for all alleged, potential, or previously identified violations in a workplace; 
 calculating and imposing fines in a manner that effectively deters future violations; and, 
 ensuring enforcement of remediation orders.   
 
The OTLA found that these issues detrimentally impacted the STSS’s enforcement of labor laws 
in a number of cases. In particular, the labor inspectorate:   
                                                          
4
 Two companies identified in the Submission have since ceased operating.    
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 Did not appear to impose sanctions on the employer in 32 of the 33 instances in which an 
inspector was denied access to the worksite. 
 Did not appear to ensure, in at least 43 cases of unlawful dismissals of union leaders, that 
employers pay a fine equivalent to six months of the dismissed leaders’ salaries to the 
workers’ union, as required by the Labor Code.  
 Did not appear to investigate for violations of Labor Code provisions that protect unions 
and their members from anti-union discrimination and other retaliation in cases involving 
founding union members and union leaders who suddenly resigned, despite receiving 
complaints that the resignations were the result of employer pressure. 
 Does not appear to have a process to ensure that the negotiation and registration of 
collective pacts do not impair workers’ rights to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining.   
 Did not appear to enforce laws protecting legitimately organized independent unions in 
cases where employers used employer-dominated unions to undermine workers’ right to 
freely associate. 
 Did not appear to impose sanctions or verify remediation in nine of the ten cases in which 
the STSS confirmed a failure to pay the minimum wage. In the one case where a fine was 
imposed, the OTLA received documents from the STSS indicating that, although the fine 
had been collected, the minimum wage violation continues without remediation, 
potentially affecting hundreds of workers. 
 Did not appear to impose sanctions or verify remediation in any of the five agricultural 
enterprises where the OTLA found the STSS had identified occupational safety and 
health violations.   
 
The OTLA review also found evidence of the use of illegal child labor in two cases, as well as in 
numerous nation- and sector-wide reports.  This evidence raises concerns regarding the 
enforcement of Honduran labor laws related to the minimum age for work and the worst forms of 
child labor, especially in the agricultural sector.   
 
Recommendations 
 
According to the OTLA’s Procedural Guidelines for submissions, its public report shall include 
any recommendations made to the Secretary of Labor.
5
  
 
While the Government of Honduras has taken certain steps to address the concerns identified in 
this report, the OTLA has not seen measureable progress and important concerns remain. For 
example, many of the specific labor law violations identified during STSS inspections 
undertaken in September 2012 in 14 of the workplaces noted in the Submission have still not 
been remediated, and STSS inspection records indicate that in several instances inspectors did 
not address violations alleged in prior inspections and complaints, including in the Submission. 
 
                                                          
5
 71 Fed. Reg. 76691 (Dec. 21, 2006). 
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The recommendations set out seven core elements of a Monitoring and Action Plan with steps 
that include specific actions to address the underlying systemic labor law enforcement concerns 
discussed in this review.   
 
The recommendations are set forth with the hope that the Government of Honduras will build on 
its positive engagement with the OTLA during the submission review process and its dialogue 
with civil society to take the additional steps needed to resolve the issues addressed in this 
Report with respect to the enforcement of Honduran labor laws.  
Recommendations to the Government of Honduras  
The OTLA makes the following seven core recommendations to facilitate compliance by the 
Government of Honduras with its commitments under Chapter 16 (Labor) of CAFTA-DR. 
 
The Government of Honduras should ensure that STSS inspectors: 
1. respond to written and verbal requests for inspections, in accordance with the applicable 
laws and internal protocols;   
2. compel access to worksites and impose fines and notify Labor Courts when access is 
denied, in accordance with the applicable laws and internal protocols; 
3. investigate all known violations of law and, upon receipt of notice, all potential, alleged 
or previously identified violations, in accordance with the applicable laws and internal 
protocols;  
4. impose sanctions for labor law violations, in accordance with applicable laws, calculate 
fines that create a significant penalty to deter violations, and collect fines in a timely 
fashion; 
5. enforce their remediation orders and compel employer compliance; 
6. improve enforcement of laws related to freedom of association and collective bargaining; 
and 
7. improve enforcement of laws related to child labor. 
 
Recommendations to the Secretary of Labor 
 
The OTLA recommends to the Secretary of Labor that the U.S. government engage with the 
Government of Honduras to address the concerns identified in this report and the 
recommendations to the Government of Honduras set forth above, and that the U.S. government 
continue its cooperative engagement with the Government of Honduras to develop a Monitoring 
and Action Plan, with the intention to develop time-bound steps and benchmarks to measure 
progress, taking into consideration the accompanying recommended actions to address the 
underlying systemic problems.  
 
The OTLA recommends to the Secretary of Labor that the U.S. government initiate consultations 
through the contact points designated in the CAFTA-DR Labor Chapter under Article 16.4 to 
develop the Monitoring and Action Plan described above.  
 
The OTLA recommends to the Secretary of Labor that the U.S. government convene a meeting 
of the representatives from Honduras and the United States of the CAFTA-DR Labor Affairs 
 v 
 
Council to discuss the findings and recommendations of the report and the outcome of the 
consultations, at the level of Trade and Labor Ministers or their designees.  
 
The OTLA, in consultation with the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Department of State, 
will review the progress of this engagement and any efforts by the Government of Honduras to 
address the concerns identified in this report, within 12 months after the report’s publication, and 
will consider appropriate action under the CAFTA-DR, including a recommendation by OTLA 
to the Secretary of Labor that the United States request Cooperative Labor Consultations under 
Article 16.6 the Labor Chapter. 
 
 
 vi 
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I. Introduction  
 
Honduras signed the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR) on August 5, 2004, and the Agreement entered into force between the United 
States and Honduras on April 1, 2006.
7
  The CAFTA-DR Labor Chapter (Chapter 16) states that 
each Party shall designate an office within its labor ministry or equivalent entity to serve as a 
contact point with the other Parties and with the public.
8
  For the United States, the U.S. 
Department of Labor’s Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA) was designated as this contact 
point in a Federal Register notice published on December 21, 2006.
9
 
 
On March 26, 2012, the OTLA received a public submission under the Labor Chapter from the 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and 26 
Honduran unions and civil society organizations alleging violation of the Labor Chapter.
10
  U.S. 
Submission 2012-01 (Honduras) (“the Submission”) alleges that the Government of Honduras 
(GOH) violated its commitments under the Labor Chapter, including those under Articles 16.1, 
16.2.1, and 16.3. The Submission highlights 17 worksites spanning factories in the apparel and 
auto parts manufacturing sectors, plantations and farms in the agricultural sector, and enterprises 
at the Port of Cortés.   
The Submission also expresses concern regarding the establishment of a hiring scheme for 
temporary workers under the National Plan for Employment by Hours.
11
  In addition, the 
Submission alleges that the GOH has failed to investigate and prosecute violence and threats 
against trade unionists, noting that violence against trade unionists and the failure to fully 
investigate such violence can have a broad chilling effect on the exercise of workers’ rights. The 
OTLA does not make findings with respect to the issue of labor violence in this report of review; 
however, the United States Government (USG) will continue to engage extensively with the 
GOH on this issue.    
Under the Labor Chapter, the Parties reaffirm their obligations as members of the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) and their commitments under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up (1998) and commit to “strive to ensure that 
such labor principles and internationally recognized labor rights set forth in Article 16.8 are 
recognized and protected by its law”12 in Article 16.1.  In Article 16.2.1, each Party commits not 
to “fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or 
inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the date of entry into force of this 
Agreement.”13  Article 16.8 of the Labor Chapter defines “labor laws” as:  
                                                          
7
 Office of the United States Trade Representative, The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), available from: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-
dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta.   
8
 CAFTA-DR, Article 16.4.3.   
9
 71 Fed. Reg. 76691 (Dec. 21, 2006), available from: 
http://webapps.dol.gov/FederalRegister/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=12492.  
10
 U.S. Submission 2012-01 (Honduras), Formal Public Submission, March 26, 2012 (Submission), available from: 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/HondurasSubmission2012.pdf.  
11
 See: Annex 2 for the OTLA’s discussion of the National Plan for Employment by Hours on page 95. 
12
 CAFTA-DR, Article 16.1.1.   
13
 CAFTA-DR, Article 16.2.1(a). 
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a Party’s statutes or regulations, or provisions thereof, that are directly related to 
the following internationally recognized labor rights:  (a) the right of association; 
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (c) a prohibition on the use of 
any form of forced or compulsory labor; (d) a minimum age for the employment 
of children and the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor; 
and (e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of 
work, and occupational safety and health.
14
 
 
In Article 16.3, each Party commits to ensuring “that persons with a legally recognized interest 
under its law in a particular matter have appropriate access to tribunals for the enforcement of the 
Party’s labor laws…”15 
 
Under the Labor Chapter, each Party’s contact point shall provide for the submission, receipt, 
and consideration of communications on matters related to the Chapter and reviews such 
communications in accordance with domestic procedures.
16
  The same Federal Register notice 
that designated the OTLA as the U.S. contact point also sets out the Procedural Guidelines that 
the OTLA follows for the receipt and review of public submissions.  According to the definitions 
contained in the Procedural Guidelines, a “submission” means “a communication from the public 
containing specific allegations, accompanied by relevant supporting information, that another 
Party has failed to meet its commitments or obligations arising under a labor chapter.”17 
 
On May 14, 2012, the OTLA accepted the Submission for review, stating that it met the criteria 
for acceptance.  The OTLA announced its decision to accept the Submission in a Federal 
Register notice on May 22, 2012.
18
 
 
Under the Procedural Guidelines, the OTLA shall issue a public report within 180 days of the 
acceptance of a submission for review, unless circumstances as determined by the OTLA require 
an extension of time.  The Guidelines further state that the report shall include a summary of any 
findings and recommendations.
19
  Due to the scope of the submission and the large amount of 
information received from the GOH and stakeholders, on November 2, 2012, the OTLA notified 
the GOH and the submitters that it was extending the period for review and announced this 
decision in a Federal Register notice published on November 7, 2012.
20
    
 
The OTLA conducted a review to gather information to better understand and publicly report on 
the issues raised by the Submission as they relate to the GOH’s commitments under the CAFTA-
DR Labor Chapter.  In doing so, the OTLA consulted with the U.S. Department of State (State) 
and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).  The OTLA submitted questions related 
to the Submission to the contact point at the Honduran Secretariat of Labor and Social Security 
(Secretaría de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, STSS) and engaged with the Embassy of Honduras in 
                                                          
14
 CAFTA-DR, Article 16.8. 
15
 CAFTA-DR, Article 16.3.1. 
16
 CAFTA-DR, Article 16.4.3. 
17
 71 Fed. Reg. 76691 (Dec. 21, 2006).  
18
 77 Fed. Reg. 30329 (May 22, 2012), available from: http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/20120522.pdf.  
19
 71 Fed. Reg. 76691 (Dec. 21, 2006).  
20
 77 Fed. Reg. 66870 (Nov. 7, 2012), available from: http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/pdf/20121107.pdf. 
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Washington, D.C.  The OTLA thoroughly reviewed approximately 1,500 documents provided by 
the submitters, employers, and the GOH.  In addition, the OTLA undertook four missions to 
Honduras (July 9-20, and December 12-14, 2012, and May 20-21 and October 23-25, 2013) to 
interview relevant stakeholders and to gather additional information on the issues raised in the 
Submission.  During these missions, representatives from the U.S. Department of Labor 
(USDOL) and the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, met with officials from the GOH, 
employers, employer associations, workers, unions, and judges.  USDOL officials interviewed 
approximately 100 workers individually or, in a limited number of cases, in groups of two to 
three; managers from all the companies named in the Submission that were still in operation;
21
  
and eight inspectors from the STSS. In all cases, no one was present other than the USDOL 
officials and interviewees.  
 
II. OTLA’s Factual Findings 
 
This section provides a detailed review of the OTLA’s findings with respect to the issues raised 
in the Submission. Unless referenced specifically as a Submission allegation in this section, the 
information herein is derived from the OTLA’s fact-finding efforts, including its review of 
documentation and interviews with relevant parties.  
 
Section A addresses the OTLA’s findings regarding the Submission’s allegations related to 
specific factories in the manufacturing sector: (1) Kyungshin-Lear; (2) Dickies de Honduras; (3) 
Ceiba Textiles; (4) A.tion; (5) Pinehurst; (6) Petralex; and (7) Hanesbrands.   
 
Section B addresses the OTLA’s findings regarding the Submission’s allegations related to 
specific plantations or farms in the agricultural sector: (1) Honduran Foundation for Agricultural 
Research; (2) Sur Agrícola de Honduras; (3) Las Tres Hermanas; (4) Okra Sur; (5) 
Agroexportadora Dome; (6) Agripac; (7) La Pradera; (8) Plantas Ornamentales; and (9) 
Azucarera la Grecia.  
 
Section C addresses the OTLA’s findings regarding the Submission’s allegations related to 
enterprises at the Port of Cortés involving the following: (1) subcontracted stevedores; (2) 
security workers; (3) fork lift operators, container checkers, and planners; and (4) the September 
2012 inspection at the Port.  
 
A. Manufacturing Sector (Apparel and Auto Parts) 
 
1. Kyungshin-Lear Honduras Electrical Distribution Systems 
 
Kyungshin-Lear Honduras Electrical Distribution Systems (Kyungshin-Lear) is an auto harness 
factory located in San Pedro Sula, Honduras.  It is a joint venture between the U.S.-based Lear 
Corporation and the Korea-based Kyungshin Corporation.  It manufactures parts for Hyundai 
and Kia cars.
22
  The Submission alleges that the GOH failed to enforce labor laws related to anti-
                                                          
21
 The OTLA did not meet with management of the shipping companies that employ stevedores except for Seaboard.  
22
 OTLA interview with Kyungshin-Lear management, July 18, 2012.  
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union retaliation, including dismissal of union leaders, as well as acceptable conditions of work 
at Kyungshin-Lear.
23
  
 
Workers at Kyungshin-Lear began organizing a union with the help of the General Workers’ 
Confederation (Central General de Trabajadores, CGT) in May 2011 and officially founded the 
Honduras Electrical Distribution Systems Kyungshin-Lear Workers’ Union (Sindicato de 
Trabajadores de la Empresa Honduras Electrical Systems S. de R.L. Kyungshin-Lear, 
SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR) on July 16, 2011.
24
  In September 2011, union members presented 
documentation of the union’s founding to the STSS and requested that an inspector accompany 
workers to notify the company.
25
 That notification formally triggers protections (protección del 
estado) for the union’s founding members under Article 517 of the Labor Code, prohibiting their 
dismissal, transfer, or demotion absent a finding of just cause by the respective authority while 
the union’s legal personality (personería jurídica) is pending before the STSS.26,27  While 
sometimes performed in tandem with union founding, filing for legal personality is a second and 
distinct step required to legally establish a union.  
 
On September 28, 2011, an STSS inspector attempted to notify the company of the union’s 
founding and investigate the company’s vacation policy.28 The security guard denied the 
inspector access, claiming that the Director of Human Resources, who was out of the country, 
was the only person able to respond to labor-related complaints.
29 
 According to the Submission, 
the worker who accompanied the inspector was called into the human resources office the same 
day and threatened by management with dismissal for attempting to form a union.
30
 The next 
day, the inspector again attempted to deliver the notification but a security guard again denied 
him entry because the Director of Human Resources was abroad.
31  
A security guard once again 
denied the inspector access on October 4, 2011, because the Director of Human Resources was 
again not present.
32 
 On October 5, 2011, the inspector submitted a request to the Regional Head 
of Labor Inspections that the legally-established fine be applied for impeding a labor inspector’s 
work on three separate occasions.
33   
The GOH provided no evidence that the STSS applied the 
                                                          
23
 Submission, pages 20-23.  
24
 Submission, page 20; SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR request for labor inspection at Kyungshin-Lear, February 21, 
2012; SITRAKYUNSGHINLEAR founding document, July 16, 2011.  
25
 The CGT requested an inspection in writing regarding Kyungshin-Lear’s allegedly unlawful vacation policy on 
September 22, 2011. Although the inspection request was limited to the vacation policy issue, both government and 
civil society have identified the practice of requesting an unrelated inspection on paper and simultaneously verbally 
requesting that the inspector deliver a notification, so as to protect nascent unions.  Submission, page 20; CGT 
request for labor inspection at Kyungshin Lear, September 22, 2011. 
26
 The OTLA consulted the 50
th
 anniversary edition of the Labor Code of Honduras. Código de Trabajo, Legislación 
Laboral Vigente en Honduras, Edición Quincuagésimo Aniversario 1959-2009, published January 27, 2012 
(hereinafter “Labor Code”). See Annex 3(a) on page 96 for the full text of Labor Code Articles cited in this report.  
27
 Labor Code, Article 517. 
28
 STSS order designating an inspector to notify Kyungshin Lear of SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR’s foundation, 
September 28, 2011; STSS report of inspection at Kyungshin Lear, September 28, 2011. 
29
 STSS report of inspection at Kyungshin Lear, September 28, 2011. The CGT accompanied the labor inspector 
during the September 28 and 29 and October 4 inspections and alleged that the management was in Mexico in the 
Submission (page 21), though the inspection reports simply say “out of the country.” 
30
 Submission, page 21.  
31
 STSS report of inspection at Kyungshin Lear, September 29, 2011.  
32
 STSS report of inspection at Kyungshin Lear, October 5, 2011. 
33
 STSS report of inspection at Kyungshin Lear, October 5, 2011.  
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recommended fine, ever notified the courts of the obstruction of a labor inspector, sought the 
assistance of the authorities or police to gain access to the premises, or made any further attempt 
to enforce the law regarding inspectors’ access to worksites.34,35   
 
In December 2011, SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR members went to the STSS in Tegucigalpa to 
request legal personality (personería jurídica) for the union.
36  
In its application, 
SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR communicated the identities of the members of its elected union 
leadership committee to the STSS, as required by law.
37,38 
Elected union leaders receive 
protection under Article 516 of the Labor Code, which prohibits employers from dismissing 
union leadership without a prior finding by the Labor Court of just cause, from the moment of 
their election until six months after they finish their terms (fuero sindical).
39 
 By January 26, 
2012, the company had dismissed four of the nine SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR leadership 
committee members, citing “reductions in personnel,” without any prior court approval.40  One of 
the four dismissed leaders told the OTLA that the Human Resources Director informed the three 
other fired union leaders that management had received a list of SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR 
members from the STSS in Tegucigalpa, threatened to blacklist the union leaders, and told them 
they were dismissed for making bad decisions.
41  
 
 
On January 27, 2012, the Minister of Labor recognized the union’s legal personality and signed 
the union’s legal registration, retroactively triggering from the date of the leadership committee 
members’ election their fuero sindical protection under Labor Code Article 516.42  The Labor 
Code requires the company to pay a fine equivalent to six months of fired union leaders’ salaries 
to the union.  The individual unionist still retains their private right to severance, and this does 
not affect the STSS’s duty to impose the fine.43   
 
                                                          
34 
Labor Code, Article 617(b). 
35
 The OTLA requested information from the GOH on their efforts to gain access or enforce the union’s protección 
del estado protection. In response to a question about the steps they took to gain access to Kyungshin-Lear to deliver 
the protección del estado notification, the GOH noted that they applied a fine in May 2011, but this precedes the 
attempts to deliver notice of protección del estado and the inspector’s recommendation that a fine be applied. GOH 
answers to OTLA’s specific questions, page 13, August 22, 2012. For additional discussion of the legal 
requirements of and tools provided to inspectors to gain access to facilities to carry out their duties, see the section 
on Access to Worksites on page 59. 
36
 SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR application for legal personality, December 14, 2011; STSS receipt for 
SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR application for legal personality, December 19, 2011. 
37
 SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR application for legal personality, December 14, 2011. 
38
 Labor Code, Article 481. 
39
 Unions are required to notify the STSS of the change in leadership and the STSS then certifies the leaders as being 
protected by fuero sindical; however, the protection against dismissal applies from the moment a leader is elected. 
Article 516 states that union leaders are protected from dismissal from the time of their election until six months 
after their term expires, and they are required under Article 481 to submit an application to the STSS in order to be 
certified as protected by fuero sindical. Article 510(c) of the Labor Code of Honduras requires, inter alia, that union 
leaders be employed for at least six months prior to their election to a union leadership committee.  
40
 Termination letters for ____________ and ___________, January 26, 2012 (names of individual workers withheld 
for privacy); OTLA interview with Kyungshin-Lear worker, July 2012. 
41
 OTLA interview with Kyungshin-Lear worker, July 2012. 
42
 STSS certification of SITRAKYUNSHINLEAR legal registration, January 27, 2012; STSS publication of 
SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR legal personality, February 7, 2012; Labor Code, Article 516. 
43
 Labor Code, Article 516. 
 6 
 
Three of the dismissed leaders eventually accepted severance.  One has taken her case to a Labor 
Court to secure reinstatement and back pay after the STSS attempted to facilitate two 
conciliation sessions.
44
  The company failed to send a representative to any of the sessions.
45 
 
The STSS summons for the conciliation meetings note that the company’s appearance is required 
by law.  If the company fails to attend, the STSS shall demand its attendance through the 
corresponding judicial process.
46 
However, the OTLA found no evidence that the STSS sought to 
have the labor court compel the company’s attendance.  
 
The company dismissed a fifth member of the leadership committee on February 10, 2012, again 
without prior judicial approval.
47 
 As a member of the leadership committee, he was protected by 
fuero sindical. According to the Submission, the Director of Human Resources requested that 
leader’s resignation in the days prior to his dismissal and then demanded the names of workers 
sympathetic to the union and other information about the union’s activities in exchange for his 
severance payment.
48  
     
 
On February 21, 2012, the CGT and one of the five dismissed union leaders requested that the 
STSS investigate the dismissals of the union leadership committee and threats of blacklisting and 
that the STSS officially notify the company of the union’s registration.49  When the OTLA asked 
the GOH in August 2012 for updates on whether the STSS investigated the company for the 
dismissals of union leaders, the GOH responded that they had no records of complaints related to 
freedom of association in this case.
50  
The OTLA requested all relevant information from the 
GOH, but it provided no evidence that the STSS ever applied a sanction for the dismissals of the 
SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR leaders with fuero sindical protection.
51
 
 
On February 27, a month after granting SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR legal personality, the STSS 
notified the company of the union’s establishment.52  The STSS scheduled a conciliation session 
between the company and the union for March 7, 2012, to discuss labor concerns.  When an 
inspector attempted to deliver the summons for the session to the company, a security guard 
denied him access and left the summons at the factory entrance.  He noted the denial in his 
                                                          
44
 OTLA interview with Kyungshin-Lear worker, July 2012. 
45
 OTLA interview with Kyungshin-Lear worker, July 2012; STSS summons for Kyungshin-Lear to appear for 
conciliation, March 24, 2012; STSS summons for Kyungshin-Lear to appear for conciliation, April 17, 2012.  
46
 The summons reads “Se le advierte que su comparecencia es obligatoria de no comparecer se le demandara por 
la vía judicial correspondiente.” (“You are advised that your attendance is obligatory; and; should you not attend, 
your attendance will be demanded through the corresponding judicial process.”); STSS summons for Kyungshin-
Lear to appear for conciliation, March 24, 2012; STSS summons for Kyungshin-Lear to appear for conciliation, 
April 17, 2012. 
47
 Termination letter for _________, February 10, 2012.  
48
 Submission, page 22. 
49
 The STSS is the responsible GOH authority for overseeing compliance with all labor laws, including those 
granting the right of freedom of association. SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR request for labor inspection at Kyungshin-
Lear, February 21, 2012. 
50
 GOH answers to OTLA’s specific questions, page 14, August 22, 2012. 
51
 The OTLA requested information from the GOH on their efforts to impose a sanction for the dismissal of 
SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR leaders with fuero sindical protection. GOH answers to OTLA’s specific questions, 
pages 13-14, August 22, 2012. 
52
 GOH answers to OTLA’s specific questions, page 14, August 22, 2012. 
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report.
53  
The company did not attend the conciliation session and the STSS provided no evidence 
to the OTLA that it sought to have the labor court compel the company’s attendance.54 
In March, SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR elected new leaders to replace the four dismissed 
leadership committee members who had accepted their severance.
55
  The Submission alleges that 
on March 12, 2012, the company dismissed three of the newly elected union leaders.
56
  It is 
unclear whether the union notified the STSS of this round of dismissals.   
 
In June, the union held an election to replace these three most recently dismissed leaders.
57 
On 
June 13, factory staff denied access to an STSS inspector attempting to verify the tenure of the 
newly elected union leaders (constancia de antigüedad) to ensure that they qualified for their 
positions under Honduran law and thus fuero sindical protection.
58
 
 
In addition to the incidents discussed above in which Kyungshin-Lear staff denied STSS 
inspectors access, an inspector reported that Kyungshin-Lear denied him access twice on May 
18, 2011, and once on May 20, 2011, after which he recommended a fine for such denial.
59 
 The 
GOH stated that the STSS fined the company 5,000 HNL (US $240);
60
 however, the supporting 
documentation shows only that STSS in Tegucigalpa received the inspector’s fine 
recommendation.
61 
 The GOH again did not provide any evidence that the STSS sanctioned the 
company for those actions preventing inspector access, notified the relevant Labor Court of the 
denials of access, sought the assistance of authorities or police to gain access, or made any 
further attempt to enforce the law regarding inspectors’ access to worksites.62    
 
Four months after the OTLA began its review, on September 11, 2012, the STSS attempted to 
conduct a self-initiated, general inspection (inspección de oficio) at Kyungshin-Lear, but the 
inspectors decided to cancel the inspection because upon their arrival at the worksite, they were 
informed that no high-level managers were present.
63 
 That same day, the union requested that an 
STSS inspector deliver a request to begin collective bargaining (pliego de peticiones) to the 
company.  The STSS returned the next day, September 12, and conducted the general inspection 
                                                          
53
 STSS summons for Kyungshin-Lear to appear for conciliation, March 6, 2012 (this document is incorrectly dated 
March 6, 2011). 
54
 OTLA interview with Kyungshin-Lear worker, July 2012.  
55
 OTLA interview with Kyungshin-Lear worker, July 2012. 
56
 Submission, page 22.  
57
 OTLA interview with Kyungshin-Lear worker, July 2012. 
58
 STSS report regarding SITRAKYUNSGHINLEAR application for registration of leadership committee, June 13, 
2012. 
59
 STSS report of attempted inspection at Kyungshin-Lear, May 23, 2011. 
60
 The OTLA used the U.S. Treasury Department’s Bureau of Fiscal Service current exchange rate of 20.82 HNL to 
US $1, last updated September 30, 2014, available from: 
http://fiscal.treasury.gov/fsreports/rpt/treasRptRateExch/currentRates.htm.  
61
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, page 13, August 22, 2012. The volumes of documents given to 
the OTLA by the GOH did not include any information on follow-up action to the inspector’s recommendation.  
62
 The OTLA requested all relevant documents from the GOH. GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, 
page 13, August 22, 2012; Notice to Kyungshin-Lear Human Resources Manager from the STSS Inspector General, 
Oficio 264/IGT/2011, June 16, 2011.  
63
 A general inspection is a whole-workplace labor inspection (not including Occupational Safety and Health), 
usually carried out by a team of inspectors. The STSS can determine on its own to carry out a general inspection, or 
order one as a result of complaints of a general nature at a particular company.  STSS record of inspection at 
Kyungshin-Lear, September 11, 2012. 
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they intended to conduct the preceding day but did not deliver the union’s collective bargaining 
request.
64  
During the inspection, the STSS found that Kyungshin-Lear treated workers in an 
abusive manner and failed to provide vacation in accordance with the law, in addition to denying 
access to inspectors in the past.
65 
 The STSS did not deliver the SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR 
request for bargaining until November 1, 2012, seven weeks after the union made its request to 
the STSS.
66  
The STSS reported that the factory management has subsequently refused to 
negotiate and denied access to STSS inspectors attempting to verify that the five-day deadline to 
begin negotiating has indeed passed, but did not provide further information regarding any 
follow-up action with respect to the denial of access.
67,68
 
 
In December 2012, the OTLA interviewed an attorney from the Solidarity Center in San Pedro 
Sula who had reviewed the information provided to the STSS by workers during the September 
12, 2012, inspection.  She stated that, in addition to the labor law violations noted above, the 
records of worker interviews conducted by the STSS also included allegations that the company 
was retaliating against union leaders.
69 
During its review, the OTLA met with workers who 
confirmed the labor law violations identified by the STSS and also reported additional unlawful 
conduct, including anti-union retaliation;
 
punishment for illness, including docking more time for 
going to the doctor than was taken in practice and directing the company-run medical center to 
deny approval to leave work to ill or injured workers; being denied breaks for bathroom use;
 
and 
improper payment for overtime hours.
70
 
 
In December 2012, workers also reported to the OTLA that management escalated anti-union 
activity in the second half of 2012, including by prohibiting workers from going outside during 
breaks, effectively preventing union leaders from conversing with workers without management 
present; switching some union leaders from day shifts to night shifts; and pressuring union 
members to resign and accept severance.
71
  Workers also reported that management pressured 
workers prior to their interviews with STSS inspectors not to speak freely to inspectors (for 
example, telling workers to be careful about what they said to the inspectors) and that 
management prevented some workers from speaking to or approaching the inspectors during the 
inspection through the use of a yellow police tape barricade around the interview room.
72
   
 
In January 2013, management at the Lear Corporation in the United States stated to the OTLA 
that all of the allegations in the Submission, with the exception of those related to vacation pay, 
were untrue but declined to provide the OTLA with corroborating evidence despite OTLA’s 
                                                          
64
 STSS record of inspection at Kyungshin-Lear, September 11, 2012; OTLA interview with Maria Elena Sabillon, 
Solidarity Center, and Evangelina Argueta, CGT, December 13, 2012. 
65
 STSS report on follow-up inspections at workplaces named in the CAFTA-DR complaint, December 18, 2012. 
66
 OTLA meeting with STSS officials, May 20, 2013; OTLA interview with Maria Elena Sabillon, Solidarity 
Center, and Evangelina Argueta, CGT, December 13, 2012; see also: General Report on Inspections of Companies 
in Relation to CAFTA-DR, undated, received May 20, 2013.  
67
 Labor Code, Article 791.  
68
 General Report on Inspections of Companies in Relation to CAFTA-DR, undated, received May 20, 2013. 
69
 OTLA interview with Maria Elena Sabillon, Solidarity Center, December 14, 2012. 
70
 OTLA interviews with Kyungshin-Lear workers, July 2012. 
71
 OTLA interview with Kyungshin-Lear worker, December 2012. 
72
 OTLA interview with Evangelina Argueta, CGT, December 13, 2012; OTLA interview with Kyungshin-Lear 
worker, December 14, 2012.  
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request for such information, citing privacy concerns.
73 
 Additionally, Lear Corporation 
management denied to the OTLA having any knowledge of any union activity at the Kyungshin-
Lear plant in Honduras.
74  
 
 
On March 4, 2013, the SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR leadership committee met with Kyungshin-
Lear management, including the Plant Manager and Human Resources Director.
75
  The union 
leadership committee wrote a follow-up letter to Kyungshin-Lear management to set a date to 
begin the collective bargaining process, but the company did not respond.
76
  Kyungshin-Lear 
management has asserted that SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR is not legally constituted and that it 
therefore will not negotiate with the union, despite numerous assurances from the STSS and the 
Minister of Labor that the union is, in fact, legally constituted.
77  
 
 
On April 24, 2013, Kyungshin-Lear dismissed all nine members of the leadership committee 
without the required prior authorization from the Labor Court, as well as approximately 200 
additional workers.
78 
 High-ranking officials from the STSS, including the Minister of Labor, 
were in San Pedro Sula and met with the dismissed union leaders the same day.
79  
It appears that 
the union elected another leadership committee after the April 2013 dismissals, and in September 
2013, the company reportedly pressured two of the newly elected union leaders to resign and was 
allegedly harassing the union’s president.80  
 
In August 2013, the STSS conducted a general inspection at Kyungshin-Lear and found that the 
company was in violation of ILO Conventions 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organize) and 98 (Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining) for illegally dismissing 
the nine members of the union leadership committee in April 2013; improper payment of 
vacation, overtime, and severance pay; and unduly restrictive bathroom policies.
81
 On September 
25, 2013, the STSS ordered the company to pay 12,327,547 HNL (US $592,101) in back wages, 
allow workers to undertake union activities, and change its policies on bathroom use, but did not 
order the company to pay the union the equivalent of six months of the dismissed union leaders’ 
salaries as required by the Labor Code.
 82 
The same day, an STSS inspector delivered a 
notification to the company that it had illegally obstructed the work of STSS inspectors by 
                                                          
73
 OTLA phone interview with Lear management, January 16, 2013.  The STSS has indicated, however, that 
Kyungshin-Lear provided it with documents showing it had corrected the problem with vacation pay. General 
Report on Inspections of Companies in Relation to CAFTA-DR, undated, received May 20, 2013.   
74
 OTLA phone interview with Lear management, January 16, 2013.  
75
 Letter from Kyungshin-Lear General Manager Gustavo Saucedo to SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR, March 4, 2013; 
Meeting minutes signed by Kyungshin-Lear management and SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR leaders, March 4, 2013; 
Follow-up letter from SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR leaders to Kyungshin-Lear management, March 6, 2013.  
76
 OTLA meeting with SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR president, May 20, 2013.  
77
 STSS, Presentation to Kyungshin-Lear Management, “Obtención de personalidad jurídica,” September 11, 2013. 
78
 Dismissal letters of five SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR leadership committee members and three additional workers, 
April 24, 2013; Follow-up Commission meeting, May 20, 2013, statement by Evangelina Argueta. 
79
 OTLA meeting with STSS officials, May 20, 2013.  
80
 OTLA meeting with Maria Elena Sabillon, Solidarity Center, and Evangelina Argueta, CGT, October 23, 2013. 
81
 Under Honduran law, ratified international treaties are self-executing and can be directly enforced. Honduras 
ratified both ILO Conventions 87 and 98 on June 27, 1956. See: Constitution of Honduras, Chapter III, Article 16. 
STSS notification report of inspection at Kyungshin-Lear, September 25, 2013.  
82
 STSS notification report of inspection at Kyungshin-Lear, September 25, 2013.  
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denying access to the factory on June 10, July 9, and August 5, 2013.
83
  The company was given 
three business days to remedy the violations.
84
  In June 2014, the regional STSS office in San 
Pedro Sula reported to the U.S. Embassy that it was in the process of notifying the company of a 
fine as the company had lost its appeal against the findings of unlawful conduct.
85
 
 
Kyungshin-Lear continued in 2014 to dismiss union leaders without prior judicial approval, most 
recently in May 2014, when it dismissed the three remaining leaders elected after the April 2013 
dismissals.
86  
The company did attend STSS-ordered conciliation sessions after the U.S. 
Ambassador to Honduras notified the company herself of the summonses.
87
 The dismissed union 
leaders reported that they accepted severance from the company at the conciliation sessions, 
rather than pursuing legal cases for reinstatement, due to a sense of futility with the STSS and 
Labor Court processes for petitioning for reinstatement.
88
  
 
The submitters reported to the OTLA that since 2011, Kyungshin-Lear has dismissed every 
SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR union leader ever elected without following the steps required to do 
so legally.
89 
The union reports that the company continues to refuse to bargain with the union and 
the company has reportedly failed to send a representative to two STSS-led mediation sessions 
regarding bargaining.
90 
  
 
2. Dickies de Honduras, S.A.  
 
Dickies de Honduras (Dickies) is an apparel manufacturing plant in Choloma, Honduras.  The 
factory is owned and operated by the U.S.-based Williamson-Dickies Manufacturing Company 
and produces apparel under the Dickies label.
91
  The Submission alleges that the GOH failed to 
enforce labor laws related to freedom of association when the company dismissed workers 
attempting to unionize on three different occasions.
92
  
 
Workers began organizing the Dickies of Honduras Workers’ Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores 
de la Empresa Dickies de Honduras, SITEDIKHOSA) in May 1998.
93 
 A security guard denied 
access to the inspector attempting to verify the tenure of the union leadership committee 
(constancia de antigüedad), but the STSS still formally granted legal personality to 
                                                          
83
 STSS notification report of inspection at Kyungshin-Lear, September 25, 2013. 
84
 STSS notification report of inspection at Kyungshin-Lear, September 25, 2013. 
85
 US Government Official meeting with STSS San Pedro Sula Regional Director Bessy Lara, June 11, 2014.  
86
 US Government Official meetings with Maria Elena Sabillon, Solidarity Center; Evangelina Argueta, CGT; three 
SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR members; and Kyungshin-Lear management, June 10, 2014.  
87
 Email from Ambassador Kubiske to Kyungshin-Lear management, May 25, 2014; US Embassy Official meeting 
with Kyungshin-Lear management, June 10, 2014.  
88
 US Government Official meetings with three SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR members, June 10, 2014. 
89
 OTLA meeting with Maria Elena Sabillon, Solidarity Center, and Evangelina Argueta, CGT, October 23, 2013. 
90
 OTLA meeting with Maria Elena Sabillon, Solidarity Center, and Evangelina Argueta, CGT, October 23, 2013; 
US Government Official meetings with Maria Elena Sabillon, Solidarity Center, and Evangelina Argueta, CGT, 
June 10, 2014. 
91
 Dickies video presentation to the OTLA, July 18, 2012. 
92
 Submission, pages 11 and 12.  
93
 SITEDIKHOSA record of union foundation and election of provisional leadership committee, May 3, 1998.  
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SITEDIKHOSA at that time.
94
  The union organizer involved in the founding of SITEDIKHOSA 
stated that shortly after the founding of SITEDIKHOSA, the company dismissed the majority of 
the founding union members, and workers abandoned the organizing effort until 2006.
95 
 
 
In May 2006, an organizer for the Unified Confederation of Workers of Honduras 
(Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores de Honduras, CUTH) requested copies of the 
SITEDIKHOSA bylaws from the STSS to assist Dickies workers with the reactivation of the 
SITEDIKHOSA union.
96  
In October 2006, the STSS published notice of the legal personality of 
the SITEDIKHOSA union.
97
  SITEDIKHOSA members elected a new six-member leadership 
committee on November 10.
98 
  
 
Documents provided by the submitters show that on November 28, factory staff denied STSS 
inspectors access to the facility to deliver notification of the union’s reactivation and the 
identities of the union leaders protected by fuero sindical.
99  
When the OTLA requested that the 
GOH explain what actions the STSS had taken to compel entry after STSS inspectors were 
denied access, the GOH responded that it had not found anything in its files related to this case 
and could not provide any evidence that it had imposed a fine or notified the courts of the denial, 
as the Labor Code requires.
100 
  
 
When the factory staff denied the STSS inspector access on November 28, three of the union 
leaders themselves informed a manager of the leadership committee’s protected status.101  
Dickies workers alleged that management interrogated workers regarding their union 
membership at that time.
102  
The company immediately dismissed the entire union leadership 
committee without prior approval from the court.
103 
 The company also dismissed other union 
members, including some who had witnessed the notification.
104
  Dismissals began on November 
28, 2006 and continued for approximately two weeks.
105  
 
 
The STSS offered to mediate the conflict between the dismissed union leaders and Dickies, and 
on November 29, issued a summons for management to appear at a conciliation session.
106  
                                                          
94
 STSS Chief Inspector’s Certification of Inspection Report, May 12, 1998.  Certification of SITEDIKHOSA Legal 
Personality, September 23, 1998. 
95
 OTLA interview with SITEDIKHOSA organizer, July 2012. 
96
 Letter from CUTH to STSS requesting copies of SITRADIKHOSA bylaws, May 25, 2006. 
97
 La Gaceta, No. 31,138, Sección B, Avisos Legales, October 26, 2006; No. 31,139, October 27, 2006; No. 31,140, 
October 28, 2006. 
98
 SITEDHIKOSA document certifying election of leadership committee, November 10, 2006. 
99
 STSS report of inspection at Dickies, November 28, 2006. 
100
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, page 5, August 22, 2012. 
101
 STSS report of inspection at Dickies, November 28, 2006. 
102
 STSS report of inspection at Dickies, November 28, 2006. 
103
 Dickies termination letter, November 28, 2007; STSS report of inspection at Dickies, November 28, 2006; press 
release in solidarity with SITEDIKHOSA by the Federation of Democratic Unions of Honduras (Federación de 
Sindicatos Democráticos de Honduras, FESITRADEH) addressed to STSS and the Honduran Association of 
Manufacturers (Asociación Hondureña de Maquiladores, AHM), December 4, 2006 (OTLA cannot confirm that the 
complaint was actually delivered to the STSS or AHM).  
104
 Press release in solidarity with SITEDIKHOSA by FESITRADEH addressed to STSS and the AHM, December 
4, 2006 (OTLA cannot confirm that the complaint was actually delivered to the STSS or AHM).  
105
 OTLA reviewed numerous termination letters of SITEDHIKOSA members.  
106
 STSS summons for Dickies to appear at December 14, 2006 conciliation, November 29, 2006.  
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Dickies management stated to the OTLA that it never received such a summons and that Dickies 
does not keep any human resources records for longer than five years.
107
  When the OTLA 
requested information from the GOH about the STSS’s efforts to compel the company to attend 
the conciliation, the GOH indicated that it had not found anything in its files related to any such 
conciliation.
108
 
 
On December 4, an STSS inspector attempted to investigate the dismissals and to notify the 
company of the union’s reactivation and identities of the union’s leaders protected from 
dismissal by fuero sindical.
109
 Factory staff denied him access, though two police officers 
accompanied the inspector to the worksite.
110 
 The OTLA requested that the GOH provide all 
evidence of the STSS’s efforts to enforce fuero sindical in connection with the November 2006 
dismissals, but the GOH indicated that it had not found anything in its files related to this case.
111  
 
 
The union organizer apparently requested inspections regarding compliance with laws protecting 
freedom of association at Dickies on at least two occasions in December 2006 and early January 
2007.
112 
Although the submitters provided the OTLA with copies of the December and January 
requests they sent to the STSS, the GOH reported that it had no records of these inspection 
requests.
113
  The Submission alleges that the dismissed workers accepted severance payments 
from the company and did not seek reinstatement and back pay because they felt they were left 
with no alternative.
114
 
 
As part of its effort to inspect companies named in the Submission, on September 11, 2012, the 
STSS conducted a general inspection of the Dickies factory.
115  
In a follow-up report the STSS 
noted that it found no labor law violations at the company.
116
 Although the STSS was aware of 
the allegations included in the Submission regarding dismissals of protected unionists at Dickies, 
the STSS did not investigate compliance with relevant laws on freedom of association, including 
laws related to illegal dismissals.
117 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
107
 OTLA interview with Dickies management, July 18, 2012. 
108
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, page 6, August 22, 2012. 
109
 STSS report of inspection at Dickies, December 5, 2006. 
110
 STSS report of inspection at Dickies, December 5, 2006. 
111
 The OTLA requested all evidence of efforts to enforce fuero sindical, including the STSS response to the 
company denying inspectors access just a week before. GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, pages 6 and 
7, August 22, 2012. 
112
 SITEDIKHOSA request for inspection at Dickies, December 11, 2006; SITEDHIKOSA request for inspection at 
Dickies, January 3, 2007 (note that one request was on an STSS form and the other was a letter addressed to 
Director Rosales, but neither has a receipt stamp from the STSS). 
113
 GOH answers to OTLA’s specific questions, August 22, 2012.  
114
 Submission, page 11. 
115
 STSS record of inspection at Dickies, September 11, 2012; STSS report on follow-up inspections at workplaces 
named in the CAFTA-DR complaint, December 18, 2012. 
116
 STSS report on follow-up inspections at workplaces named in the CAFTA-DR complaint, December 18, 2012. 
117
 OTLA meeting with STSS officials, May 20, 2013; see also: General Report on Inspections of Companies in 
Relation to CAFTA-DR, undated, received May 20, 2013. 
 13 
 
3. Ceiba Textiles S. de R.L. 
 
Ceiba Textiles is a garment factory located in Santa Barbara, Honduras, in the Green Valley 
Industrial Park.  It is owned and operated by U.S.-based Delta Apparel and manufactures apparel 
under Delta and Wal-Mart labels.
118 
 The Submission alleges that the GOH failed to enforce 
labor laws related to freedom of association when the company coerced union members to resign 
from their jobs.
119
   
 
An STSS-approved agreement between the company and non-unionized workers, known as a 
collective pact, has been in effect at the factory since 2008.
120 
 Under the collective pact, a 
coalition of worker representatives meets regularly with management to negotiate benefits and 
working conditions.
121 
 
 
On February 15, 2010, 46 workers founded the Ceiba Textiles Workers’ Union (Sindicato de 
Trabajadores de la Empresa Ceiba Textiles, SITRAMCETEX), a union affiliated with the 
national-level Independent Federation of Workers of Honduras (Federación Independiente de 
Trabajadores de Honduras, FITH) and the CUTH.
122 
  
 
On March 2, 2010, FITH requested STSS assistance to notify Ceiba Textiles of the union’s 
founding.
123 
 On March 10, 2010, an STSS inspector went to the factory to carry out the 
notification; the Human Resources Manager at Ceiba Textiles received the document but refused 
to sign the notification.
124 
 The same day, the STSS issued a certificate of protección del estado 
to the 46 founding members of SITRAMCETEX.
125,126
 
 
On March 4, 2010, the coalition of worker representatives under the collective pact formally 
requested to negotiate severance for workers who voluntarily resign.
127 
 A meeting between the 
worker representatives and the Human Resources Director took place on March 17 in the 
company’s Human Resources office.128  The outcome of the meeting was a policy that allows 
four workers per month to resign from their jobs and receive their full severance payment, 
                                                          
118
 OTLA interview with Ceiba Textiles management, July 18, 2012.  
119
 Submission, pages 12-14. 
120
 Ceiba Textiles collective pact, March 10, 2008; STSS registration of collective pact at Ceiba Textiles, August 26, 
2008.  
121
 Ceiba Textiles collective pact, March 10, 2008; see page 73 for discussion of Employer-Controlled Collective 
Pacts.  
122
 SITRAMCETEX notification of foundation to Ceiba Textiles, February 15, 2010; SITRAMCETEX notification 
of foundation to the STSS, February 15, 2010.  
123
 Request for STSS inspection at Ceiba Textiles, March 2, 2010. 
124
 STSS record of delivery of SITRAMCETEX notification documents, March 10, 2010. 
125
 STSS certification of protección del estado for SITRAMCETEX members, March 10, 2010.   
126
 Labor Code, Article 517 grants this special protection to founding members of a union while the union’s legal 
personality is pending. They cannot be demoted, transferred, or dismissed without a prior finding of just cause by 
the Labor Court.  
127
 In Honduras, workers who resign are not entitled to severance pay under Labor Code Articles 112 and 113;  
Memo from the Coalition of Ceiba Textiles Workers to negotiate benefits under the collective pact, March 4, 2010.  
128
 Meeting minutes from Coalition/management meeting, March 17, 2010.  
 14 
 
provided they give the company two months’ notice and the company approves.129  Ceiba 
management confirmed this process and resulting policy in an interview with the OTLA.
130
 
 
The Submission alleges that all of the 46 founding SITRAMCETEX members were called into 
private meetings with management and pressured to resign under the March 17 resignation 
policy.
131
  A SITRAMCETEX leader interviewed by the OTLA stated that the workers were told 
that voluntarily resigning from their job was the only way they could get the severance benefits 
owed to them, that management had already determined the amount of their benefits, and that 
they would be fired if they did not resign voluntarily.
132   
Management told the OTLA that 
although the policy is typically limited to four workers per month, they allowed a higher number 
of participants to resign with severance for the first few months of this program.
133  
Management 
provided the OTLA with resignation letters signed by 41 of the 46 SITRAMCETEX members.  
Most were dated between March 17 – 21, 2010, about one week after the date of the 
SITRAMCETEX notification by the STSS.
134 
  According to the Submission, union officials 
from the FITH informed the STSS of the allegedly coerced resignations in August 2010, but the 
STSS took no follow-up action.
135
  The GOH stated that it has no records of anyone reporting the 
resignations or of a follow-up investigation.
136  
 
 
As part of its effort to inspect companies named in the Submission, on September 7, 2012, the 
STSS conducted a general inspection of Ceiba Textiles.
137
   In a follow-up report the STSS noted 
that it found no labor law violations at the company.
138 
 Although the STSS was aware of the 
allegations included in the Submission regarding coerced resignations of protected unionists at 
Ceiba Textiles, the STSS did not investigate compliance with relevant laws on freedom of 
association, including laws related to employer interference in the exercise of workers’ rights.139    
 
4. A.tion Honduras, S.A. de C.V.  
 
A.tion is a Korean-owned apparel manufacturing factory in Choloma, Honduras, that produces 
apparel for the Foot Locker, Ecko, and Zoo York brands.
140 
 The Submission alleges that the 
GOH failed to enforce labor laws related to the company’s illegal dismissal of union members.141 
                                                          
129
 Meeting minutes from Coalition/management meeting, March 17, 2010; OTLA interview with Ceiba Textiles 
management, July 18, 2012. 
130
 OTLA interview with Ceiba Textiles management, July 18, 2012. 
131
 Submission, page 13 (Submission incorrectly states that these events occurred in April rather than March.) 
132
 OTLA interview with Ceiba Textiles worker, July 2012. 
133
 OTLA interview with Ceiba Textiles management, July 18, 2012. 
134
 Resignation documents provided to OTLA by Ceiba Management. 
135
 Submission, page 13; see pages 66 and 70 for discussions of protections for founding union members and anti-
union reprisals and page 61 for a discussion of the STSS’s obligation to inspect.  
136
 The OTLA requested that GOH provide any information about its investigation of the dismissal of workers with 
protección del estado or any evidence of investigating alleged violations of freedom of association. GOH answers to 
OTLA’s specific questions, page 8, August 22, 2012. 
137
 STSS record of inspection at Ceiba Textiles, September 7, 2012. In OTLA interviews with Ceiba Textiles 
workers in July 2012, workers noted that management continues to engage in anti-union retaliation.  
138
 STSS report on follow-up inspections at workplaces named in the CAFTA-DR complaint, December 18, 2012. 
139
 OTLA meeting with STSS officials, May 20, 2013; see also: General Report on Inspections of Companies in 
Relation to CAFTA-DR, undated, received May 20, 2013. 
140
 OTLA interview with A.tion management, July 18, 2012. 
 15 
 
 
On June 12, 2009, 68 workers founded the A.tion Workers’ Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores 
de la Empresa A.tion, SITRATION).
142 
 In July, workers requested STSS inspections for what 
they regarded as an unlawful production quota increase.
143
  They also asked the STSS to notify 
the company of the union’s founding and the identities of the 68 founding SITRATION 
members, officially placing them under protección del estado.
144,145  
An STSS inspector 
attempted to access the factory on July 21, 22, 28, and 29.
146 
 Each time the security guard told 
him that he could not enter because the Human Resources Manager was not on the premises, 
although on three of those occasions the inspector confirmed that the Human Resources Manager 
was indeed on site by having workers outside the factory gates call workers inside the factory to 
inquire about the manager’s whereabouts.147   
 
From late July through early August 2009, a “strong majority” of the 68 founding members of 
SITRATION were dismissed.
148 
  The Submission alleges that most of the dismissed workers 
took their severance payments, believing they had no other option,
149
 after which both the CGT 
and the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) intervened on behalf of the SITRATION members.
150
 
Communications between those two organizations and the factory’s owners indicate that the 
owners claimed to have no knowledge of the union and that decreases in production required 
corresponding layoffs.
151 
 The WRC informed the company that it “[could not] accept these 
claims as accurate,” and claimed that the company had unlawfully dismissed founding union 
members under protección del estado.
152
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
141
 Submission, pages 14-16.  
142
  SITRATION notification to STSS of union formation, June 12, 2009; Worker Rights Consortium letter to A.tion 
owner, September 9, 2009. 
143
  Request for an STSS inspector to notify A.tion of SITRATION formation, July 11, 2009; Worker Rights 
Consortium letter to A.tion owner, September 9, 2009; GOH answers to the OTLA’s Specific Questions, August 22, 
2012.   
144
  Request for an STSS inspector to notify A.tion of SITRATION formation, July 11, 2009; Worker Rights 
Consortium letter to A.tion owner, September 9, 2009; GOH answers to the OTLA’s Specific Questions, August 22, 
2012 (confirming that as alleged, the production increase would be in violation of the law as a breach of contract).   
145
  Labor Code, Article 517 grants this special protection to founding members of a union while the union’s legal 
personality is pending. They cannot be demoted, transferred, or dismissed without a prior finding of just cause by 
the respective authority. Request for STSS inspector at A.tion, July 21, 2009; Worker Rights Consortium letter to 
A.tion owner, September 9, 2009. 
146
 STSS record of inspection at A.tion, July 29, 2009; STSS record of inspection at A.tion, July 28, 2009; STSS 
record of inspection at A.tion, July 22, 2009; STSS record of inspection at A.tion, July 21, 2009; Worker Rights 
Consortium letter to A.tion owner, September 9, 2009. 
147
 STSS record of inspection at A.tion, July 21, 2009; STSS record of inspection at A.tion, July 22, 2009; STSS 
record of inspection at A.tion, July 28, 2009; Worker Rights Consortium letter to A.tion owner, September 9, 2009.  
148
 Worker Rights Consortium letter to A.tion owner, September 9, 2009.  In an interview with A.tion management, 
A.tion told the OTLA that there was a reduction in orders in the summer of 2009, resulting in massive layoffs. 
OTLA reviewed six termination letters. OTLA interview with A.tion management, July 18, 2012.  
149
 Submission, page 15.  
150
 The Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) is an independent labor rights organization that monitors working 
conditions in apparel factories throughout the world. WRC conducts worksite investigations, issues public reports 
and provides assistance to workers on labor rights issues.  
151
 Letter from A.tion owner to Evangelina Argueta, August 18, 2009.  
152
 Worker Rights Consortium letter to A.tion owner, page 3, September 9, 2009; Labor Code, Article 517.  
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On August 25, 2009, the inspector who attempted to carry out the union notification in July 
recommended that A.tion be sanctioned for denying the STSS access to the factory and 
obstructing the inspector’s work.153  However, the GOH has no record of the STSS having ever 
applied the fine.
154
 Additionally, there are no records that the STSS ever informed the 
corresponding labor court that the company denied the inspectors’ access.155   
 
Additionally, on May 7 and 12, and June 13, 2011, the factory staff again denied access to an 
STSS inspector attempting to deliver an unrelated notification.
156
  The GOH reported that it has 
no record that it has ever fined the company for denying access or notified the courts of the 
denials, as required by the Labor Code.
157 
 
 
As part of its effort to inspect companies named in the Submission, on September 11, 2012, the 
STSS conducted a general inspection of the A.tion factory.
158
  In a follow-up report the STSS 
noted that it found no labor law violations at the company.
159
  Although the STSS was aware of 
the allegations included in the Submission regarding dismissals of union members at A.tion, the 
STSS did not investigate compliance with relevant laws on freedom of association, including 
laws related to illegal dismissals or anti-union retaliation
160 
 
 
5. Pinehurst Manufacturing, Inc. 
 
Pinehurst is a U.S.-owned apparel factory located in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, with 
approximately 1,200 employees.
161 
 The factory produces apparel for the Nike, Adidas, Armani, 
Kenneth Cole, and Calvin Klein brands, among others.
162 
 The Submission alleges that the GOH 
failed to enforce labor laws related to violations of freedom of association stemming from the 
formation of an employer-dominated union at the factory, as well as laws related to acceptable 
conditions of work.
163
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
153
 STSS record of inspection at A.tion, August 25, 2009; Worker Rights Consortium letter to A.tion owner, 
September 9, 2009. 
154
 The OTLA requested all information related to the GOH response to A.tion denying STSS inspectors access to 
the factory. GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, page 9, August 22, 2012; Labor Code, Article 617(b). 
155
 The OTLA requested all information related to the GOH response to A.tion denying STSS inspectors access to 
the factory. GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, page 9, August 22, 2012; Labor Code, Article 617(b). 
156
 STSS report of inspection at A.tion, June 14, 2011. 
157
 The OTLA requested all information related to the GOH response to A.tion denying STSS inspectors access to 
the factory. GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, page 9, August 22, 2012; Labor Code, Article 617(b). 
158
 STSS record of inspection at A.tion, September 11, 2012.  
159
 STSS report on follow-up inspections at workplaces named in the CAFTA-DR complaint, December 18, 2012. 
160
 OTLA meeting with STSS officials, May 20, 2013; see also: General Report on Inspections of Companies in 
Relation to CAFTA-DR, undated, received May 20, 2013. 
161
 OTLA interview with Pinehurst management, July 18, 2012. 
162
 OTLA interview with Pinehurst management, July 18, 2012. 
163
 Submission, pages 16-20. 
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a)  Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
 
In 2010, Pinehurst employees began meeting with the CGT to form a union.
164  
On August 14, 
workers founded the Pinehurst Workers’ Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Empresa 
Pinehurst, SITRAPINEHURST).
165
  Soon after, management began to retaliate against union 
members, including by dismissing founding union members.
166 
 
 
On September 6, 2010, the union requested that the STSS assist it in notifying Pinehurst of the 
union’s founding.167  Also in early September, the Center for Women’s Rights (Centro de 
Derechos de Mujeres, CDM) requested that the STSS investigate Pinehurst for numerous alleged 
Labor Code violations, including the dismissals of workers involved in founding the union.
168  
In 
October, the STSS conducted a general inspection.
169  
However, the dismissals of the founding 
union members are not discussed in the resulting inspection report.  The report also does not 
indicate whether the STSS inspector attempted to deliver the notification of 
SITRAPINEHURST’s founding to management, as requested by the union in September.170  
 
The STSS received SITRAPINEHURST’s paperwork to formally request legal personality 
(personería jurídica) for the union on October 28, 2010,
171 
 and formally approved that legal 
personality on November 26.
172 
 
 
A report by the WRC found that in October 2010,
 
management invited workers and paid 
transportation costs  to attend a meeting regarding the reactivation of a second union, known as 
the Sewing Workers’ Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria de la Costura y 
Similares, SITRAINCOSI).
173  
The WRC report concluded that Pinehurst management 
“initiat[ed] the establishment of, and direct[ed] the development of, the Sitraincosi union as a 
management-dominated rival body to Sitrapinehurst...”174  OTLA interviews with workers and 
                                                          
164
 Submission, page 16 (says workers began organizing in August); Fair Labor Association, “Independent External 
Monitoring Report,” (Factory Code 53002912021), October 26-27, 2010 (says workers began organizing in July); 
COVERCO Final Report, “Independent Assessment on Freedom of Association at Pinehurst Manufacturing,” 
December 2010 (says workers began organizing in May). 
165
  Record of SITRAPINEHURST founding assembly, August 14, 2010. 
166
  Worker Rights Consortium Assessment, “Pinehurst Manufacturing (Honduras) Findings, Recommendations, and 
Status,” July 13, 2012. 
167
 SITRAPINEHURST request for STSS inspection, September 6, 2010.  
168
 The particulars of this request and subsequent inspection are described in section (b) below. CDM request for 
STSS inspection on behalf of Pinehurst workers, September 8, 2010. 
169
 STSS notification report of inspection at Pinehurst, December 7, 2010.  
170
 STSS notification report of inspection at Pinehurst, December 7, 2010. 
171
 SITRAPINEHURST application for legal personality, October 27, 2010.  
172
 STSS registration of SITRAPINEHURST legal personality, November 26, 2010. 
173
 The WRC conducted an investigation after receiving a complaint from SITRAPINEHURST in August 2010. 
Worker Rights Consortium Assessment, “Pinehurst Manufacturing (Honduras) Findings, Recommendations, and 
Status,” July 13, 2012 (states that the meeting occurred on October 18 on page 10); COVERCO Final Report, 
“Independent Assessment on Freedom of Association at Pinehurst Manufacturing,” December 2010 (states that the 
meeting occurred on October 20 and asserts on page 7 that the SITRAINCOSI document was backdated). 
174
 Worker Rights Consortium Assessment, “Pinehurst Manufacturing (Honduras) Findings, Recommendations, and 
Status,” page 5, July 13, 2012. 
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outside observers confirmed that workers generally regarded SITRAINCOSI as an employer-
dominated union.
175 
 
 
SITRAINCOSI submitted paperwork to the STSS regarding its new leadership committee on 
October 26, 2010.
176
  Two days later, the STSS notified Pinehurst management of 
SITRAINCOSI’s reactivation and the identities of the SITRAINCOSI leadership committee 
members.
177 
 
On October 26-27, 2010, the Fair Labor Association (FLA)
178
 conducted an audit at Pinehurst 
and issued a report.
179 
  Investigators found “uncorroborated evidence of noncompliance” with 
the FLA Code of Conduct requirements on Freedom of Association regarding employer 
interference, blacklisting, and proper grievance procedures.
180
  In light of those findings, the 
FLA commissioned a Guatemalan firm, the Commission for the Verification of Codes of 
Conduct (Comisión para la Verificación de Códigos de Conducta, COVERCO),
181
 to conduct a 
more thorough investigation, carried out from November 28 to December 4, 2010, which 
resulted in a report (relevant findings cited below).
182 
 
 
On November 1, 2010, the STSS notified SITRAINCOSI that two of the leadership committee 
members had not worked for the required six months at Pinehurst to be eligible for union 
leadership positions.
183 
 On November 10, SITRAINCOSI sent new tenure letters issued by the 
Human Resources Department at Pinehurst for both workers, stating that the dates were in error 
on the originals.
184 
 Five days later, the STSS accepted the new documents and approved 
SITRAINCOSI’s leadership committee.185  
 
                                                          
175
 OTLA interviews with Pinehurst workers, July 2012; OTLA interview with COVERCO official, October 18, 
2012; OTLA interview with WRC staff, August 2, 2012. 
176
 Worker Rights Consortium Assessment, “Pinehurst Manufacturing (Honduras) Findings, Recommendations, and 
Status,” July 13, 2012; SITRAINCOSI application for change in leadership committee, October 26, 2010. 
177
 STSS record of document delivery to Pinehurst, October 28, 2010; OTLA interview with STSS inspector. 
178
 The Fair Labor Association (FLA) is an international nonprofit organization that works closely with universities, 
civil society groups and the private sector to promote fair labor practices in multiple employment sectors.   
179
 FLA Statement on Remediation at Pinehurst Manufacturing in Honduras, May 4, 2011; FLA, “Independent 
External Monitoring Report,” Factory Code 53002912021, October 26-27, 2010.  
180
 Additionally, the FLA audit found other violations, including failure to follow the FLA Code of Conduct and/or 
Honduran law regarding occupational safety and health, discrimination, and childcare. Fair Labor Association, 
“Independent External Monitoring Report,” Factory Code 53002912021, October 26-27, 2010. 
181
 The Commission for the Verification of Codes of Conduct (COVERCO) is a Guatemalan nonprofit organization 
that monitors labor standards compliance in Central America’s major export industries. COVERCO works with 
private employers to conduct worksite audits and investigations.  
182
 FLA Statement on Remediation at Pinehurst Manufacturing in Honduras, May 4, 2011; COVERCO Final Report, 
“Independent Assessment on Freedom of Association at Pinehurst Manufacturing,” December 2010. 
183
 STSS Department of Social Organizations evaluation of SITRAINCOSI request for leadership committee 
registration, November 1, 2010. 
184
 Letter from SITRAINCOSI to STSS, November 10, 2010; Tenure letters for two SITRAINCOSI leadership 
committee members, October 20, 2010 (stating they were hired in March and August 2009); Tenure letters for 
SITRAINCOSI leadership committee members, October 20, 2010 (stating one was hired in August 2010 and the 
other with a blank start date).  
185
 STSS General Directorate decision to register SITRAINCOSI leadership committee, November 15, 2010.  
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The OTLA interviewed workers from Pinehurst who stated that it was well known that the two 
workers at issue had not been employed at Pinehurst for the full six months prior to their election 
to the leadership committee.
186 
 The COVERCO report concluded that Pinehurst provided false 
information to the STSS regarding the tenure letters, and that one of the employees in question 
was outside of the bargaining unit.
187
  The Submission alleges that on November 15, 2010, CDM 
wrote to the STSS expressing concern that a new management-sponsored union had been formed 
inside the plant, which would be contrary to Honduran law.
188
    
 
On December 2 and 6, 2010,
 
SITRAINCOSI submitted a collective bargaining request to 
Pinehurst.
189
  SITRAPINEHURST submitted its own request for collective bargaining on 
December 13.
190
  Under the Labor Code, only one collective contract may be in effect at a 
workplace.
191
  On December 20, the company sent a letter to the STSS to ask for assistance in 
determining which union had collective bargaining rights.
192
  On January 4, 2011, after the 
issuance of the COVERCO and WRC reports, SITRAINCOSI withdrew its bargaining request
 
and informed the company that it had disbanded.
193
  
 
On January 10, 2011, the company reinstated the five founding SITRAPINEHURST members 
who were dismissed in August 2010.
194 
 Pinehurst management met with SITRAPINEHURST on 
January 14, 2011, and the company agreed to recognize and bargain with the union.
195  
The 
parties formally initiated the collective bargaining process on February 11.
196
  The direct 
negotiation phase ended in stalemate on June 17, 2011,
197
 and an STSS-facilitated mediation 
phase began on July 4.
198 
 Additionally, on August 2, 2011, Pinehurst announced a 24 percent 
decline in orders and proportional layoffs.  Over the next month, approximately 160 Pinehurst 
                                                          
186
 OTLA interviews with Pinehurst workers, July 2012. 
187
 COVERCO Final Report, “Independent Assessment on Freedom of Association at Pinehurst Manufacturing,” 
pages 8-9, December 2010.  
188
 Submission, page 17; see page 75 of this report for the OTLA’s discussion of Employer-Dominated Unions.  
189
 COVERCO Final Report, “Independent Assessment on Freedom of Association at Pinehurst Manufacturing,” 
December 2010. 
190
 Worker Rights Consortium Assessment, “Pinehurst Manufacturing (Honduras) Findings, Recommendations, and 
Status,” page 23, July 13, 2012; SITRAPINEHURST request to Pinehurst to bargain collectively, December 14, 
2010. 
191
 Labor Code, Article 53.   
192
 Letter from Pinehurst to STSS, December 20, 2010; OTLA interview with Pinehurst Management, July 18, 2012.  
193
 Letter from SITRAINCOSI to Pinehurst regarding SITRAINCOSI’s decision to disband, January 4, 2011; 
Worker Rights Consortium Assessment, “Pinehurst Manufacturing (Honduras) Findings, Recommendations, and 
Status,” July 13, 2012. 
194
 Worker Rights Consortium Assessment, “Pinehurst Manufacturing (Honduras) Findings, Recommendations, and 
Status,” page 17, July 13, 2012; STSS record of Pinehurst rehiring of workers, January 10, 2011. 
195
 Worker Rights Consortium Assessment, “Pinehurst Manufacturing (Honduras) Findings, Recommendations, and 
Status,” page 17, July 13, 2012. 
196
 Worker Rights Consortium Assessment, “Pinehurst Manufacturing (Honduras) Findings, Recommendations, and 
Status,” page 23, July 13, 2012. 
197
 Worker Rights Consortium Assessment, “Pinehurst Manufacturing (Honduras) Findings, Recommendations, and 
Status,” page 23, July 13, 2012. 
198
 Worker Rights Consortium Assessment, “Pinehurst Manufacturing (Honduras) Findings, Recommendations, and 
Status,” page 23, July 13, 2012. 
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workers were dismissed, including seven of the sixteen SITRAPINEHURST union negotiators 
and 91 union members.
199
 
 
Mediation sessions took place from October 25, 2011, through June 12, 2012, when the 
mediation was declared unsuccessful.
200  
However, sometime in late August or early September, 
2012, the parties signed a collective contract.
201  
 In August 2014, the company acknowledged 
previous anti-union activities and asserted its commitment to working with the union, including 
by replacing managers responsible for the actions described above.
202
 
 
As part of its effort to inspect companies named in the Submission, on September 12, 2012, the 
STSS conducted a general inspection at Pinehurst.
203 
In a follow-up report the STSS noted that it 
found no labor law violations at the company.
204
  Although the STSS was aware of the 
allegations included in the Submission regarding dismissals of protected unionists and employer 
interference in union activities at Pinehurst, the STSS did not investigate compliance with 
relevant laws on freedom of association, including laws related to illegal dismissals.
205
 
 
b) Acceptable Conditions of Work 
 
In August 2010, workers at Pinehurst began requesting that the STSS conduct inspections 
regarding allegations of inaccurate payment of wages, verbal mistreatment of workers, and 
occupational safety and health (OSH) violations.
206 
 The STSS attempted three inspections, but 
factory staff did not allow the inspector to access the factory.
207
  At least one of the STSS 
inspection reports recommended transferring the matter to the STSS Inspector General in 
Tegucigalpa and sanctioning the company for obstructing an STSS investigation.
208
 
 
When the 
OTLA requested information about whether the STSS followed up on the recommendation to 
sanction the company for denying access to a labor inspector, the GOH responded that it had 
“effectively applied a fine,” but the fine that the GOH response cites was not applied until over a 
year later, in October 2011, and appears to be for the company’s failure to pay overtime rather 
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 21 
 
than for denying an STSS inspector access.
209 
  The GOH response also does not indicate that the 
STSS informed the corresponding Labor Court of the denials of access.
210
 
 
As discussed above, in early September 2010, SITRAPINEHURST and the CDM requested that 
the STSS investigate allegations of inaccurate payment of wages, verbal mistreatment of 
workers, and OSH violations.
211
  According to the Submission, the STSS did make two attempts 
that month to conduct inspections based on those requests but was again denied access to the 
worksite.
212
 The GOH reported that it had no records of inspectors being denied access at that 
time.
213
 
 
On October 5, 2010, three STSS inspectors gained access to conduct a general inspection of the 
Pinehurst factory.
214
  The report from that inspection documented nonpayment of overtime to 
598 workers over a two month period and mandated that the company pay the workers the 
overtime premium of 25 percent per hour, for a total of 453,433 HNL (US $21,778) within three 
business days.
215  
 The report also found that Pinehurst violated Article 187 of the Social Security 
Regulation by deducting wages for time spent at the Honduran Institute for Social Security 
(Instituto Hondureño del Seguro Social, IHSS), the public health care institution.
216 
 The report 
does not indicate whether the STSS inspected for the OSH issues raised by CDM and Pinehurst 
workers.  The STSS notified the company of its findings and orders regarding overtime 
payments and salary deductions on December 7, 2010.
217
 
 
On February 9, 2011, the STSS conducted a re-inspection and found that the company had not 
paid the workers back wages owed to them and continued to fail to pay overtime in compliance 
with the law.
218  
The STSS decided to impose a fine on March 23, 2011.
219 
 On October 26, 2011, 
over a year after the date of the initial inspection, the STSS officially imposed a 10,000 HNL 
(US $480) fine for the overtime violation and illegal deductions found in the October 5, 2010, 
inspection.
220
  Pinehurst paid the fine on May 2, 2012.
221 
 In July 2012, CDM reported to the 
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OTLA that workers had still not received back wages despite the December 7, 2010, STSS 
order.
222
 
 
As part of its effort to inspect companies named in the Submission, on September 12, 2012, the 
STSS conducted a general inspection at Pinehurst.
223
  In a follow-up report the STSS noted that 
it found no labor law violations at the company.
224 
 Though unpaid overtime violations and 
unlawful wage deductions under Article 187 of the Social Security Regulation were the subject 
of the previous STSS inspections and fines, the 2012 inspection did not investigate whether 
Pinehurst had paid workers their back wages pursuant to their December 7, 2010 order.
225 
 
6. Petralex S. de R.L. 
 
Petralex is a U.S.-owned apparel manufacturer located in the Zip Bufalo Industrial Park in 
Villanueva, Honduras. It produces garments for Family Dollar, Aeropostale, National Wholesale, 
and Prime Life.
226  
The Submission alleges that the GOH failed to enforce labor laws related to 
the company’s illegal dismissal of over 100 union members in 2007 and 2008.227 
 
On June 24, 2006, a group of Petralex workers founded the Petralex Workers’ Union (Sindicato 
de Trabajadores de la Empresa Petralex, SITRAPETRALEX).
228
  The same day, the union 
elected a provisional (first) leadership committee consisting of six workers.
229
  The union applied 
for legal personality (personería jurídica) on August 16, 2006.
230
  On May 7, 2007, the STSS 
granted the union legal personality.
231  
According to the Submission, members of 
SITRAPETRALEX elected their permanent (second) leadership committee on May 12.
232
   
 
Evangelina Argueta, the Northwest Coordinator of the CGT and the main organizer of 
SITRAPETRALEX, requested that an STSS inspector verify that the union’s second leadership 
committee members had sufficient tenure at Petralex to qualify for their positions, one of the 
steps required by the STSS to validate that union leaders qualify for fuero sindical.
233  
On June 4, 
2007, an inspector attempted to fulfill this request, but factory staff denied the inspector entry.  
The inspector confirmed the workers’ tenure by checking the start dates printed on the workers’ 
company badges as they left the facility.
234
  The inspector wrote a report and recommended a 
fine for the denial of access, but the GOH could not find any record of the Regional STSS 
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Director proceeding further to request the application of the fine or notify the corresponding 
labor court that the company impeded the work of an inspector.
235
 
 
Between June 6 and 8, 2007, Petralex dismissed all six members of the permanent 
SITRAPETRALEX leadership committee for “staff restructuring.”236  Shortly thereafter, those 
workers filed a lawsuit against the company contesting their dismissals; it was still pending at the 
time the Submission was filed.
237
 
 
On June 30, 2007, SITRAPETRALEX elected a third leadership committee.  On July 25, 
Evangelina Argueta met with the Regional Director of the STSS in San Pedro Sula.
238  
Argueta 
requested that the factory and workers not be identified in STSS records until after the committee 
received fuero sindical protection from the STSS to prevent Petralex from learning their 
identities and dismissing them prior to receiving such protection.
239  
Rosales agreed. Argueta 
returned the next day and met with the Regional Chief Inspector for the STSS in San Pedro 
Sula.
240 
 The Regional Chief Inspector allegedly wrote down the names of the workers in the 
STSS records,
241
 asserting to the OTLA during an interview that Rosales had not requested 
anonymity at that time.
242  
However, in a separate interview with the OTLA, Rosales confirmed 
that she requested anonymity in the records as described in the Submission.
243
 
 
When Argueta and the inspector went to the factory on July 25, 2007, to verify that the union’s 
third leadership committee members had sufficient tenure to qualify for their positions, they were 
again denied access.
244
  The inspector verified the leadership committee members’ tenure at the 
factory by waiting outside and checking the start dates printed on the workers’ company 
badges.
245 
The GOH reported that the inspector wrote a report and recommended a fine, but that 
there are no records of the Regional STSS Director requesting the application of the fine or 
notifying the corresponding labor court that the company impeded the work of an inspector.
246
 
                                                          
235
 GOH answers to OTLA’s specific questions, page 2, August 22, 2012. 
236
 The OTLA reviewed dismissal letters for each of the leadership committee members. These dismissals occurred 
before the union could complete the certification process for its permanent leadership committee; however, the 
protection is retroactive from the date of elections. SITRAPETRALEX request for STSS registration of leadership 
committee, June 6, 2007; Petralex dismissal letters, June 2007; Labor Code, Article 516. 
237
 OTLA interview with Petralex worker, July 2012; OTLA’s specific questions for the GOH, June 11, 2012; Email 
from the OTLA to Evangelina Argueta, October 10, 2012. 
238 While the Submission states that these events occurred on the 24, 25, and 26 of July 2007, OTLA’s review of the 
documents shows that they occurred on the 25, 26, and 27 of July 2007. CGT complaint filed against STSS San 
Pedro Sula Chief Inspector, August 6, 2007. 
239
 CGT complaint filed against STSS SPS Chief Inspector, August 6, 2007; OTLA interview with Petralex worker, 
July 2012.  
240 
CGT complaint filed against STSS SPS Chief Inspector, August 6, 2007.  
241
 Submission, page 7.  
242
 OTLA interview with Inspector _____, July 16, 2012. 
243
 OTLA interview with former STSS SPS Regional Director, July 16, 2012.  
244
 STSS certification of SITRAPETRALEX leadership constancia de antigüedad, July 25, 2007. 
245
 STSS certification of SITRAPETRALEX leadership constancia de antigüedad, July 25, 2007. 
246
 The OTLA requested information from the GOH about their response to Petralex’s denials of access to the 
inspector, but the GOH could find no records of applying a fine or notifying the courts. GOH answers to the 
OTLA’s specific questions, page 2, August 22, 2012. 
 24 
 
Later that same day, Argueta returned to the factory and learned that the company dismissed 
three of the six leadership committee members, again for “staff restructuring” and without prior 
permission from the court.
247  
The company dismissed the other three leadership committee 
members over the next few days under the same circumstances.
248
  The STSS certified the third 
leadership committee on July 30, 2007, retroactively triggering from the date of the leadership 
committee members’ election their fuero sindical protection under Labor Code Article 516.249     
 
On July 27, 2007, Argueta approached Rosales to file a complaint against the Regional Chief 
Inspector regarding the dismissed workers, alleging that the Regional Chief Inspector leaked 
their names to the company.
250
  The OTLA’s review of photocopied STSS records revealed that 
names on the official STSS ledger had been erased, although neither the STSS nor the OTLA 
were able to conclusively determine when or why.
251  
On August 6, Argueta filed a formal 
complaint against Regional Chief Inspector with the STSS headquarters.
252  
The hearing records 
show that an investigator interviewed both parties and reviewed relevant documents.
253  
The 
Regional Chief Inspector’s statement of defense disputes all of the alleged facts except that she 
did erase the names in the STSS records, but at Argueta’s insistence.254 According to the GOH, 
there was insufficient evidence of serious misconduct, and the STSS sanctioned the Regional 
Chief Inspector under the Civil Service Law; she no longer serves as Chief Inspector.
255 
 
 
The union elected a fourth leadership committee on August 25, 2007, which the STSS certified 
on October 17, 2007.
256
  On November 2, one of the union leaders requested an STSS inspector 
notify Petralex of both the union’s legal status and the identities of the leadership committee 
members protected by fuero sindical.
257
  On November 8 and 12, factory staff denied access to 
the STSS inspector attempting to notify the company.
258  
As in prior cases, the inspector wrote a 
report and recommended a fine, but the STSS could not find any record of the Regional STSS 
Director proceeding with the fine or notifying the corresponding labor court that the company 
impeded the work of an inspector.
259
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According to the Submission, Argueta sent then-Director Rosales a letter on December 18, 2007, 
requesting intervention at Petralex because of the dismissals of union leaders and denials of 
access to STSS inspectors.
260
  The Submission also alleges that Rosales went to the facility and 
delivered a summons to the company to appear at the STSS on December 20.
261
  However, the 
GOH claims no knowledge of this letter or summons,
262
 and the OTLA did not receive any 
corroborating documentation from the submitters.  The Submission alleges that on December 21, 
Petralex dismissed all six members of the fourth leadership committee, without the required prior 
approval from the court, along with three other union members, citing  “staff restructuring” as 
the justification. According to the Submission, the company then dismissed 180 union members 
in January and February 2008.
263 
 
 
According to the Submission, SITRAPETRALEX elected a fifth leadership committee on 
January 19, 2008.
264
  Petralex allegedly dismissed three of the newly elected leaders on February 
11 and 12, before the union could complete the process for applying for certification for its 
leadership committee.
265
  The union held an election to replace those committee members on 
February 13.
266 
 
 
On February 14, 2008, an STSS inspector attempted to notify Petralex both that it had granted 
legal personality to SITRAPETRALEX and the identity of the union’s fifth leadership committee 
members who were protected by fuero sindical; factory staff denied him access.
267
  The inspector 
called Rosales, who arrived and called the police.
268  
Upon their arrival, the STSS officials were 
allowed to enter the industrial park office, though not the factory premises,
269 
where they 
delivered the notification to a Petralex human resources assistant.
270  
Following prior practices, 
the inspector wrote a report and recommended a fine, but the GOH could not find any record of 
the Regional STSS Director proceeding further to request the application of the fine or to notify 
the corresponding labor court that the company impeded the work of an inspector.
271
 
 
On April 13, Daniel Durón, the head of the CGT, filed a complaint about the January and 
February 2008 dismissals of 180 SITRAPETRALEX union members with the STSS.
272  
On April 
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18 and April 25, 2008, an STSS inspector attempted to investigate the dismissals,
 
but the factory 
staff denied the inspector access.
273  The inspector’s report, issued May 23, 2008, concluded that 
Petralex violated the law by dismissing leadership committee members and other union members 
and denying the STSS access on multiple occasions.
274
  The report ordered Petralex to reinstate 
the workers within three business days,
275
 which it failed to do.
276
  Although the STSS found that 
Petralex had unlawfully dismissed leadership committee members, it did not order Petralex to 
pay the union an amount equivalent to six months of the dismissed leaders’ salaries as required 
under Labor Code Article 516.
277 
 
 
On September 19, 2008, the STSS conducted a re-inspection, led by Inspector Erazo.
278
 
 
Although the re-inspection report states that the violations identified in the May 23 report were 
corrected, it lists the only violation as “payroll records” and does not address the failure to 
reinstate the dismissed SITRAPETRALEX members.
279  
Nevertheless, on December 2, 2008, the 
STSS in Tegucigalpa recommended that Petralex be sanctioned 10,000 HNL (US $480) for 
dismissing the leadership committee and 134 other SITRAPETRALEX members.
280  
Petralex 
paid the fine on December 11, 2009.
281
  The GOH indicated that it could not locate the related 
documentation about its response to PETRALEX’s failure to reinstate the dismissed workers or 
those about whether the STSS had re-inspected or imposed an additional fine for failure to 
comply with the reinstatement order.
282
  The STSS provided no evidence that it took further 
action with regard to the union members and elected union leaders dismissed in 2007 and 2008, 
in support of its order that Petralex reinstate the illegally dismissed workers.   
 
As part of its effort to inspect companies named in the Submission, on September 12, 2012, the 
STSS conducted a general inspection of Petralex.
283
  In a follow-up report the STSS noted that it 
found no labor law violations at the company.
284  
Though alleged freedom of association 
violations were the subject of CGT and SITRAPETRLEX complaints and previous STSS 
inspections, fines, and orders as noted in this section and in the Submission, the 2012 inspection 
did not investigate whether Petralex was in compliance with laws guaranteeing the right of 
freedom of association, had paid the legally-required payment of six months of the previously 
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fired union leaders’ salaries to the union, or had complied with the prior order to reinstate the 
wrongly dismissed union members and leaders.
285
  
 
7. Hanesbrands, Inc. 
 
Hanesbrands is a U.S.-based company that owns and operates 11 factories in Honduras that 
produce exclusively for Hanesbrands, which include Hanes, Champion, Playtex, Bali, L’eggs, 
Just My Size, Barely There, Wonderbra, and Duofold.
286
  The Submission alleges that the 
agreements between management and non-unionized workers, known as collective pacts (pactos 
colectivos), that are in place at eight of the Hanesbrands factories impede workers’ rights to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining by facilitating  interference with freedom of 
association,
 
 and that the GOH has failed to enforce labor laws protecting workers from such 
conduct.
287
 
 
Hanesbrands management confirmed, in interviews with the OTLA, that Hanesbrands introduced 
collective pacts, including worker committee structures, at eight of its factories in Honduras 
beginning in October 2008.  The introduction of the collective pacts allegedly coincided with a 
union organizing effort at the Confecciones del Valle factory. The OTLA reviewed signed 
statements from 41 workers at Confecciones del Valle that alleged anti-union statements by 
management and dismissals of workers trying to form a union.
288
 The Submission alleges that 
Hanesbrands introduced collective pacts in reaction to and to counteract the union organizing 
effort.
289
  
 
Hanesbrands management told the OTLA that they initiated the pacts to alleviate 
concerns from workers that their existing non-contractual benefits, for example funding for 
continuing education, would be eliminated as a part of the company’s response to the global 
economic crisis.
290
   
 
According to Hanesbrands’ management, management selected representatives for the worker 
committees at all eight factories and workers could have nominated their own candidates yet did 
not do so.
291  
Management also told the OTLA that they chose the committee members  on the 
same day that the pacts were negotiated, finalized, signed, and read aloud to and approved by the 
workers and that the STSS was present for the entire same-day process.
292
 Management’s 
account of events is corroborated by the collective pacts from the Jasper and Confecciones del 
Valle factories, provided to the OTLA by Hanesbrands, and from the Hanes Choloma factory, 
provided to the OTLA by the STSS.
293 
 When the OTLA reviewed three examples of the 
collective pacts provided by Hanesbrands, the OTLA found them to be substantially similar to 
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each other, with only three articles differing.
294 
 The other articles were identical, including the 
article relating to the election process that outlines the election of workers’ representatives to the 
worker committees  as being conducted under the supervision of “the Department Manager, a 
Supervisor, the Human Resources Manager” and the other delegates.295 
 
The Labor Code prohibits employers from infringing or restricting rights granted to workers in 
the Labor Code, including those related to freedom of association.
296
  When the OTLA inquired 
about the STSS’s role in ensuring that there is no employer interference in the collective pacts’ 
process, STSS officials informed the OTLA that it accepts workers signatures on the collective 
pacts in good faith.
297
       
 
B. Agriculture Sector 
 
1. Honduran Foundation for Agricultural Research  
 
The Honduran Foundation for Agricultural Research (Fundación Hondureña de Investigación 
Agrícola, FHIA) was founded by the GOH and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in 1984.
298
  It is a nonprofit research center that develops seeds for use 
throughout Central America.
299
  FHIA continues to receive funding as a subcontractor for 
various USAID projects.
300
  The Submission alleges that the GOH failed to enforce labor laws 
related to the coerced resignations from the union and illegal dismissals of most of the founding 
union members, and that the GOH subsequently authorized the dissolution of the union based on 
an insufficient number of members that resulted from those illegal dismissals of union 
members.
301
  
 
On March 2, 2008, FHIA workers formed the FHIA Workers’ Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores 
de la Fundación Hondureña de Investigación Agrícola, SITRAFHIA).
302
  On March 3, the STSS 
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299
 OTLA interview with FHIA management, July 19, 2012. 
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302
 SITRAFHIA request to STSS for legal registration, March 2, 2008; SITRAFHIA founding document and record 
of election of leadership committee, March 2, 2008. On March 1, 2008, 34 workers signed a letter addressed to the 
“labor prosecutor,” complaining that FHIA management subjected the workers to verbal abuse. Note that the 
addressee, the “Fiscalía del Trabajador” is not an office within the GOH and the OTLA was unable to confirm 
whether the GOH received the document. Letter from FHIA workers to “Fiscalía del Trabajador,” March 1, 2008. 
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certified that the 34 founding members of SITRAFHIA would be under protección del estado as 
soon as FHIA management was notified of their intent to form a union.
303
    
 
On March 5, 2008, the Coordinator of Honduran Banana and Agro-industrial Unions 
(Coordinadora de Sindicatos Bananeros y Agroindustriales de Honduras, COSIBAH), a worker 
rights organization focused on the agricultural sector in Honduras,
304
 requested that an STSS 
inspector notify FHIA of the founding of the union.
305
  The same day, the STSS assigned an 
inspector to carry out the notification.
306
  FHIA’s Human Resources Manager met the inspector 
and received the relevant documents but refused to sign the inspector’s record.307  Nevertheless, 
the STSS considered FHIA legally notified of the union’s founding as of that date and placed the 
34 founding SITRAFHIA members under protección del estado.
308
 
 
Within a day, FHIA allegedly dismissed four of the 34 founding SITRAFHIA members without 
requesting prior authorization from the respective authority, as required by the Labor Code.
309
  
The same day, at least two other founding members resigned from the union.
310
  Additional 
dismissals without prior authorization from the STSS and resignations from the union occurred 
through October 2008.
311
  Most of the dismissed workers received their severance payments.
312
  
According to the Submission, SITRAFHIA reported the dismissals to the STSS several times 
beginning in March 2008, alleging that they were unlawful, including because they occurred 
without the required prior authorization from the respective authority.
313
  The STSS conducted 
inspections to investigate the dismissals on August 5 and 7.
314
  The FHIA Director and Human 
Resources Manager were unavailable to meet with the inspector on both occasions and FHIA 
was instead represented by a Human Resources Assistant and later the Administrative 
Chief.
315,316
  Both told the STSS that the founding union members had not been fired but, 
instead, had quit and requested severance.
317
   
 
                                                          
303
 STSS certification of SITRAFHIA founding members’ protección del estado, March 3, 2008; GOH answers to 
the OTLA’s specific questions, page 15, August 22, 2012.   
304
 In May 2013, COSIBAH became the Federation of Unions of Agro-industrial Workers (Federación de Sindicatos 
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305
 COSIBAH request to STSS for inspector to notify FHIA of SITRAFHIA formation, March 5, 2008.  
306
 STSS order to inspector to carry out SITRAFHIA notification, March 5, 2008; STSS record of delivery of 
SITRAFHIA notification documents, March 5, 2008.  
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 STSS record of notification at FHIA, March 5, 2008. 
308
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, page 15, August 22, 2012. 
309
 STSS report of inspection at FHIA, June 4, 2009 (recording statement of SITRAFHIA president); COSIBAH 
press release regarding dismissals of SITRAFHIA members, March 6, 2008; OTLA interview with FHIA worker, 
July 2012. 
310
 The OTLA reviewed copies of both resignation letters.  
311
 The OTLA reviewed copies of 14 dismissal letters and 11 resignation letters. 
312
 OTLA interview with FHIA worker, July 2012.   
313
 Submission, page 28.  
314
 STSS record of inspection at FHIA, August 5, 2008; STSS record of inspection at FHIA, August 7, 2008. 
315
 STSS record of inspection at FHIA, August 5, 2008. 
316
 STSS record of inspection at FHIA, August 7, 2008. 
317
 STSS record of inspection at FHIA, August 7, 2008; OTLA interview with FHIA management, July 19, 2012.  
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On April 28, 2008, the STSS notified the union that its application for legal registration 
contained errors.
318
  Several rounds of communication between SITRAFHIA and STSS resolved 
the issues, and on August 4, 2008, the STSS granted SITRAFHIA legal personality.
319
  By this 
time, however, due to at least 11 dismissals and additional resignations from the union, fewer 
than 13 of the original 34 founding SITRAFHIA members remained employed with FHIA and 
with the union.
320
  Under Labor Code Articles 475 and 527, a union must have a minimum of 30 
members at all times.
321
  
 
On September 22 and 25, 2008, SITRAFHIA requested further inspections regarding the 
dismissals.
322
  On September 30, the STSS conducted an inspection.
323
 FHIA’s Human 
Resources Director said that the dismissals were part of a reduction of personnel due to the end 
of a project.
324
  It appears from the inspection record that the inspector did not interview any 
workers.
325
  
 
On September 22, 2008, an attorney filed for dissolution of the union on behalf of six FHIA 
workers,
326
 arguing that fewer than 30 SITRAFHIA members remained.
327
  This petition also 
suggested that at least some of the founding union members thought they were joining a 
cooperative and not a union.
328
  The OTLA interviewed one of the parties to this petition, 
however, who stated unequivocally that he was not aware of such a filing, did not know the 
attorney of record, and at all times knew that he had participated in founding a union.
329
   
 
According to the court decision, the Court attempted to notify the SITRAFHIA president about 
the case to give him an opportunity to challenge the dissolution request. The notification was 
sent to the workplace, however, rather than the address noted in the union’s bylaws as its official 
address for any and all legal notifications related to the union (on file with the STSS),
330
 and as a 
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 STSS report on SITRAFHIA request for recognition, April 28, 2008.  
319
 STSS notification report of inspection at FHIA, July 28, 2009; STSS Resolution regarding SITRAFHIA, August 
4, 2008; STSS report on SITRAFHIA request for recognition, April 28, 2008; STSS decision on STRAFHIA 
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320
 OTLA reviewed copies of the dismissal and/or resignation letters of 21 SITRAFHIA members; see also: STSS 
record of inspection at FHIA, August 7, 2008.    
321
 Labor Code, Article 475.  
322
 SITRAFHIA request for STSS inspection at FHIA, September 22, 2008; SITRAFHIA request for STSS 
inspection at FHIA, September 25, 2008. 
323
 STSS notification report of inspection at FHIA, July 28, 2009; STSS report of inspection at FHIA, September 30, 
2008. 
324
 STSS report of inspection at FHIA, September 30, 2008. 
325
 STSS FHIA inspection report, September 30, 2008. 
326
 Petition to dissolve SITRAFHIA, filed September 22, 2008. 
327
 Petition to dissolve SITRAFHIA, filed September 22, 2008, page 2. 
328
 Petition to dissolve SITRAFHIA, filed September 22, 2008, pages 3 and 4. 
329
 OTLA interview with FHIA worker, July 2012. 
330
 The union’s address is listed in the SITRAFHIA statutes, Chapter 1, Article 2.  
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result, the union president never received the notification, as it was sent  after his dismissal on 
October 9, 2008.
331
 The Labor Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice in San Pedro Sula 
granted the petition to dissolve SITRAFHIA on January 26, 2009.
332
  At the time of the decision, 
21 of the founding SITRAFHIA members no longer worked at FHIA, including the SITRAFHIA 
president.
333
   
 
On June 4, 2009, COSIBAH requested an STSS inspection to investigate the 2008 dismissals of 
the union members fired and to verify that eight of the founding union members were forced to 
quit the union in order to maintain their jobs.
334
  An STSS inspector attempted to conduct an 
inspection that same day but was informed that neither FHIA’s Director nor Human Resources 
Director was on site and that no other company representative was present to receive the 
inspector.
335
  The inspector nonetheless took worker statements regarding the dismissals and 
submitted a report to the Regional STSS Inspector General on July 9, 2009, indicating that the 
claim remained pending.
336
   
 
On July 9, 2009, the same inspector conducted another inspection, specifically focusing on the 
application of provisions of ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association.
337
  The inspector 
and the SITRAFHIA president met with FHIA’s attorney.  The attorney stated that the union had 
only caused internal problems for FHIA and that many of the founding members did not know 
they were joining a union when they affiliated, instead believing they were joining a 
cooperative.
338
  
 
As a result of the July 9 inspection, the STSS found that FHIA was noncompliant with both 
Convention 87 and protección del estado for dismissing the founding union members without 
prior authorization.  The resulting inspection report stated that FHIA had violated national and 
international labor standards covering the right to organize when firing the founding union 
members and specifically found that the workers named in the August 6 and September 30, 
2008, inspection reports had been fired illegally.
339
 On July 20, the STSS attempted to serve a 
summons on FHIA regarding these violations, but FHIA staff refused to give the inspector 
access.
340
  The STSS did not provide any evidence that it issued a sanction or reported the denial 
of access to the corresponding labor court.
341
  The STSS delivered the report detailing both the 
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 Supreme Court communication to STSS, January 26, 2009. 
332
 Supreme Court communication to STSS, January 26, 2009. 
333
 Supreme Court communication to STSS, January 26, 2009. At least seven of the SITRAFHIA members had been 
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337
 STSS report of inspection at FHIA, July 9, 2009.  
338
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339
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341
 The OTLA requested all documents relevant to the allegations in the submission from the GOH. The volumes of 
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2009, denial of access. OTLA’s questions to the GOH, June 11, 2012. 
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June and July inspections to FHIA’s attorney on July 28 and ordered the company to correct the 
violations within three business days.
342
  
 
FHIA appealed the finding to the STSS on July 30, 2009.
343
 On November 16, 2009, the STSS 
upheld the finding and levied a 10,000 HNL fine (US $480) against FHIA.
344
  FHIA appealed the 
fine with the STSS on December 3.
345
  Nearly eight months later, on July 15, 2010, Honduran 
Minister of Labor Ávila declared that FHIA’s appeal was without merit.346 According to the 
STSS, the defense presented in the appeal was not sufficient to show compliance with 
Convention 87.
347
  The STSS transferred the 10,000 HNL (US $480) fine levied on FHIA to the 
Attorney General for collection.
348
  FHIA paid the fine on January 10, 2011.
349
  On February 2, 
2011, the STSS closed the case because FHIA had paid the fine.
350
  The STSS provided no 
evidence, however, that it followed up on its July 28, 2009 order that FHIA correct its 
Convention 87 and protección del estado violations with respect to the unlawful dismissals of 
founding union members.  Only three of those workers were rehired, and the STSS played no 
part in their rehiring.
351
   
 
On July 3, 2012, the STSS conducted a general inspection of FHIA and found that the employer 
had failed to pay the minimum wage, improperly paid the 13
th
 and 14
th
 month bonuses,
352
 and 
failed to provide legally required vacation.
353
  The STSS notified FHIA of the July 3 findings on 
September 12, 2012.  FHIA appealed the new findings on October 17, 2012, and STSS granted a 
ten-day period to present evidence.
354
  In May 2013, the STSS stated that a sanction against 
FHIA was in progress for the violations identified on July 30, 2012.
355
 The OTLA, despite 
requesting, had not received any further information about whether the sanction was imposed or 
paid as of January 26, 2014.  
 
2. Sur Agrícola de Honduras and Cultivos de Vegetales del Sur 
 
Sur Agrícola de Honduras and Cultivos de Vegetales del Sur (SurAgro) are farms on the same 
plantation operating in Choluteca, Honduras, under the auspices of a company called Grupo Sol, 
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 STSS notification report of inspection at FHIA, July 28, 2009. 
343
 FHIA response to STSS findings, July 30, 2009.  
344
 STSS Inspector General decision regarding FHIA, November 16, 2009; GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific 
questions, page 18, August 22, 2012. 
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346
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 STSS decision on FHIA’s appeal, July 15, 2010. 
348
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349
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350
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351
 OTLA interview with SITRAFHIA leader, July 2012. 
352
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th
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th
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salary, paid in June and December. Legislative Decree 135-94 (October 12, 1991), Legislative Decree 131 (January 
11, 1982). 
353
 STSS record of inspection at FHIA, July 3, 2012. 
354
 STSS report on follow-up inspections at workplaces named in the CAFTA-DR complaint, December 18, 2012. 
355
 OTLA meeting with STSS officials, May 20, 2013; see also: General Report on Inspections of Companies in 
Relation to CAFTA-DR, undated, received May 20, 2013. 
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which exports melons to the United States.
356
  According to the Submission, the plantation 
employs between 3,000 and 5,000 workers.
357
  The OTLA found that the farms have the same 
management and that the STSS does not differentiate between them for purposes of labor law 
enforcement actions.
358
  The Submission alleges that the GOH failed to enforce labor laws 
related to acceptable conditions of work at SurAgro.
359
  
 
Workers interviewed by the OTLA reported that the plantation has consistently failed to pay the 
minimum wage since 2005.
360
  According to the Submission, beginning in May 2006, COSIBAH 
made verbal complaints to the STSS regional office in Choluteca about the non-payment of 
minimum wages, and other violations, on a monthly basis and the STSS allegedly told 
COSIBAH that it did not have a vehicle or inspector available.
361
 The STSS did not conduct an 
inspection of SurAgro until March 2007.
 362
  
 
On March 8, 2007, the STSS conducted a general inspection and found numerous Labor Code 
violations:
 363
 
 
 a range of OSH violations, including: 
o failure to provide potable water, 
o failure to report OSH incidents to the proper authorities, 
o allowing children to use hazardous chemicals, and 
o failure to provide personal protective equipment;364   
 employment of eight children (all age 17) without STSS permission;365  
 failure to pay the minimum wage;  
 failure to pay overtime; 
 failure to provide the inspector with requested documents;  
 the employment of five foreign executives without work permits (including the owner) 
and 10 Nicaraguan workers without work authorizations;  
 failure to provide written work contracts; 
 failure to adopt internal work rules;  
 failure to enroll workers in the IHSS;  
 lack of payroll/employment records in accordance with the IHSS model;  
 failure to provide the required day of rest;  
                                                          
356
 Email from U.S. Embassy in Honduras to the OTLA, November 30, 2012; OTLA interview with SurAgro owner, 
July 14, 2012. 
357
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358
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 failure to give workers legal holidays; 
 failure to pay or allow vacations; 
 failure to pay the 13th month bonus; 
 failure to pay the 14th month bonus; and  
 failure to pay the education bonus.366 
   
This inspection resulted in several follow-up notifications to the company.  The STSS notified 
the company of the child labor findings on June 2, 2007, and gave the company 15 business days 
to remediate the violations.
367
  The STSS notified the company of the OSH findings on July 9, 
2007, and gave the company 60 business days to remediate the violations.
 368  
The STSS notified 
the company on November 2, 2007, of the other Labor Code violations found in the March 8 
inspection.
369
  In total, the STSS calculated that SurAgro owed workers 5,166,818 HNL (US 
$248,166) in unpaid compensation for failing to pay the minimum wage, overtime payments, 
legal holidays, and other compensation related violations.
370
  The notification ordered the 
company to pay the workers the unpaid compensation and correct the violations within three to 
30 business days depending on the violation.
371
  
 
On December 14, 2007, the STSS re-inspected to check for continued use of child labor and 
found that the violations had been corrected.
372
  Also on December 14, the STSS re-inspected to 
determine whether SurAgro had corrected the violations that were the subject of the November 
2, 2007, notification and found that SurAgro had not corrected them.
373
  On March 6, 2008, the 
STSS re-inspected again and found that the company had not corrected the OSH violations found 
in the March 8, 2007, inspection.
374
 The STSS gave the company another 60 business days to 
remediate the violations.
375
   
 
In August 2008, workers conducted a work stoppage to protest the continued nonpayment of the 
minimum wage.
376
  Shortly thereafter, the company raised wages from 65 to 80 HNL (US $3.12 
to 3.84) per day.
377
  In 2008, the minimum wage for employees of agricultural sector businesses 
that employed 16 or more workers was 104 HNL (US $4.99) per day.
378
  
 
On October 14, 2008, the STSS imposed a 90,000 HNL (US $4,323) fine on the company for 
some, but not all, of the violations found in the March 8, 2007, inspection.
379
  The illegal 
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employment of eight children carried a 25,000 HNL (US $1,201) fine,
380
  and fines of 5,000 
HNL (US $240) each were imposed for 13 of the other Labor Code violations.
381
  The STSS did 
not levy any fines for the failure to correct the OSH violations or the failure to follow legal 
requirements for legal holidays.  On October 22, 2008, the company paid the 90,000 HNL (US 
$4,323) fine but not the 5,166,818 HNL (US $248,166) in unpaid compensation owed to workers 
or correct the underlying violations, other than child labor.
382
  On November 14, 2008, the STSS 
Inspector General closed the case because SurAgro had paid the fine.
383
  It does not appear that 
the STSS took steps to ensure compliance with its remediation order. 
 
On November 19, 2009, the STSS conducted another inspection and found a lack of individual 
work contracts, failure to adopt internal work rules, lack of IHSS model payroll records, and 
failure to pay the minimum wage.
384
  On March 1, 2010, the STSS notified the company of the 
November 19, 2009, inspection results and gave the company three business days to remedy the 
violations.
385
  The STSS re-inspected on March 9, 2010, and found that the violations had not 
been corrected.
386
  At that time, the STSS in Choluteca forwarded the findings to the Inspector 
General at STSS headquarters to apply fines.
387
  Despite the OTLA’s request, the GOH did not 
provide the OTLA with any documents regarding the November 2009 inspection,
388
 and the 
OTLA obtained all documents related to this inspection from the submitters. The documents did 
not contain evidence that the STSS applied fines or otherwise sanctioned the company based on 
the violations found in the November 2009 inspection.    
 
In July 2012, SurAgro workers interviewed by the OTLA reported ongoing Labor Code 
violations, including that the company failed to pay the minimum wage, the 13
th
 and 14
th
 month 
bonuses, the seventh day bonus, and overtime; failed to provide personal protective equipment 
and potable water; imposed a 300 HNL (US $14.40) penalty for missing a day of work (even 
with permission from a supervisor) in addition to that day’s salary; and threatened workers with 
dismissal for speaking with the STSS.
389
 The workers that the OTLA interviewed reported that 
the company no longer employs children.
390
  During a separate interview, a former manager 
called a current manager at the company in the presence of the OTLA and confirmed that the rate 
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of pay was 95 HNL (US $4.56) per day, or 15 HNL (US $.72) below the required minimum 
wage in July 2012.
391
  That was the same amount that workers interviewed by the OTLA 
reported receiving.  
 
As part of its effort to inspect companies named in the Submission, on September 10, 2012, the 
STSS attempted to conduct a general inspection at SurAgro, but the plantation staff denied the 
inspectors access.
392
  On September 11, the inspectors requested that the Inspector General at 
STSS headquarters impose a sanction on the company for failing to allow them access but did 
not report the incident to the corresponding labor court.
393
  In a follow-up report, the STSS stated 
that an inspector attempted to notify the company of the sanction for failure to grant access to an 
STSS inspector but was unable to do so because management was not onsite.
394
  In that report, 
the STSS also noted that it found violations related to minimum wage, vacation, internal work 
rules, individual contracts, and record keeping, but did not specify when the STSS found those 
violations.
395
  In May 2013, the STSS reported to the OTLA that it would conduct a re-
inspection.
396
 As of the publication of this report, despite its request, the OTLA had received no 
evidence regarding a re-inspection or other follow-up action by the STSS at SurAgro and has no 
evidence that the violations have stopped or been remediated.
397
  
 
3. Las Tres Hermanas 
 
Las Tres Hermanas is a banana plantation located in El Progreso, Honduras.  It consists of three 
farms: Santa Bárbara, Ana María, and María.  At the time of the Submission, the plantation 
supplied bananas exclusively to Chiquita through its subsidiary, the Tela Railroad Company.
398
  
The plantation was directly owned by Chiquita until 2005, when Hurricane Gamma forced the 
plantation to close.
399
  Under Chiquita, workers were represented by the El Surco Workers’ 
Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores de El Surco, SITRASURCO) and had a collective bargaining 
agreement in place.
400
  The plantation reopened as Las Tres Hermanas in May 2006,
401
 and 
COSIBAH began organizing at Las Tres Hermanas in 2007.
402
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 Letter from Las Tres Hermanas General Manager to the OTLA, December 13, 2012.  
400
 Report from submitters, received June 28, 2012 (undated); OTLA interview with Las Tres Hermanas 
Management, December 13, 2012. 
401
 OTLA interview with Las Tres Hermanas management, December 13, 2012.  
402
 A former organizer with COSIBAH confirmed this in an October 4, 2012 email to OTLA officials; Submission, 
page 35. 
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The Submission alleges that the GOH failed to enforce labor laws related to anti-union 
discrimination at Las Tres Hermanas.
403
 The submitters also allege that, after the Submission 
was filed, the company sought to form an employer-dominated union. 
 
According to the Submission, on January 24, 2010, COSIBAH met with 19 workers, 
 
all but one 
of whom signed documents to initiate the process of formally creating a union.
404
  The following 
day, 17 of those workers were dismissed and escorted from the plantation by security guards.
405
  
The OTLA interviewed one of those workers as well as a representative from COSIBAH, who 
corroborated the general sequence of events alleged in the Submission.
406
  
 
On January 26, 2010, the 17 dismissed workers signed a statement alleging that management told 
them that the company fired them because of their involvement in forming a union.
407
  Las Tres 
Hermanas management told the OTLA, however, that the dismissals were a necessary reduction 
in personnel due to the slow pace of business after an October 2008 hurricane forced the 
plantation to close for four months.
408
  Nonetheless, according to the Submission, on January 29, 
Las Tres Hermanas allegedly asked remaining workers to assist management in finding 
replacements for the fired workers.
409
 
 
Throughout the month of February, COSIBAH and the dismissed workers met with Las Tres 
Hermanas management to negotiate reinstatement.  According to the workers, on February 22, 
they came to a verbal agreement for reinstatement, including payment of a 2,000 HNL (US $96) 
production bonus owed to them from 2009, company recognition of the workers’ seniority, and 
the option for workers to choose between permanent or temporary contracts.
410
  The workers 
alleged, however, that when five of the dismissed workers returned to the plantation on March 8, 
2010, pursuant to the February 22 agreement, Las Tres Hermanas asked each of them to sign a 
document that departed from the agreement by failing to include recognition of seniority, the 
2,000 HNL (US $96) payment, and the possibility of a permanent contract.
411
  
 
Further direct negotiations did not prove fruitful, and COSIBAH asked the STSS to intervene.
412
  
The STSS facilitated three conciliation meetings between the dismissed workers and Las Tres 
Hermanas management, but the parties did not arrive at a mutually agreeable solution.
413
 The 
GOH did not provide any evidence that the STSS took further actions with respect to the 
dismissed workers.  
                                                          
403
 Submission, pages 34-37. 
404
 Submission, page 34. 
405
 List of dismissed workers provided to the OTLA by the submitters, June 28, 2012; Letter from COSIBAH to 
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On June 11, 2010, four workers filed a lawsuit against Las Tres Hermanas for unlawful 
dismissal.
414
  Two dropped out of the lawsuit, and two others reportedly won a favorable ruling 
in the corresponding labor court.
415
  Although the OTLA requested all relevant court documents, 
neither the submitters nor the GOH provided any court records pertaining to this case.
416
  The 
Submission alleges that of the remaining workers, some returned to work under the condition 
that they would not organize a union and that the others were never reinstated.
417
    
 
On September 3, 2012, workers at Las Tres Hermanas notified the company of their intent to 
form the Banana Workers’ Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria de Banano, 
SITRAINBA) and provided documentation of their legal personality on October 26, 2012.
418
  
The company refused to act upon a petition by SITRAINBA to engage in collective 
bargaining.
419
  As of October 2013, the company had failed to send a representative to any of the 
three STSS-led mediation sessions, and the collective bargaining process had progressed to the 
conciliation phase.
420
  
 
Workers allege that the company has sought to form an employer-dominated union, the Union of 
Workers of the Ana María, Bárbara, and María Farms (Sindicato de Trabajadores de las Fincas 
Ana María, Bárbara, y María, SITRAFMARIA), as a result of the SITRAINBA notification.
421
  
The company denied any involvement in SITRAFMARIA.
422
  The STSS told the OTLA that it 
was aware of the allegations that SITRAFMARIA was an employer-dominated union being used 
to thwart the independent SITRAINBA, but its role in approving the legal personality of a union 
is supposed to be neutral and based on whether the union meets the standard criteria.  As a result, 
the STSS did not investigate the allegations.
423
   
 
SITRAINBA reported to the OTLA and the STSS that the company dismissed three of their 
members because of their union activities between October 2012 and January 2013.
424
   
COSIBAH reported to the OTLA that one additional SITRAINBA member was dismissed in 
October 2013 and that Las Tres Hermanas management failed to send a representative to an 
STSS conciliation session regarding that October 2013 dismissal.
425
 According to the 
information the STSS has provided to the OTLA through the publication of this report, the STSS 
                                                          
414
 Submission, page 36. 
415
 OTLA interview with Las Tres Hermanas management, December 13, 2012; Submission, page 36.  
416
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417
 Submission, page 36. 
418
 Emails from COSIBAH to the OTLA and Honduran Minister of Labor, February 2013. 
419
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425
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has not facilitated conciliation or mediation sessions with respect to the three workers dismissed 
between October 2012 and January 2013, nor taken any other actions, including conducting an 
investigation, despite being notified of the allegedly anti-union dismissals on several 
occasions.
426
        
 
In December 2013, Rainforest Alliance withdrew its certification of a consortium of banana 
plantations that included Las Tres Hermanas.
427
  As a result, Chiquita purchased the plantation, 
and the union reported in December 2014 that the situation remains unchanged with respect to 
the union.
428
     
 
4. Okra Sur S. de R.L.  
 
Okra Sur is an okra and melon plantation located in Choluteca, Honduras.  The Submission 
alleges that the GOH failed to enforce labor laws related to acceptable conditions of work at 
Okra Sur.
429
  In addition, the OTLA found evidence that the GOH failed to enforce labor laws 
related to the minimum age for the employment of children. 
 
According to the Submission, COSIBAH verbally requested that the STSS inspect Okra Sur on 
numerous occasions, beginning in 2007.
430
  The STSS conducted a general inspection on 
February 26, 2010, nearly three years later.
431
  The STSS inspection identified numerous Labor 
Code violations, including lack of written work contracts, failure to enroll workers in the IHSS, 
and failure to pay the minimum wage, education bonus, and 13
th
 and 14
th
 month bonuses.
432
  The 
company was given eight days to correct the violations.
433
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 STSS report on follow-up inspections at workplaces named in the CAFTA-DR complaint, December 18, 2012; 
OTLA meeting with STSS officials, May 20, 2013; General Report on Inspections of Companies in Relation to 
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2010.  
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 STSS notification report of inspection at Okra Sur, March 25, 2010; Report on Labor Inspections at Foreign-
owned Plantations in Choluteca, STSS Choluteca Director, March 25, 2010.  
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The STSS conducted an OSH inspection on April 9, 2010.
434
  In addition to various OSH 
violations, such as failure to provide personal protective equipment and failure to provide potable 
drinking water, the inspectors found that the company was in violation of child labor laws in 
relation to four workers, who were 17 year-old children working without prior permission from 
the STSS.
435
  The OSH inspectors found that the child laborers’ shifts were longer than the 
maximum six hours permitted by law and that the company had failed to pay them the minimum 
wage.
436,437
  The STSS gave the company 60 business days to correct the OSH violations and 15 
business days to correct the child labor violations.
438
  
 
On the same day as the OSH inspection, the STSS conducted a re-inspection to verify 
compliance with the orders stemming from the February 26 general inspection.  The STSS found 
that the education bonus had not been paid but the inspection report was silent as to the 
remediation of the other violations, including the failure to pay the minimum wage.
439
  Despite 
OTLA’s request, the GOH did not provide the OTLA with any documentation to show that the 
STSS further pursued enforcement of any of the previously identified violations, including with 
respect to child labor.
440,441  
 
According to the Submission, in April 2010, Okra Sur workers conducted a work stoppage to 
protest working conditions at the plantation.
442
  The Submission alleges that management made 
death threats against the workers participating in the work stoppage and that nine were fired as a 
result of their participation in the stoppage.
443
  On April 12, the STSS facilitated a conciliation 
meeting between the fired workers and Okra Sur, but the parties did not reach an agreement.
444
  
The Submission states that the nine workers took their case to court and won a favorable ruling 
in October 2011.
445
  The OTLA requested the relevant court documents from the GOH but the 
GOH did not provide any.
446
  COSIBAH was unable to locate the court records, and the nine 
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 STSS report of inspection at Okra Sur, April 9, 2010. 
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 STSS report of inspection at Okra Sur, April 9, 2010. 
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workers were unavailable to meet with the OTLA.
447
  Therefore, the OTLA was unable to verify 
the details of the judicial proceedings.
448
  
  
In July 2012, Okra Sur workers reported to the OTLA that labor law violations were ongoing, 
including the full-time employment of children as young as 14; failure to pay the minimum 
wage; lack of access to potable water; and 300 HNL (US $14.40) deductions, plus the day’s 
salary, for missing a day of work.
449
  Management also met with the OTLA in July 2012 and 
stated that the company does not employ children and that workers are paid according to the 
minimum wage law.
450
  
 
As part of its effort to inspect companies named in the Submission, on September 12, 2012, the 
STSS conducted a general inspection at Okra Sur and found a range of OSH violations; the 
inspection record indicated that more analysis would be forthcoming after the STSS reviewed 
documents collected from the employer, including payroll records and copies of employment 
contracts.
451
 The STSS did not find any child labor violations in that inspection. In a follow-up 
report, the STSS noted that it had identified violations related to minimum wage, internal work 
rules, and record keeping, and found during a re-inspection that those violations had not been 
corrected; however, the follow-up report made no mention of the OSH violations.
452
  The STSS 
reported to the OTLA on May 20, 2013 that the company had not corrected any of the violations 
identified in September 2012 and that the STSS was in the process of imposing a sanction for 
each violation.
453
  During the May 20, 2013, meeting with the STSS, COSIBAH leaders 
indicated that child labor violations have never been remediated at Okra Sur, despite the STSS 
finding none in September 2012.
454
 
 
5.  Agroexportadora Dome 
 
Prior to closing in 2010, the okra plantation Agroexportadora Dome was located in Choluteca, 
Honduras, and employed approximately 150 workers.
455
  The Submission alleges that the GOH 
failed to enforce labor laws related to the minimum age for the employment of children and 
acceptable conditions of work at Agroexportadora Dome.
456
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 OTLA email to former COSIBAH organizer, October 4, 2012; OTLA interview with COSIBAH (Choluteca), 
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According to the Submission, COSIBAH requested inspections on six occasions between April 
2008 and February 2010, claiming the plantation failed to pay the minimum wage, but the STSS 
did not conduct an inspection during that time period.
457
  On March 11, 2010, the new regional 
director of the STSS in Choluteca ordered a general inspection of the plantation.
458
  The 
inspection uncovered substantial violations of the Labor Code, including failure to pay the 
minimum wage, employment of 60 children in violation of child labor laws, failure to maintain 
payroll records, failure to adopt internal work rules,
 
employment of 55 Nicaraguans without 
work authorizations, lack of written work contracts,
459
 and various OSH violations.
460
 
 
The STSS notified Agroexportadora Dome management of its findings with respect to the non-
OSH violations on March 25, 2010, and gave the company deadlines that varied between three 
and 30 business days to correct the violations.
461
 The STSS notified the company of its findings 
with respect to OSH violations sometime in April.
462
 On April 21, the STSS conducted a re-
inspection,
463
 though the deadline for remedying certain violations had not yet expired.
464
   The 
re-inspection report states that the child labor violation had been partially corrected but provides 
as evidence the dismissal of “foreign and Nicaraguan” workers,465 although most of the children 
found working illegally were Honduran.
466
  The STSS found that the company had not corrected 
the other violations, including failure to pay the minimum wage.
467
  
 
The STSS in Choluteca sent its findings to the STSS headquarters in Tegucigalpa on May 7, 
2010.
468
  On August 2, the STSS Inspector General in Tegucigalpa nullified the notification due 
to the arbitrary three and 30 day deadlines granted to Agroexportadora to correct the violations, 
as well as the fact that the April 21 re-inspection was conducted before the 30 day deadline had 
expired.
469
  On November 11, an inspector went to Agroexportadora Dome to re-notify the 
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company and found that the plantation was shut down.
470
  The STSS took no further actions to 
follow up on its findings or sanction the company or its owners.
471
 
 
In May 2013, the STSS reported that it found that the plantation had reopened in Choluteca and 
planned to conduct an inspection.
472
 
 
6. Agroindustria Pacifico S. de R.L.  
 
Agro Industrias Pacifico (Agripac) is a melon plantation located in Choluteca, Honduras.  The 
Submission alleges that the GOH failed to enforce labor laws related to acceptable conditions of 
work at Agripac.
473
 
 
According to the Submission, COSIBAH began requesting labor inspections at Agripac in 
September 2009 regarding minimum wage and overtime violations, as well as failure to enroll 
workers in the IHSS.
474
 The STSS conducted an inspection on March 5, 2010, but the plantation 
staff denied inspectors access to part of the worksite.
475
  The inspectors found various OSH 
violations, lack of payroll records, failure to adopt internal work rules, failure to pay the 
minimum wage, failure to enroll six workers in the IHSS, lack of written contracts, failure to pay 
overtime, and lack of employment records.
476
 The STSS notified Agripac of the OSH violations 
on April 13 and gave the company 60 business days to correct the violations and notified 
Agripac of the remaining Labor Code violations on March 25 and gave the company three to 30 
business days to correct the other violations.
477
 
 
Agripac responded to the inspector access violation with a letter saying it had resulted from a 
failure of communication and would not be a problem in the future.
478
  On April 30, 2010, the 
STSS conducted a re-inspection of the plantation.
479
  The STSS closed the investigation on 
March 5, 2011, and later told the OTLA that the re-inspection document showed that all 
                                                          
470
 STSS report to regional inspector general regarding Agroexportadora Dome, November 11, 2010; GOH answers 
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471
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, pages 27 and 28 (the volumes of documents referenced in the 
response do not contain any information after November 11, 2010).  
472
 OTLA meeting with STSS officials, May 20, 2013; see also: General Report on Inspections of Companies in 
Relation to CAFTA-DR, undated, received May 20, 2013. 
473
 Submission, pages 41-43.  
474
 Submission, page 41. The STSS does not have records of such requests and the OTLA was unable to verify 
whether the requests were made. 
475
 STSS notification report of inspection at Agripac, March 25, 2010, Report on Labor Inspections at Foreign-
owned Plantations in Choluteca, STSS Choluteca Director, March 25, 2010.  
476
  Report on Labor Inspections at Foreign-owned Plantations in Choluteca, STSS Choluteca Director, March 25, 
2010.  
477
 STSS report of inspection at Agripac, March 5, 2010; STSS notification report of inspection at Agripac, March 
25, 2010; STSS notification report of occupational safety and health inspection at Agripac, April 13, 2010. 
478
 Letter from Agripac legal representative to the STSS, April 27, 2010.  
479
 STSS report of re-inspection at Agripac, April 30, 2010.  
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violations had been corrected.
480
 The re-inspection report, however, states only that the minimum 
wage violation had been corrected and is silent about the other violations.
481
 
 
In July 2012, workers interviewed by the OTLA said that Agripac continued to fail to pay the 
minimum wage, overtime, 13
th
 and 14
th
 month benefits, seventh-day bonus, and holiday pay.
482
 
Workers also reported that when they take sick days, they are penalized with deductions from 
pay or dismissal and that the company suspends workers for two weeks if they miss work on a 
Sunday.
483
  
 
As part of its effort to inspect companies named in the Submission, on September 12, 2012, the 
STSS conducted a general inspection at Agripac and found the following OSH violations:  
inadequate facilities, lack of a medical center, lack of a cafeteria, and lack of break areas. The 
inspection report did not specify a deadline by which Agripac would be required to correct the 
violations.
484
  In a follow-up report, the STSS noted that it planned to conduct a general 
inspection in January 2013, during the harvest season.
485
  As of the publication of this report, the 
STSS has not provided the OTLA with any information regarding further inspections, sanctions, 
or other follow-up actions by the STSS at Agripac, despite the OTLA’s request for such 
information.
486
 
 
7. La Pradera 
 
According to the Submission, La Pradera was a small melon producer in Choluteca, Honduras, 
that employed approximately 30 workers.
487
  The Submission alleges that the GOH failed to 
enforce labor laws related to acceptable conditions of work at La Pradera.
488
 
 
The Submission alleges that, beginning in 2007, COSIBAH verbally requested every two to 
three months that the STSS conduct inspections at La Pradera for failure to pay the minimum 
wage, failure to pay overtime, and failure to pay the seventh-day bonus.
489
  The GOH does not 
have any records of an inspection or a request for an inspection at La Pradera.
490
  The plantation 
had closed by the time the OTLA began its investigation.  Although the OTLA requested all 
relevant documents, neither the GOH nor the submitters were able to provide the OTLA with any 
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documents pertaining to La Pradera.
491
  The OTLA was unable to locate any former La Pradera 
workers or a representative of the employer during the course of the submission review. 
 
8. Plantas Ornamentales 
 
Plantas Ornamentales is an ornamental plant farm in San Marcos, Honduras.
492
 The Submission 
alleges that the GOH failed to enforce labor laws related to acceptable conditions of work at 
Plantas Ornamentales.
493
 
 
The Submission alleges that in 2008, COSIBAH began making requests to the STSS for 
inspections of Plantas Ornamentales regarding minimum wage violations, failure to pay 
overtime, and failure to pay the seventh-day bonus, but were told each time that no inspector was 
available.
494
 After the Submission was filed, Agrolibano became the majority shareholder of the 
company in April 2012.
495
 
 
In April 2010, the STSS attempted to conduct an inspection, but inspectors were denied access to 
the plantation by the security guard.
496
  The STSS confirmed that the company denied access to 
inspectors at least three times; however, the STSS has not indicated to OTLA whether it reported 
those denials of access to the corresponding labor court.
497
  On April 30, the STSS in Choluteca 
sent a report to the STSS in Tegucigalpa requesting sanctions, citing these three different 
instances of the company denying access to inspectors.
498
  The STSS notified Plantas 
Ornamentales of the inspector’s report of denial of access on August 12 and gave the company 
three business days to respond;
499
 an STSS inspector delivered the same notification again on 
November 10.
500
  In July 2011, almost a year later, the STSS in Tegucigalpa determined that the 
three-day period for Plantas Ornamentales to respond to the notification had lapsed.
501
 As of the 
publication of this report, the OTLA did not receive any evidence indicating that the STSS had 
collected a 5,000 HNL (US $240) fine stemming from the April 30, 2010, report.
502
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495
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496
 STSS report of inspection at Plantas Ornamentales, April 27, 2010; GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific 
questions, page 29, August 22, 2012. 
497
 OTLA’s specific questions to the GOH, June 11, 2012; GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, page 30, 
August 22, 2012.  
498
 STSS Choluteca report to STSS Tegucigalpa regarding Plantas Ornamentales’ denial of access to the inspector, 
April 30, 2010.  
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 Letter from STSS Inspector General to Plantas Ornamentales, Oficio No. 268, August 12, 2010.  
500
 STSS report confirming delivery of August 12, 2010 letter to Plantas Ornamentales, November 10, 2010. 
501
 STSS determination regarding Plantas Ornamentales, July 2011.  
502
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, page 30, August 22, 2012. 
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Plantas Ornamentales participates in the National Plan for Employment by Hours, a new hiring 
scheme that expands the allowable scope of temporary work contracts.
503
  Under this plan, 
employers must be audited and inspected prior to receiving permission to hire certain temporary 
employees.  Plantas Ornamentales underwent such an inspection on March 18, 2011.
504
  The 
STSS uncovered numerous violations at the plantation, including failure to pay the minimum 
wage,
505
 failure to adopt internal work rules, and failure to pay the 13
th
 and 14
th
 month bonus.
506
 
On November 21, the STSS notified the company of its findings, gave it three business days to 
correct the violations, and ordered it to pay workers a minimum of 224,445 HNL (US $10,780) 
total in back wages.
507
  On January 26, 2012, the STSS conducted a re-inspection, which 
concluded that the company had corrected the violations and noted that most of the employees 
named in the March 2011 inspection report no longer worked at Plantas Ornamentales.
508
  STSS 
documents show that workers who remained employed at Plantas Ornamentales at the time of the 
re-inspection did receive the back wages owed to them.
509
 
 
As part of its effort to inspect companies named in the Submission, on September 11, 2012, the 
STSS conducted a general inspection of Plantas Ornamentales and uncovered minimum wage 
violations.
510
  In a follow-up report, the STSS stated that it ordered a re-inspection related to 
minimum wage, individual contracts, and illegally employed foreign nationals.
511
  In May 2013, 
the STSS reported to the OTLA that the violations had been corrected.
512
    
 
9. Azucarera la Grecia 
 
Azucarera la Grecia is a sugar plantation currently owned by the Guatemalan company Grupo 
Pantaleon in Choluteca, Honduras.  The workers were unionized and had a collective bargaining 
agreement until Grupo Pantaleon bought the plantation in 1999.
513
  The Submission alleges that 
the GOH failed to enforce labor laws related to acceptable conditions of work at Azucarera la 
Grecia.
514
 
 
The plantation operates through at least three different sub-entities: Servisur, Serdiver, and 
Servimar.
515
  Employees rotate among those companies on temporary contracts approximately 
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515
 OTLA interviews with Azucarera la Grecia workers, July 2012. 
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every six months.
516
  Under the Labor Code, temporary contracts are exceptions and are only 
legal where the nature of the work is temporary.
517
  Workers reported to the OTLA that although 
the companies issuing their paychecks change, their actual jobs remain the same; they have the 
same supervisors, hours and locations of work, tasks, and tools regardless of which company is 
responsible for their temporary contracts.
518
  
 
On May 21, 2008, the STSS ordered a general inspection of the company, which was carried out 
the same day.
519
  Inspectors spoke with the 16 managers at Azucarera la Grecia but not with any 
of the hundreds of subcontracted workers.
520
 On May 30, the STSS completed its inspection 
report and found no Labor Code violations.
521
 
 
The STSS conducted an OSH inspection of Azucarera la Grecia on January 6, 2011, and found 
various violations, including failure to provide personal protective equipment, implement an 
OSH plan, report workplace accidents to the STSS and the corresponding labor court in 
accordance with Labor Code article 435, among others.
522
  The STSS notified the company of its 
findings on February 1 and gave the company 60 business days to correct the violations.
523
  The 
documents provided to the OTLA by the GOH show that Azucarera la Grecia was notified of a 
sanction on December 21, 2011; however, the document does not specify the underlying 
infractions or the amount of the fine, and the OTLA cannot determine whether this sanction 
relates to the January 2011 OSH violations or to other matters.
524
  The OTLA requested all 
relevant documents from the GOH, but did not receive evidence as to whether Serdiver or 
Azucarera la Grecia has paid or appealed the fine, or remediated the OSH violations.
525
  
 
In July 2012, workers interviewed by the OTLA reported numerous violations of the Labor 
Code, including failure to pay the 13
th
 and 14
th
 month bonuses, imposing a 300 HNL (US 
$14.40) penalty for missing a day of work in addition to that day’s salary, failure to provide 
workers with copies of their contracts or time to review them before signing, requiring workers 
to pay for company-provided personal protective equipment, shifts of up to 24 hours during 
harvest, and failure to pay the night work premium.
526
 
 
As part of its effort to inspect companies named in the Submission, on September 10, 2012, the 
STSS conducted a general inspection of Azucarera la Grecia.
527
  The OTLA received no further 
information on that inspection; however, the STSS reported that during a subsequent inspection 
conducted on January 30, 2013, the STSS found that the company was in violation of minimum 
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 OTLA reviewed a substantial number of termination letters, paystubs, and other employment-contract related 
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 Labor Code, Article 47.  
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wage and overtime laws.
528
  The company was notified of the violations, and the inspection 
report was sent to the STSS headquarters in Tegucigalpa.
529
  In addition, the report notes that the 
STSS conducted an OSH inspection and provided recommendations.
530
  The report on the 
January 2013 inspection provided to the OTLA in May 2013 did not provide information 
regarding the status of the violations or STSS follow-up efforts to ensure remediation of the 
identified violations or fine Azucarera la Grecia.
531
   
 
C. Port Sector 
 
Puerto Cortés, the largest port in Central America, is located on the Atlantic coast of Honduras.  
Operations at the port are managed by the National Port Company (Empresa Nacional Portuaria, 
ENP), a state-run entity in charge of Honduras’ four ports.532  Shipping companies operating out 
of Puerto Cortés often employ subcontracted workers through hiring agencies.  The city of 
Puerto Cortés is also the site of a regional STSS office.  The Submission alleges that violations 
of freedom of association and acceptable conditions of work related to minimum wage, hours of 
work, and OSH occur at the port with impunity, affecting subcontracted stevedores, security 
workers, fork lift operators, container checkers, and planners.
533
  
 
1. Subcontracted Stevedores 
 
Seaboard Honduras (Seaboard) is one of many shipping companies operating at Puerto Cortés.
534
  
On July 17, 2007, the Dockworkers’ Trade Union (Sindicato Gremial de Trabajadores de 
Muelle, SGTM) filed a lawsuit on behalf of 19 workers against Seaboard in the Puerto Cortés 
Labor Court for allegedly unlawful dismissal and sought payment of severance, vacation time, 
13
th
 and 14
th
 month bonuses, overtime wages, lost wages from the date of firing, and legal 
costs.
535
  According to the lawsuit, the workers were dismissed verbally on April 18, 2007.
536
   
 
Prior to the lawsuit, workers asked the STSS Labor Inspectorate in Puerto Cortés to intervene in 
order to confirm that they had been dismissed and to assist them in obtaining payment of their 
severance.  According to the lawsuit, each time that the labor inspector attempted to interview 
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 OTLA meeting with STSS officials, May 20, 2013; see also: General Report on Inspections of Companies in 
Relation to CAFTA-DR, undated, received May 20, 2013. 
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Seaboard’s Regional Manager, he was unavailable.537  On May 17, 2007, the labor inspector 
interviewed the Regional Manager, who confirmed that the workers were fired verbally and 
indicated that he had been instructed to not pay them severance because the company did not 
consider them permanent workers.
538
  The lawsuit states that the workers had been working for 
Seaboard on a continuous basis since their dates of hire, three as early as 2002 and one since 
1999.
539
  The lawsuit also stated that the workers’ hours exceeded the limits established by the 
Labor Code and that they were not paid overtime wages.
540
  Despite requesting information from 
the SGTM and the GOH, the OTLA has not received information on the outcome of this case.
541
   
 
The Submission alleges that on four occasions in 2008 and 2009, a former SGTM president, José 
Edgardo Contreras, verbally reported to the regional STSS office allegations of labor law 
violations committed by shipping companies at Puerto Cortés against subcontracted stevedores 
with respect to non-payment of minimum wages, nonpayment of 13
th
 and 14
th
 month bonuses, 
and lack of safety equipment.
542
  The Submission alleges that in no instance did the STSS 
investigate or otherwise intervene and that the STSS responded on each occasion that it did not 
have inspectors available, did not have vehicles or funds to pay for gasoline to carry out the 
investigation, or both.
543
  The GOH reported to the OTLA that it did not find anything in its files 
related to these inspection requests.
544
  The STSS also does not appear to have inspected any of 
the shipping companies operating at Puerto Cortés when in September 2012 it conducted general 
inspections of companies discussed in the Submission.
545
 
 
2. Security Workers 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
The Submission alleges that the GOH failed to enforce laws related to acceptable conditions of 
work with respect to security workers at the ENP.
546
  On October 22, 2010, at the request of the 
security workers’ legal representative, the STSS conducted inspections into wage and hour 
violations committed against security workers by ENP and produced two inspection reports.
547
  
The reports identified the following violations and ordered the ENP to correct them within three 
business days:
548
 
 From 2008-2010, the ENP did not pay the correct amount in overtime wages to 117 
security workers who worked a shift consisting of day and nighttime hours.  The STSS 
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determined that the ENP owed the affected workers a total of 2,913,545 HNL (US 
$139,939) in back pay.
549
  
 From 2008-2010, the ENP did not pay the correct seventh-day bonus to 119 security 
workers.
550
  The STSS determined that the ENP owed the affected workers a total of 
801,028 HNL (US $38,474) in back pay.
551
 
 
On November 18, 2010, the ENP submitted a written defense to the STSS challenging the 
overtime and seventh-day violations described in the October 22 inspection reports.
552
      
 
On April 6, 2011, after reviewing the evidence submitted by the parties, the Director of the 
STSS’s Legal Services Division issued a ruling imposing a fine on the ENP for failure to correct 
the violations identified in the October 22, 2010, inspection reports.
553
  On July 7, 2011, the 
Labor Inspector General issued a decision upholding the validity of the October 22, 2010, 
reports, declaring the ENP’s defenses to be without merit, imposing a fine of 10,000 HNL (US 
$480) on the ENP for the overtime violations and the seventh-day bonus violations, and stating 
that a 50 percent surcharge would be added to the penalty if the ENP repeated the violations.
554
  
The ENP paid the fine on February 6, 2012.
555
   
 
In July 2012, security workers reported to the OTLA that they have not been paid the overtime 
and seventh-day back wages for work performed in prior years, suggesting that the STSS did not 
take steps to ensure the ENP fully remedied the violations.    The workers told the OTLA, 
however, that the ENP is now generally paying them overtime and the seventh-day bonus 
correctly.
556
   
 
The Submission also alleges that the ENP employs between 130-150 security workers who have 
worked continuously but are on successive fixed-term, two-month contracts.
557
  Under Article 47 
of the Labor Code, when a temporary employment contract expires the presumption is that a 
permanent contract is established if the nature of the work performed is permanent or continuous 
and if the need for the employee to perform the work persists beyond the expiration of the 
contract.
558
  Temporary contracts are the exception rather than the rule and can only be used 
when the service or job to be performed is of a temporary nature.
559
  Several security workers 
interviewed by the OTLA indicated that they are misclassified as temporary employees by the 
ENP even though they have worked for the ENP continuously for several years and perform the 
same tasks as their permanent counterparts.
560
  The Submission alleges that ENP has violated 
these workers’ wage and hour protections by failing to properly calculate their overtime pay and 
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failing to provide paid vacation and other compensation benefits.
561
  Employees on temporary 
contracts reported to the OTLA that they are paid less than permanent employees performing the 
same job functions, do not receive overtime wages despite working more than eight hours per 
shift, do not receive the seventh-day bonus, are not enrolled in IHSS by the ENP, cannot use the 
ENP health clinic, and receive only 50 percent of their pay on sick days.
562
   
 
The STSS conducted a general inspection at the ENP on September 13, 2012, discussed in 
further detail below.
563
   Although the STSS reported that, with respect to temporary workers, the 
ENP does not pay the minimum wage, among other violations, the report did not specify which 
temporary workers were affected by these violations.
564
  As a result, the OTLA cannot determine 
whether the STSS inspected for violations alleged against temporary security workers.  
Additionally, although the STSS was aware of the allegations included in the Submission 
regarding misclassification of security guards as temporary at the ENP, the STSS did not 
investigate compliance with Article 47 of the Labor Code.
565
             
 
3. Fork Lift Operators, Container Checkers and Planners 
 
The ENP also employs forklift operators, container checkers, and planners (who check the 
weight balance on ships).  ENP management told the OTLA that it has temporary workers on 
call to assist the permanent workers during busy times.
566
  Temporary workers are paid by the 
hour and earn the minimum wage.
567
  The ENP stated that permanent workers’ salaries are 
higher because they are governed by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated 
with the SITRAENP, which includes terms regarding pay raises tied to seniority and years of 
service.
568
  According to a labor court finding, the temporary workers are outside of the 
bargaining unit and their employment relationships with the ENP are not governed by the 
collective bargaining agreement.
569
         
 
Workers interviewed in July 2012 provided documentation to the OTLA demonstrating several 
instances when they worked well over 80 or 100 hours in one week, despite a legal maximum of 
44 hours per week.
570
  One worker reported working 48 hours straight over a weekend due to the 
high volume of work, but added that she did so voluntarily because she needed the extra 
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money.
571
  ENP management similarly told the OTLA that there have been instances when 
workers worked, voluntarily, more than 24 consecutive hours.
572
  The ENP indicated that all 
ENP temporary workers have had to work more than 12 hours in one day, the maximum allowed 
under the Labor Code.
573
  The ENP further told the OTLA that it was in the process of training 
20 new temporary workers to avoid having the current workers work more than a 12-hour 
shift.
574
   
 
ENP management also told the OTLA that it pays workers the correct amount in overtime 
wages.
575
  Workers told the OTLA, however, that they do not always receive correct overtime 
pay and have never received paid vacation time or any other benefits, such as the seventh-day or 
the 13
th
 and 14
th
 month bonuses.
576
   
 
The Submission alleges that representatives from SGTM met with the Minister of Labor in 
Tegucigalpa and requested an inspection at the ENP in 2010 to investigate minimum wage and 
hours of work violations, including employees working 36 hour shifts.
577
  The Minister ordered 
an inspection that was conducted by two inspectors who interviewed 49 workers.
578
  In response 
to questions raised by the OTLA, the GOH indicated that no labor law violations were found at 
the ENP during the 2010 inspection, because the workers at issue were temporary employees.
579
  
However, the alleged violations pertained to rights available to temporary workers.
580
  The 
OTLA requested documents from the GOH regarding this inspection, but the GOH did not 
provide any. As a result, the OTLA cannot determine whether the STSS inspected for all alleged 
violations.  
 
On April 30, 2012, a group of temporary ENP employees submitted a written request to the 
STSS office in Puerto Cortés requesting its intervention due to the ENP’s failure to raise the 
workers’ minimum wage in accordance with the law.581  On May 5, an STSS inspector and the 
temporary workers met with an ENP Human Resources representative, who stated that the ENP 
was waiting for authorization from the Finance Ministry to make the pay increase, because it had 
not been included in the ENP’s budget.582  The ENP Human Resources representative added that 
once the ENP received approval, it would apply the pay increase retroactively going back to 
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January 2012, and asked the workers to be patient.
583
  Documentation submitted to the OTLA 
regarding a separate intervention request to the STSS from SITRAENP indicates that as of July 
18, 2012, the ENP had not implemented the new minimum wage rates and the Puerto Cortés 
STSS office had forwarded the matter to the STSS Inspector General in Tegucigalpa to apply 
fines.
584
        
 
During a September 13, 2012, general inspection, discussed in more detail below, the STSS 
found that the ENP does not pay minimum wage to temporary workers.
585
  However, because the 
report did not specify the types of temporary workers affected by these violations, the OTLA 
cannot determine whether the STSS’s finding pertained to the workers who submitted the April 
30, 2012, inspection request.       
 
4. September 2012 Inspection 
 
As part of its effort to inspect companies named in the Submission, on September 13, 2012, the 
STSS conducted a general inspection of the ENP and interviewed 47 workers.
586
  The STSS 
inspection report indicated that, with respect to temporary workers, the ENP does not pay the 
minimum wage, the seventh-day or the education bonuses, underpays the 13
th
 and 14
th
 month 
bonuses, and fails to provide vacation time and a day of rest.
587
  However, the inspection report 
does not specify the types of temporary workers at issue in the inspections.
588
  It also makes no 
mention of an investigation of potential OSH hazards, nor does it appear that the STSS 
conducted inspections of any of the shipping companies operating at Puerto Cortés, despite 
allegations that subcontracted stevedores at such companies are also not paid the minimum wage 
and are subject to other labor law violations.   
 
The STSS Chief Inspector told the OTLA in May 2013 that the STSS found 15 infractions in 
total during the September 2012 inspection and that the ENP’s appeals were still pending.  The 
inspection report indicated that the STSS notified ENP of these violations and that the ENP has 
appealed the findings.
589
  The STSS also stated that ENP staff had denied access to STSS 
inspectors on three occasions and that a fine was in the process of being applied for each 
denial.
590
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III. OTLA Analysis  
 
The OTLA’s detailed analysis below of the Submission presents the OTLA’s evaluation of the 
GOH’s enforcement of labor laws in the 17 cases set out above.  Here, it refers to the CAFTA-
DR definition of labor laws:  
 
“a Party’s statutes or regulations, or provisions thereof, that are directly related 
to the following internationally recognized labor rights: (a) the right of 
association; (b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (c) a prohibition 
on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (d) a minimum age for 
the employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of the worst 
forms of child labor; and (e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to 
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.”591   
 
The OTLA limited its analysis to events that occurred after the CAFTA-DR entered into force 
for Honduras on April 1, 2006.
592
    
 
Section A reviews the GOH’s general enforcement of its labor laws through the inspection, 
remediation, and sanction process.  It analyzes the findings described above with regard to the 
STSS’s effectiveness in inspecting worksites, including in instances in which the law requires 
inspections, such as when the STSS is presented with written or verbal allegations of violations; 
compelling employers to allow inspectors to access worksites; ensuring that the inspections 
conducted cover all known or alleged labor law violations; imposing sanctions on violating 
employers; calculating and applying sanctions in a manner that effectively deters violations; and 
verifying remediation of previously identified violations, including compliance with remediation 
orders.  These cross-cutting procedural deficiencies undermine the government’s capacity to 
enforce its labor laws related to particular rights, as discussed in the sections that follow.  
 
Section B reviews the GOH’s enforcement efforts with respect to labor laws as defined by 
CAFTA-DR.  The first part evaluates enforcement of labor laws related to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining.  This part analyzes the STSS’s response to dismissals of 
protected founding union members (protección del estado) and union leaders (fuero sindical) and 
to other anti-union retaliation.  It also assesses the specific case of judicial dissolution of the 
SITRAFHIA union at FHIA, and then analyzes the STSS’s responses to additional alleged 
employer interference with workers’ rights through the use of collective pacts and employer-
dominated unions.  
 
The second part of Section B reviews enforcement efforts related to the minimum age for the 
employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor.   
 
                                                          
591
 CAFTA-DR, Article 16.8.  
592
 The Labor Chapter of the CAFTA-DR, and the submission process, apply from entry into force of the CAFTA-
DR and a change in administrations does not prevent the OTLA from reviewing information from previous 
administrations.  See: Office of the United States Trade Representative, The Dominican Republic-Central America-
United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), available from: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta.    
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The third part of Section B evaluates enforcement of labor laws related to acceptable conditions 
of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and OSH.    
  
A. Enforcement of Labor Laws: The Inspection, Remediation, and Sanction Process 
 
The Submission alleges that the GOH, through the STSS, routinely fails to conduct requested 
inspections; fails to compel employers to allow inspectors access to worksites; where access to 
worksites is granted, fails to inspect for all known or alleged labor law violations; fails to 
sanction violating employers, or when it does sanction employers, fails to calculate and apply 
fine amounts that effectively deter future violations; and fails to ensure remediation of identified 
violations.   
 
Obligation to Inspect 
 
The Honduran Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) tasks the Ministry of Labor’s inspectorate with 
overseeing compliance with labor laws,
593
 including through workplace inspections.
594
  
According to the Labor Code, a worker or group of workers can lodge a complaint with the 
STSS, including by simply notifying any inspector, verbally or in writing, of the complaint.
595
  
Receipt of a complaint obligates the STSS to conduct a complaint-driven inspection.
596
  The 
STSS can also self-initiate general inspections that investigate employers’ overall compliance 
with the Labor Code.
597
  Inspectors are also required to intervene if they have notice of labor 
conflicts to attempt to prevent their escalation.
598
   
 
Resources 
 
The STSS Labor Inspectorate has 137 posts for labor inspectors; 119 of which are occupied by 
personnel who perform inspection functions.  The others perform general STSS functions.  Of 
the 119 who perform inspection functions, 40 inspectors are located in Tegucigalpa; 19 in San 
Pedro Sula; seven in El Progreso; six each in La Ceiba and Choluteca; four each in Comayagua, 
Danli, Villanueva, and La Esperanza; three each in Choloma, Olanchito, Juticalpa, Santa Rosa de 
Copan, the Bay Islands, and Puerto Cortés; two in Quimistan; and one each in the remaining 
offices in Santa Barbara, Trujillo, Yoro, Tela, and La Mosquitia.
 599
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
593
 Labor Code, Articles 610 and 614(I). 
594
 Labor Code, Article 614(I). 
595
 Labor Code, Article 618; Labor Code, Article 617(d). 
596
 Labor Code, Article 618.    
597
 STSS Answers to the OTLA’s general questions, July 20, 2012.  
598
 Labor Code, Article 617(d).  
599
Verification Report on the Implementation of the White Paper Recommendations, Period: August 2010-December 
2010, International Labor Organization, page 256, (this report states there are 118 inspectors, but the regional 
breakdown only includes 115); Email from Tania Casco, Honduran Embassy, to OTLA official, February 19, 2014 
(updating the number and geographic distribution of inspectors).    
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Labor Inspectors’ Access to the Worksite 
 
The Labor Code empowers inspectors to enter workplaces at any hour of the day or night.
600
  The 
Labor Code also requires employers to permit and facilitate inspections,
601
 and Labor Code 
Article 625(b) establishes that employers who impede inspectors from fulfilling the duties of 
their job, including by obstructing worksite inspections, shall face a 50 – 5,000 HNL (US $2.40 
to $240) fine.
602
 The Labor Code does not require that management be present during an 
inspection; to the contrary, the STSS has the right to access worksites, even when management is 
not present.
603
 
 
If an inspector encounters “unjustified resistance” during an inspection, the inspector is required 
to report the occurrence to the Labor Court to obtain a judicial order to compel access.
604
  If 
immediate action is necessary, the inspector may call for the assistance of the police or other 
authorities. However, the Labor Code appears to place personal liability on the inspectors for any 
consequences that may result from calling on the police or other authorities, in such instances, 
including any violence or altercations, which STSS officials suggested to the OTLA may deter 
inspectors from requesting such police assistance.
605
   
 
Inspecting the Worksite 
 
Labor Code Articles 617 and 618 delineate labor inspectors’ authority during an inspection. 
Article 617 empowers inspectors to review accounting books, payroll records, and other relevant 
documents, and to examine the health and safety conditions of the workplace.
606
  Article 618 
establishes inspectors' authority to interview workers outside the presence of management or 
other witnesses.
607
  Inspections must cover all violations that are the subject of a written or 
verbal complaint.
608
  The STSS is also required to intervene in workplace conflicts of which it 
has notice.
 609
  This intervention is not limited to inspections; rather, the STSS may conduct 
conciliation sessions to try to resolve the issues.
610
 
 
To complement the requirements of the Labor Code, the STSS has compiled a manual for 
inspectors with administrative steps for conducting both general inspections and complaint-
driven inspections.
611
  While it does not have the force of law, and inspectors retain discretion 
over which steps to follow in any given inspection, the manual is designed to provide a basic 
procedural framework to help inspectors carry out their duties in a consistent manner.   
                                                          
600
 Labor Code, Article 618.  
601
 Labor Code, Article 95.  
602
 Labor Code, Article 625.  
603
 Labor Code, Article 618. 
604
 GOH Answers to the OTLA’s general questions, July 20, 2012; Labor Code, Article 617(b). There are no criteria 
for determining what circumstances amount to “unjustified resistance,” and the STSS did not pursue follow-up to 
denials of access through the Labor Courts in any of the 33 instances described above. 
605
 OTLA interviews with current and former STSS officials; Labor Code, Article 617(b).   
606
 Labor Code, Article 617(a) and (c).  
607
 Labor Code, Article 618.  
608
 Labor Code, Articles 617 and 618. 
609
 Labor Code, Article 617(d).  
610
 Labor Code, Article 617(d).  
611
 Manual de Procedimientos de la Inspección General de Trabajo. 
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The manual states that during a general inspection, the inspector should first interview the 
employer to ascertain certain information, such as the number of workers employed.
612
  The 
inspector should then interview workers, asking a specific set of questions to collect information 
such as their ages, when they started their jobs, their typical hours, what types of work they do, if 
they are paid correctly, and other basic information about their working conditions.
613
  During a 
complaint-driven inspection, the inspector investigates the facts surrounding all of the issues 
raised in the underlying complaint and has the authority to inspect for any additional issues of 
which he or she is notified during the course of the inspection.
614
   
 
There are also special protocols for investigating possible labor law violations related to freedom 
of association, child labor, and OSH.
615
 OSH issues, however, are the only ones handled by a 
separate, specially-trained corps of inspectors.
616
   
   
Reports 
 
The results of inspections, including any recommended sanctions and remediation, are 
memorialized in inspection reports (“actas”) prepared by STSS inspectors.  An inspection report 
generally includes the information contained in the handwritten inspection record by an STSS 
inspector prepared at the site of an inspection, as well as data reviewed after the inspection, such 
as payroll records where the inspection identified related labor law violations.  The inspector 
must draft the inspection report at the conclusion of an inspection, noting any irregularities 
identified, and must read the inspection report to the employer or his/her representative and to 
the worker or workers involved in any infraction, who then sign the record.
617
   
 
The final inspection report is generally a typed report prepared in the office of the STSS 
inspector that identifies labor law violations based on the inspection.  Labor Code Article 618 
instructs an inspector to share this final inspection report with the “dependent authority.”618   
Though Article 618 does not define “dependent authority,” Labor Code Article 619 clarifies that 
final inspection reports shall be presented to the relevant Labor Inspectorate regional chief.
619
   
 
                                                          
612
 Although the STSS may conduct inspections at worksites even if management is not present, where management 
is available, the manual recommends interviewing the employer first.  Manual de Procedimientos de la Inspección 
General de Trabajo, page 59 (Fig. 54, Datos Suministrados por el Empleador). 
613
 Manual de Procedimientos de la Inspección General de Trabajo, page 63 (Fig. 55, Datos Suministrados por el 
Trabajador).  
614
 Manual de Procedimientos de la Inspección General de Trabajo, p. 22; Labor Code, Article 617(d). 
615
 The Freedom of Association protocol was published in 2013 and was not available to inspectors at the time of 
most of the cases in the Submission. See: Colección de Protocolos de Inspección, STSS, received by the OTLA 
January 26, 2014 (this compendium also includes an OSH inspection protocol that updates a prior version).  The 
Child Labor protocol was established in 2008. See: Procedimiento para la atención integral  a la niñez y 
adolescencia trabajadora desde la STSS, 2008.  
616
 OTLA meeting with STSS officials, July 10, 2012 (noting that there is no specialized corps of child labor 
inspectors although the law does reference Child Labor Inspectors).  Additionally, both general and OSH inspectors 
found child labor violations in the documents reviewed by the OTLA. 
617
 Labor Code, Articles 618 and 619.  
618
 Labor Code, Article 618. 
619
 Labor Code, Article 618. 
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Sanctions and Remedial Action 
 
The Labor Code requires the STSS to issue sanctions for labor law violations.
620
  If an inspector 
recommends sanctions and/or remedial actions, the regional STSS office sends the inspector’s 
report to the STSS headquarters in Tegucigalpa for review, where the Inspector General must 
determine any “corresponding sanctions” for each violation and order any necessary steps for 
remediation.
621
  
 
Sanctions vary depending on the underlying violation.  Table 1 below lists the sanctions for some 
types of labor law violations.  Despite OTLA requests, the GOH provided no other regulations or 
laws that prescribe how the STSS should calculate these fines.   
 
Table 1: Sanctions for Labor Law Violations 
Type of Violation Minimum Sanction Maximum Sanction Authority 
Obstructing the work of an 
inspector 
50 HNL (US $2.40) 5,000 HNL (US $240) Labor Code Art. 625
622
 
Failure to pay minimum wage 100 HNL (US $4.80) 1,000 HNL (US $48) Minimum Wage Law Art. 
40
623
 
Child labor 5,000 HNL (US $240) 25,000 HNL (US 
$1,201) 
Code on Childhood and 
Adolescence, Art. 128
624
 
Violence or threats to impede 
exercise of workers’ rights 
200 HNL (US $9.60) 10,000 HNL (US $480) Labor Code Art. 469
625
 
Any other violation of the Labor 
Code 
50 HNL (US $2.40) 5,000 HNL (US $240) Labor Code Art. 625 
OSH violations 50 HNL (US $2.40) 500 HNL (US $24) Legislative Decree 39, 
Art. 4
626
 
 
If after reviewing the inspection report, the Inspector General determines that a fine is warranted, 
the Inspector General orders the labor inspector to prepare a notification report (“acta de 
notificación”) delivered to the employer that indicates the sanction amount.627  The notification 
report, in practice, also generally reiterates the violation(s) the STSS identified, the applicable 
law(s), and the process an employer must follow to appeal.  Once notified, the employer has 
three business days from the date after notification to request that the Inspector General 
reconsider the sanction or submit an appeal to the STSS.
628
   
 
According to STSS officials, an employer’s obligation to remediate is independent from the 
sanction, and payment of a fine does not excuse an employer from correcting underlying Labor 
Code violations.
629
  Labor Code Article 614, which outlines the powers of the Labor 
                                                          
620
 Labor Code, Articles 618 and 625(d). 
621
 Labor Code, Articles 618 and 625(d).  
622
 Labor Code, Article 625. 
623
 Minimum Wage Law, Decree No. 103, April 30, 1971, Article 40.  
624
 Code on Childhood and Adolescence, Decree No. 73-96, September 5, 1996, Article 128. 
625
 Labor Code, Article 469.  
626
 Legislative Decree No. 39, May 10, 1982, Article 4.   
627
 Labor Code, Article 620. 
628
 Labor Code, Articles 620 and 621. 
629
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s general questions, page 21, July 20, 2012.  
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Inspectorate, indicates that the Labor Inspectorate may also conduct re-inspections to verify 
remediation of previously identified labor law violations.
630
   
 
1. Response to inspection requests 
 
The Submission alleges that the STSS fails to respond to requests for inspections.  As evidence, 
the Submission provided examples from nine workplaces: Dickies, Ceiba Textiles, SurAgro, 
Okra Sur, Agroexportadora Dome, Agripac, La Pradera, Plantas Ornamentales, and Puerto 
Cortés, in violation of Labor Code Article 618.     
 
The Submission alleges that workers and workers’ organizations made dozens of verbal requests 
for inspections regarding allegations of labor law violations at the following eight workplaces: 
Ceiba Textiles, SurAgro, Okra Sur, Agroexportadora Dome, Agripac, La Pradera, Plantas 
Ornamentales, and Puerto Cortés.
631
  The OTLA asked the GOH and the Submitters to provide 
all documents pertaining to these verbal requests but did not receive any evidence that the STSS 
followed-up on any of them.  There is no evidence that these verbal requests were ever 
successful at prompting statutorily required inspections of any of the employers named in the 
Submission.
632
  
 
The OTLA also followed-up on the Submission’s allegations that the STSS did not properly 
handle written requests.  The OTLA received evidence that CUTH wrote to the STSS to request 
inspections regarding the dismissal of SITEDHIKOSA members at Dickies in November and 
December 2006.  The GOH indicated that it could not find the request in its records and provided 
no evidence to the OTLA that the STSS responded to the request or attempted an 
investigation.
633
   
 
Based on its review, the OTLA has serious concerns that the STSS has not effectively responded 
to verbal inspection requests.    
 
2. Access to Worksites  
 
The Submission alleges that STSS inspectors fail to compel access to worksites when denied 
entry and fail to impose fines for such denials. As evidence, the Submission provided examples 
from nine workplaces: Kyungshin-Lear, Dickies, A.tion, Pinehurst, Petralex, FHIA, SurAgro, 
Agripac, and Plantas Ornamentales.  In addition, OTLA found in its review that the STSS 
inspectors were also denied entry and failed to compel access at SurAgro (see Table 2).  
 
 
                                                          
630
 Labor Code, Article 614(1)(d).   
631
 Submission, pages 13, 31, 37, 39, 41, 43, and 44. 
632
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, August 22, 2012, pages 8, 20, 25, 26, 28, and 29.  
633
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, August 22, 2012, pages 5-6; SITEDIKHOSA request for 
inspection at Dickies, December 11, 2006; SITEDIKHOSA request for inspection at Dickies, January 3, 2007 (One 
request was on an STSS form and the other was a letter addressed to the STSS SPS Regional Director, but neither 
has a receipt stamp from the STSS and the STSS denies any knowledge of such requests). 
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Table 2: Documented instances at eight workplaces where employers denied access to STSS inspectors
634
 
 
Number of times inspectors denied access 33 
Number of times access denial reported to superiors 33 
Number of instances for which the OTLA confirmed that access 
denials were reported to courts for “unjustified resistance” 
0 
Number of times inspectors determined that immediate 
attention was required and called the police for assistance 
2 
 
Number of times fines recommended by inspectors 6 requests covering 14 
denials 
Number of times the OTLA found evidence that the STSS 
imposed fines for access denial 
1 
 
The Labor Code requires that employers permit and facilitate inspections and not obstruct 
inspectors in the performance of their duties, and establishes labor inspectors’ authority to enter 
workplaces at any time to conduct inspections.
635
  Nonetheless, the OTLA found that employers 
routinely refused access to STSS inspectors.  Employers commonly have security guards or other 
staff charged with turning away inspectors, claiming, sometimes falsely, that management is 
unavailable to receive them. For example, in the cases of A.tion and Kyungshin-Lear, inspectors 
were denied access four and two times, respectively, based on claims, which inspectors 
documented as untrue, that management was not on site to receive the inspectors.
636
   
 
Although inspectors are empowered under the Labor Code to call the police for assistance when 
an employer denies them access and the situation requires immediate attention, the OTLA found 
that inspectors did not call the police in 31 of the 33 instances reviewed by the OTLA where an 
employer denied their access.
637
  However, the criteria to determine whether a particular instance 
requires immediate attention and thus justifies calling the police are unclear and the Labor Code 
appears to place personal liability on the inspectors for any consequences of calling the police.
638
  
At Petralex, the inspector and then-Regional STSS Director Rosales called the police for 
assistance notifying the company of SITRAPETRALEX’s legal personality and the identities of 
union leaders protected under fuero sindical.  With police assistance, the inspector and Director 
                                                          
634
 Further details regarding each access denial can be found in the fact sections above. Kyungshin-Lear: May 18, 
2011 (twice); May 20, 2011; September 28, 2011; September 29, 2011; October 4, 2011; March 6, 2012; June 13, 
2012; September 11, 2012; Dickies: November 28, 2006; December 4, 2006; A.tion: July 21, 2009; July 22, 2009; 
July 28, 2009; July 29, 2009; May 7, 2011; May 12, 2011; June 13, 2011; Pinehurst: August 16, 2010; August 18, 
2010; August 25, 2010; Petralex: June 4, 2007; July 25, 2007; November 8, 2007; November 12, 2007; February 
14, 2008; April 18, 2008; April 25, 2008; FHIA: July 20, 2009; SurAgro: September 10, 2012; Plantas 
Ornamentales: Date unknown; Date unknown; April 27, 2010. 
635
 Labor Code Articles 95(8) and 614.  
636
 See: Kyungshin-Lear: September 28 and 29, 2011; A.tion: July 21, 22, 28 and 29, 2009. 
637
 Instances in which inspectors were denied access and did not call the police for assistance: Kyungshin-Lear: 
May 18, 2011 (twice); May 20, 2011; September 28, 2011; September 29, 2011; October 4, 2011; March 6, 2012; 
June 13, 2012; September 11, 2012; Dickies: November 28, 2006; A.tion: July 21, 2009; July 22, 2009; July 28, 
2009; July 29, 2009; May 7, 2011; May 12, 2011; June 13, 2011; Pinehurst: August 16, 2010; August 18, 2010; 
August 25, 2010; Petralex: June 4, 2007; July 25, 2007; November 8, 2007; November 12, 2007; April 18, 2008; 
April 25, 2008;  FHIA: July 20, 2009; SurAgro: September 10, 2012; Plantas Ornamentales: Date unknown; 
Date unknown; April 27, 2010. 
638
 Labor Code, Article 617(b).  
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Rosales were able to enter the worksite.
639
  At Dickies, the inspector and Director Rosales called 
the police for assistance to investigate the dismissals of union leaders.  Despite the call, the 
inspector and Director Rosales were not allowed to enter the worksite.
640
     
 
In all 33 documented instances where an employer denied access to an STSS inspector, the 
inspector formally notified his or her supervisor in writing.  However, the OTLA found no 
evidence that the STSS reported any of the denials to the Labor Courts as required under Labor 
Code Article 617(b) in cases of “unjustified resistance” by employers.641  Similarly, of the 33 
documented instances of an employer denying an inspector access to a worksite, the STSS fined 
the employer in only one.
642
  
 
The OTLA notes that STSS inspectors often returned several times to try to gain entry; however, 
after reporting the repeated failed attempts to their supervisors, the inspectors abandoned their 
efforts in all but one case.  Thus, based on its review, the OTLA has serious concerns that the 
STSS does not compel access to worksites, preventing the inspectors from fulfilling their duty to 
conduct worksite inspections to enforce labor laws.   
 
3. Inspection of Alleged, Potential, or Previously Identified Violations   
 
Key stakeholders interviewed by the OTLA noted that while STSS inspectors are generally 
knowledgeable about the content of the Labor Code and associated regulations, they commonly 
conduct deficient inspections and re-inspections.
643
    In its review, the OTLA found that the 
STSS conducted such deficient inspections or re-inspections at nine workplaces: Kyungshin-
Lear, Pinehurst, Petralex, SurAgro, Las Tres Hermanas, Okra Sur, Agroexportadora Dome, 
Azucarera la Grecia, and the ENP.
 
 
 
The OTLA found examples of the STSS failing to investigate potential violations of laws 
protecting freedom of association, even when the STSS was inspecting worksites for other labor 
law violations and was aware of allegations of labor law violations related to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining.
644
  The October 2010 general inspection at Pinehurst, 
                                                          
639
 STSS report of inspection at Petralex, February 25, 2008; OTLA interview with former STSS SPS Director, July 
16, 2012. 
640
 STSS report of inspection at Dickies, December 5, 2006; OTLA interview with former STSS SPS Director, July 
16, 2012. 
641
 The OTLA requested all relevant documents from the STSS but did not receive any that indicate the STSS 
reported the denials of access to the Labor Courts.  
642
 See Plantas Ornamentales (April 30, 2010) for the only case where the OTLA’s review confirmed that the STSS 
fined an employer for unlawfully denying an inspector access to a workplace. 
643
 They noted that some inspectors fail to inspect for all potential violations during general inspections, even 
violations of which there are allegations or previous findings. Further, some inspectors do not prepare for 
inspections and therefore are unprepared to investigate all relevant allegations, follow up on prior violations, or 
inspect on all relevant areas of law.  Some conduct interviews with employees in the presence of management, 
deterring workers’ from speaking freely on the matters under investigation and other labor concerns. OTLA 
interviews with civil society, workers, and private sector representatives.  
644
 The STSS mandate includes oversight of compliance with laws that protect the right of freedom of association; 
however, the STSS’s Inspection Manual, published in June 2012, includes interview formats for employers and 
workers that do not include any questions regarding freedom of association. The new Protocol for Inspectors on 
Freedom of Association, published in 2013, was not available when most of the facts in the Submission cases 
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which occurred in the wake of the August 2010 dismissals of founding union members, did not 
address freedom of association, despite the STSS’s awareness of the dismissals and ongoing 
dispute.
645
  More recently, the STSS’s September 2012 inspection report from Kyungshin-Lear 
did not include any information regarding freedom of association, despite receiving ongoing 
complaints related to dismissals of union members and anti-union discrimination, including a 
February 2012 request from the CGT that the STSS investigate dismissals of the union 
leadership committee and blacklisting threats at Kyungshin-Lear.
646,647
  
 
The OTLA also found examples where the re-inspection apparently failed to address violations 
found in the initial inspection.
648
  At Petralex, an initial inspection in April 2008 found violations 
related to failure to grant the inspector access to the worksite and unlawful dismissal of union 
leaders and members.  The inspection report, issued May 23, 2008, required reinstatement of the 
union leaders and members within three business days.
649
  The subsequent re-inspection, which 
did not occur until September 19, 2008, failed to address the unlawful dismissals or ensure their 
reinstatement.  Instead the subsequent re-inspection report listed the only item for re-inspection 
as “payroll records” and found that the violation had been corrected.650  At Okra Sur, the 
February 26, 2010 general inspection found several labor code violations, including failure to 
pay minimum wage.
651
  The April 9 re-inspection reported a failure to pay the education bonus 
but was silent on the status of the other previously identified labor law violations.
652
  At 
Agroexportadora Dome, the STSS conducted a re-inspection on April 20, 2010, after an initial 
general inspection a month earlier had found several Labor Code violations, including prohibited 
child labor.
653
  Although the re-inspection report states that the child labor violation was 
corrected, the inspector references remediation of a different violation in reaching that 
conclusion.
654
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
occurred. Manual de Procedimientos de la Inspección General del Trabajo, p. 59-66, June 2012. Colección de 
Protocolos: Protocolo de Libertad de Asociación (received by the OTLA on January 26, 2014).  
645
 STSS notification report of inspection at Pinehurst, December 7, 2010. 
646
 SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR request for labor inspection at Kyungshin-Lear, February 21, 2012; STSS record of 
inspection at Kyungshin-Lear, September 11, 2012. 
647
 In addition to the failure to inspect for freedom of association, the STSS did not investigate the working 
conditions for the majority of workers at certain worksites.  For example, on May 21, 2008, the STSS conducted a 
general inspection of Azucarera la Grecia, a company that employs hundreds of subcontracted workers.  The 
inspector did not inspect the working conditions of the subcontracted workers and instead only investigated the 
working conditions of sixteen managers directly employed by the company. STSS report of inspection at Azucarera 
la Grecia, May 30, 2008; STSS inspection data collected at Azucarera la Grecia, May 21, 2008; OTLA interview 
with Azucarera la Grecia Management, December 12, 2012. 
648
 For example, STSS report of re-inspection at Okra Sur, April 9, 2010; STSS report of re-inspection at 
Agroexportadora Dome, April 21, 2010.  
649
 STSS report of inspection at Petralex, May 23, 2008. 
650
 The STSS in Tegucigalpa noticed the oversight and proceeded to sanction the employer despite the omission of 
the freedom of association violations from the re-inspection report. STSS report of re-inspection at Petralex, 
September 19, 2008. 
651
 Report on Labor Inspections at Foreign-Owned plantations in Choluteca, March 25, 2010, STSS Choluteca 
Director. 
652
 STSS report of re-inspection at Okra Sur, April 9, 2010. 
653
 STSS record of inspection at Agroexportadora Dome, March 11, 2010; STSS notification report of inspection at 
Agroexportadora Dome, March 25, 2010; Report on Labor Inspections at Foreign-owned plantations in Choluteca, 
March 25, 2010, STSS Choluteca Director; STSS report of re-inspection at Agroexportadora Dome, April 21, 2010.  
654
 The initial inspection report listed the child labor violations as item 2 and violations related to the illegal 
employment of foreign workers as item 3.  The subsequent re-inspection report indicated that the employer had 
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Based on its review, the OTLA has serious concerns that STSS does not sufficiently inspect for 
all alleged, potential, or previously identified violations of labor laws.   
 
4. Calculation and Imposition of Fines  
 
The Submission alleges that the STSS generally fails to impose fines for identified labor law 
violations, and that when it does impose fines, the fines assessed are too low to deter future 
violations.  As the ILO has noted, the current fine amounts are too low to be “sufficiently 
effective and serve as a deterrent.”655  Most fines range from 50 – 5,000 HNL (US $2.40 – $240), 
an amount that has not been increased or adjusted for inflation since 1980.
656
  
 
As discussed above, the Labor Code empowers the STSS to issue fines for labor law 
violations,
657
 and Article 618 specifically calls on STSS authorities to impose corresponding 
sanctions when they find labor law infractions.  After any administrative appeals by the 
employer are exhausted, the STSS headquarters forwards the fine to the Procurador de la 
República for collection.
658
  Under Honduran law, paying fines does not excuse compliance with 
remediation orders.
659
  
 
In its review, the OTLA found that the STSS did not impose fines in approximately half of the 
instances where inspectors found Labor Code violations.
660
  In none of the instances reviewed 
did the STSS fine an employer more than once, even when subsequent inspections showed that 
previously identified labor law violations had not been remedied and, instead, were ongoing 
contrary to the STSS’s remediation orders. The STSS has asserted that it is empowered to 
increase the fines by 50 percent in those cases, but the STSS did not increase fines in any case.
661
  
In most instances where the STSS imposed fines, the STSS fined the employers for some, but not 
all, of the Labor Code violations that the inspectors identified.
662
  Additionally, the OTLA found 
that the STSS failed to impose any fines in the eight cases where inspectors found OSH 
violations,
663
 though Labor Code Article 400 specifically provides that in cases of OSH 
violations, it is the responsibility of STSS to impose fines.
664
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
partially corrected items 2 and 3 by dismissing the foreign workers, however, the majority of the child laborers were 
Honduran.  STSS report of re-inspection at Agroexportadora Dome, April 21, 2010. 
655
372
nd
 Report of the ILO CFA, June 13, 2014, page 81, available from:  
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_247039.pdf.  
656
 Labor Code, Article 625 (last modified by Decree 978 on July 14, 1980).  
657
 Labor Code, Article 625. 
658
 The Procurador de la República is similar to the Attorney General in the United States but with only civil 
jurisdiction. 
659
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s general questions, pages 20-21, July 20, 2012. “La multa o sanción impuesta, no 
libera de su obligación  de corregir la violación a las leyes laborales.” (The imposed fine or sanction does not 
liberate them of their obligation to correct a violation of labor laws.) 
660
 See Kyungshin-Lear, Dickies, FHIA, Sur Agro, Okra Sur, Agroexportadora Dome, Agripac, and ENP factual 
findings above.  
661
 For example, STSS Inspector General decision imposing fine on Petralex, June 8, 2009 (stating the fine would 
increase by 50 percent if the violation occurred again). 
662
 See: Petralex, Pinehurst, and Sur Agro factual findings above.  
663
 See: Sur Agro, Okra Sur, Agroexportadora Dome, Agripac, and Azucarera La Grecia factual findings above. 
664
 Labor Code, Article 400.  
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In addition to failing to impose fines when required by law, the STSS uses a fine calculation 
methodology that results in penalties that are generally too small to compel compliance with the 
law and, instead, are often treated as a minimal cost of doing business, although that 
methodology is not required by law.
665
  For example, in cases involving enterprises that fail to 
pay the minimum wage, the STSS considers such failure to be one violation, calculating the fine 
accordingly, rather than multiple violations based on the number of workers not paid the 
minimum wage.   
 
At Petralex, for example, the STSS imposed a 5,000 HNL (US $240) fine on the company in 
June 2009 for dismissing 134 founding union members in violation of protección del estado,
666
  
instead of levying the 5,000 HNL fine for each unlawfully dismissed worker, which would have 
totaled 670,000 HNL (US $32,180).  
 
The STSS also often allows remediation deadlines to lapse by months or years before imposing 
fines, reducing still further the deterrent effect of the minimal fines imposed.  As an illustration, 
the STSS gave Pinehurst three business days, beginning on December 7, 2010, to comply with an 
order to pay overtime payments owed to workers.
667
  Although the STSS determined that 
Pinehurst had not complied during a follow-up inspection on February 9, 2011, the STSS did not 
impose a fine until October 26, 2011.
668
  Pinehurst paid the fine on May 2, 2012, but never paid 
the back wages owed its workers.
669
   
 
Based on this review, the OTLA has serious concerns regarding the imposition of fines by the 
STSS, including the apparent infrequent imposition of fines, the relatively low level at which 
fines are assessed, and the timeliness of fines that are imposed.  
 
5. Remediation of Identified Labor Law Violations  
 
The Submission alleges that the STSS generally fails to ensure remediation of identified labor 
law violations.  Remediation is a critical component of an effective labor law enforcement 
regime, and paying a fine does not excuse an employer from remediating underlying labor law 
violations.
670
  Instead, under Article 618, the STSS shall both impose corresponding fines and 
order the implementation of remedial measures.
671
  However, the OTLA review of documents 
indicates that the STSS appears to regularly close cases upon payment of fines, regardless of 
whether the employer has corrected the underlying violations.
672
  For instance, the STSS failed to 
                                                          
665
 Labor Code, Article 625. 
666
 STSS inspector general decision imposing fine on Petralex, June 8, 2009; GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific 
questions, page 1, August 22, 2012.  
667
 STSS notification report of inspection at Pinehurst, December 7, 2010. 
668
 Decision of the STSS inspector general regarding Pinehurst, IL-100914050107210, October 26, 2011. 
669
 Receipt for payment of 10,000 HNL issued by the Treasury of Honduras regarding Pinehurst, May 2, 2012; 
OTLA interview with CDM representative, July 17, 2012. 
670
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s general questions, July 20, 2012. 
671
 Labor Code, Article 618. 
672
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s general questions, July 20, 2012.  
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ensure remediation of violations of protección del estado and fuero sindical at Petralex, child 
labor at Okra Sur, and minimum wage, overtime, and OSH violations at SurAgro.      
 
Numerous stakeholders told the OTLA that many employers choose to pay fines, rather than 
come into compliance.
673
  The fine methodology calculation by inspectors, discussed above, 
often results in fines much lower than the cost of remediating the violations. As a result, 
employers are often willing to pay the fines, as long as they are not required by the STSS, in 
practice, to comply with remediation orders.  Once a case is closed, the STSS does not follow up 
to ensure remediation, and in many cases, the underlying violations continue.  As an illustration, 
at SurAgro, back wages due to the workers as a result of the employer’s failure to pay the 
minimum wage totaled 2,702,821 HNL (US $129,818), but the fine for failure to pay minimum 
wage was only 5,000 HNL (US$240).
674
  SurAgro paid the fine, and the STSS concluded the 
administrative process and closed the case without following up on its remediation order.
675
  
OTLA found evidence that SurAgro continues to pay workers less than the minimum wage.
676
  
Similarly, documents regarding FHIA indicate that upon receiving payment of the fine imposed, 
the STSS likewise closed the case and failed to verify reinstatement of the illegally dismissed 
union leaders and founding union members.
677
   
 
Based on its review, the OTLA has serious concerns regarding the STSS’s enforcement of 
remediation orders. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS ON LABOR LAW INSPECTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT  
 
Based on its review, the OTLA has serious concerns regarding the GOH’s inspection, sanction, 
and remediation of labor laws in the cases described above.  The OTLA considers that these 
issues may undermine the GOH’s capacity to effectively prevent, identify, and remedy violations 
of labor law.        
 
B. Enforcement of Labor Laws:  Subjects Defined by the CAFTA-DR Article 16.8  
 
The issues identified with respect to inspection processes and procedures, discussed in the 
previous section, affect the GOH’s ability to effectively enforce its labor laws in the substantive 
areas discussed below.  The following sections assess GOH enforcement of labor laws that are 
directly related to: (1) the right of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively, 
(2) a minimum age for the employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of the 
worst forms of child labor, and (3) acceptable conditions of work. 
 
                                                          
673
 OTLA interviews and meetings with stakeholders, July 2012, December 2012, May 2013, and October 2013.  
674
 STSS notification report of inspection at SurAgro, November 2, 2007, page 33; STSS notice of sanction to 
SurAgro, October 14, 2008 (although the minimum wage law sets a maximum fine of 1,000 HNL (US $48), the 
STSS imposed a higher fine and the employer did not appeal the sanction).  
675
 STSS document closing SurAgro case, November 14, 2008. 
676
 OTLA interviews with SurAgro workers, July 2012 and May 2014; OTLA interview with COSIBAH 
(Choluteca), July 11, 2012. 
677
 STSS document closing FHIA case, February 2, 2011.  
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1. The Right of Association and the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively 
 
The definition of “labor laws” in Article 16.8 of the CAFTA-DR includes statutes and 
regulations, or provisions thereof, that are directly related to the right of freedom of association 
and collective bargaining.
678
  The Submission alleges that the GOH failed to effectively enforce 
Honduran laws protecting these rights, particularly in the manufacturing sector.  
 
The Honduran Constitution enshrines the right to freedom of association and establishes that the 
Government has the responsibility to protect that right in Honduras.
679
  The STSS is the arm of 
the Honduran executive branch charged with enforcing Honduran labor laws, including those 
that protect the right of freedom of association and collective bargaining.
680
      
 
The first part of this section analyzes the STSS’ enforcement of the Labor Code provisions 
protecting a union’s founding members (protección del estado).  The second part analyzes the 
STSS’ enforcement of the Labor Code provisions protecting a union’s executive board (fuero 
sindical).  The third part analyzes the STSS’ enforcement of the Labor Code provisions that 
protect workers from anti-union discrimination and other anti-union retaliation.  The fourth part 
analyzes the GOH’s role in the dissolution of a legally established union.  The fifth and final part 
of this section analyzes the STSS’ failure to effectively prevent or respond to employer 
interference with the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining, including through 
the use of collective pacts (agreements between an employer and a group of nonunionized 
workers) and employer-dominated unions.  
a) Protection of Founding Union Members (Protección del Estado) 
 
The Submission alleges that the STSS fails to protect the rights of founding union members as 
required under the Labor Code. As evidence, the Submission provided examples from four 
workplaces: Petralex (SITRAPETRALEX), Ceiba Textiles (SITRAMCETEX), A.tion 
(SITRATION), and FHIA (SITRAFHIA). 
 
Before engaging in the official STSS registration process, a group of at least thirty workers must 
first notify their employer of their intent to found a union.
681
  Once an employer is notified, the 
founding union members are protected from dismissal, demotion, and other adverse acts, unless 
and until the respective authority (undefined in the Labor Code) makes a determination that there 
is just cause to take adverse action against the protected worker.
682
  This protection is referred to 
as protección del estado and runs from the moment the employer is notified of the workers’ 
intent to form a union until the STSS grants the union’s legal existence, known as its legal 
personality (personería jurídica).
683
  
 
Although there is no legal requirement that they do so, in practice STSS inspectors generally 
accompany workers during employer notification of workers’ intent to form a union.  In some 
                                                          
678
 CAFTA-DR, Article 16.8.  
679
 Constitution of Honduras, Chapter V, Article 128.  
680
 Labor Code, Articles 54, 467, and  610.   
681
 Labor Code, Article 517.   
682
 Labor Code, Article 517.   
683
 Labor Code, Article 517.   
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cases, STSS inspectors, rather than the workers, directly notify the employer of the workers’ 
intention to organize.  Workers view the STSS presence and involvement as reducing the risk 
that employers will claim they were not notified and did not know of the union and then dismiss 
the union’s founders.684  
 
When the OTLA interviewed employers, they often justified the dismissals of protected workers 
by stating that the dismissals were for legitimate causes, such as decreased purchase orders.
685
  
Unless the “respective authority” determines that such just cause exists, however, the dismissal is 
nonetheless unlawful.
686
   
 
In the event that an employer illegally dismisses a founding union member with protección del 
estado without prior authorization from the “respective authority,” the worker is owed back pay 
from the time of the dismissal, and may either accept a severance payment from his or her 
employer or invoke his or her legal right to reinstatement.
687
  If a worker notifies the STSS of the 
illegal dismissal, the STSS must investigate.
688
  Regardless of whether a worker has accepted 
severance or reinstatement, if the STSS finds the worker was illegally dismissed, the STSS can 
impose a sanction on the company for violating protección del estado.
689
  The worker may also 
pursue reinstatement through the courts as a private remedy.
690
 
 
The OTLA’s analysis found that in the cases of Petralex and FHIA, where the employer was 
notified of the union’s founding either by workers or the STSS, the employers dismissed the 
organizing workers without requesting and obtaining prior authorization as required by 
protección del estado.  Together, these cases affected over 140 workers.
691
  The STSS fined 
Petralex and FHIA 5,000 HNL (US $240) each for illegally firing workers in violation of 
protección del estado; in the case of Petralex, the fine amounted to approximately 37.31 HNL 
(US $1.79) per worker.
692
  The STSS issued reinstatement orders in both cases; however, it failed 
to ensure the employers complied with the orders. None of the illegally dismissed workers at 
Petralex or FHIA have been reinstated due to the intervention of the STSS.
693
   
 
Similar issues arose at A.tion.  On June 12, 2009, 68 workers founded SITRATION.
694
  In July, 
workers requested STSS inspections, in part to notify the company of the identities of the 
                                                          
684
 See: Kyungshin-Lear, Ceiba, A.tion, Petralex, and FHIA factual findings above.  
685
 OTLA interviews with Kyungshin-Lear management, A.tion management, Petralex management, and FHIA 
management, July 18 and 19, 2012.  
686
 Labor Code, Article 517. 
687
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s general questions, page 6, July 20, 2012; see also: Labor Code, Article 113(a). 
688
 Labor Code, Article 618.  
689
 GOH responses to the OTLA’s general questions, page 6, July 20, 2012. 
690
 Labor Code, Article 113.   
691
 Petralex dismissed 134 founding SITRAPETRALEX members, and FHIA dismissed 12 founding SITRAFHIA 
members (the STSS grouped two SITRAFHIA leaders together with the 12 as 14 founding SITRAFHIA members – 
for purposes of this analysis the OTLA distinguishes the two groups and has not double-counted them), totaling 146.    
692
 STSS inspector general decision imposing fine on Petralex, June 8, 2009; GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific 
questions, page 1, August 22, 2012 (the 10,000 HNL fine included 5,000 each for violation of fuero sindical and 
protección del estado). 
693
 See: Petralex and FHIA factual findings above.  
694
 SITRATION notification to STSS of union formation, June 12, 2009.  
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founding SITRATION members and trigger protección del estado.
695
  An STSS inspector 
attempted to access the factory on July 21, 22, 28, and 29.
696
  Each time, the security guard told 
him that he could not enter because the Human Resources Manager was not on the premises, 
although on three of those occasions the inspector confirmed through workers who were inside 
the factory that the Human Resources Manager was indeed on site.
697
  From late July through 
early August 2009, A.tion dismissed a “strong majority” of the 68 founding SITRATION 
members.
698
  The STSS attempted to conduct an investigation of the dismissals, but was denied 
access on multiple occasions and did not report the occurrence to the Labor Court to obtain a 
judicial order to compel access.  Therefore, it did not further investigate or make findings in this 
case.
699
  Without an STSS reinstatement order, the dismissed founding union members accepted 
severance and were never reinstated.   
b) Protection of Union Officials (Fuero Sindical)  
 
The Submission alleges that the STSS fails to effectively enforce the right of fuero sindical for 
union leaders.  As evidence, the Submission provided examples from four workplaces: Petralex 
(SITRAPETRALEX), Dickies (SITEDIKHOSA), Kyungshin-Lear 
(SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR), and FHIA (SITRAFHIA). 
 
Labor Code Article 516 prohibits employers from dismissing union officials from the moment 
they are elected until six months after their terms expire without prior authorization of just cause 
from the respective Labor Court Judge or, if there is no Labor Court in that region, the respective 
Civil Court Judge.
700
  This protection is called fuero sindical.  When workers form a union, the 
union leadership applies for fuero sindical under the same process that the union follows for 
applying for its legal personality (personería jurídica).
701
  The STSS must certify the union 
leadership.
702
  This certification officially places the union leadership under fuero sindical and 
applies retroactively from the date of their election.
703
  Subsequent leadership committees apply 
for fuero sindical separately, submitting the same documents that the founding union leaders are 
required to submit, including copies of their identity cards and literacy certifications.
704
  
 
If the STSS receives a complaint alleging that a worker with fuero sindical has been dismissed 
without prior Labor Court approval, the Labor Code requires the STSS to conduct an 
investigation.
705
  If the dismissal occurred while the worker was protected by fuero sindical, the 
                                                          
695
 Request for an STSS inspector to notify A.tion of SITRATION formation, July 11, 2009.  
696
 STSS record of inspection at A.tion, July 29, 2009; STSS record of inspection at A.tion, July 28, 2009; STSS 
record of inspection at A.tion, July 22, 2009; STSS record of inspection at A.tion, July 21, 2009. 
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 STSS record of inspection at A.tion, July 28, 2009; STSS record of inspection at A.tion, July 22, 2009; STSS 
record of inspection at A.tion, July 21, 2009; WRC letter to A.tion owner, page 2, September 9, 2009. 
698
 WRC letter to A.tion owner, page 2, September 9, 2009. In an interview with A.tion management, A.tion told the 
OTLA that there was a reduction in orders in the summer of 2009, resulting in massive layoffs.  
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 GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, page 8, August 22, 2012.     
700
 Labor Code, Article 516.  
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 GOH answers to the OTLA’s general questions, page 8, July 20, 2012; Labor Code, Articles 481(7) and 489.  
702
 For example, STSS certification of SITRAPETRALEX leadership committee, October 24, 2007.  
703
 For example, STSS certification of SITRAPETRALEX leadership committee, October 24, 2007 (granting fuero 
sindical retroactively to August 25, 2007).  
704
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s general questions, page 8, July 20, 2013; Labor Code, Articles 481(7) and 489.   
705
 Labor Code, Article 618.  
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employer will be subject to a fine by the STSS.
706
  In addition, the Labor Code states that an 
employer who violates fuero sindical will have to compensate the union an amount equivalent to 
six months of the dismissed leader’s salary.707  In cases where a union leader has not accepted 
severance payment and wants to be reinstated, the STSS must order reinstatement as a remedy.
708
   
 
The OTLA’s analysis found that in the cases of Petralex, Dickies, Kyungshin-Lear, and FHIA, 
the employers dismissed union leaders without first petitioning the Labor Court and 
demonstrating just cause as required under fuero sindical.  Table 3 below summarizes the 
OTLA’s findings in each of these cases. 
 
Table 3: Union Leaders Dismissed 
Company Petralex  Dickies  Kyungshin-Lear  FHIA Total  
Number of Union 
Leaders 
Dismissed 
18 (potentially 28)
709
 6 20 (potentially 39)
710
 2 43 (potentially 72) 
Number of times 
prior permission 
sought from a 
Court 
0 0 0 0 0 
Reported to the 
STSS 
Y Y Y Y  
Number of 
Workers 
Reinstated by the 
STSS 
0 0 0 0 0 
Evidence of fines 
imposed for fuero 
sindical violation 
1 0 0 0 1 
Evidence of 
compensation 
paid to the union 
0 0 0 0 0 
 
In the cases examined by the OTLA, STSS intervention did not result in the reinstatement of a 
single illegally dismissed union leader, though some workers indicated to the STSS and the 
OTLA that they wanted to be reinstated.
711
  In some cases, workers who would otherwise have 
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 Labor Code, Article 516. 
707
 The Labor Code is ambiguous as to how this provision should be implemented in practice and does not indicate 
whether it is an administrative or judicial remedy or whether the STSS, the union, or the illegally-dismissed union 
leader has standing to invoke the provision. The STSS stated that the aggrieved union could invoke it in court and at 
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to a reinstatement case filed with the Labor Court. OTLA meeting with Evangelina Argueta, CGT, May 20, 2013; 
Labor Code, Articles 516 and 625. 
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 Labor Code, Article 618 empowers Inspectors to order corrective measures.  Labor Code, Article 113(a) creates 
the right to reinstatement in these cases. 
709
 The OTLA counted the 18 SITRAPETRALEX leaders for whom it has evidence that the STSS was notified of 
their election, a required step to obtain fuero sindical. The other 10 may or may not have notified the STSS. 
710
 The OTLA counted the 20 SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR leaders for whom it has evidence that the STSS was 
notified of their election, a required step to obtain fuero sindical. The other 19 may or may not have notified the 
STSS.  
711
 OTLA interviews with workers, July 2012.  Given that fuero sindical protections begin upon notice to the STSS 
of a union leader’s election, and not notice to the employer, an employer who pleads lack of knowledge would still 
be obligated to respect fuero sindical as the employer’s knowledge is not a required element of the protection, 
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sought reinstatement accepted severance because of their sense of the futility of seeking STSS 
intervention on behalf of organized workers.
712
   
 
In the one instance (Petralex) where the STSS imposed a fine, the 5,000 HNL (US $240) fine 
amounted to approximately US $40 per dismissed union leader, and the workers were not 
reinstated.
713
  The OTLA found no case where the STSS ensured an employer had paid the 
legally-required six-month salary fuero sindical fine to the dismissed leader’s union.   
 
The Kyungshin-Lear case also raises issues with respect to the enforcement of fuero sindical.  
Kyungshin-Lear management dismissed each of SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR’s 36 elected 
leaders between January 2012 and October 2013 without obtaining prior judicial approval, as 
required by law.
714
  The STSS was aware of these dismissals, as the union noted the issues and 
requested investigation, but it appears the STSS did not investigate the dismissals, fine the 
company, or order reinstatement of any of the dismissed union leaders, despite having granted 
fuero sindical protection to the leadership committee beginning in January 2012.
715
  The STSS 
did note that some workers were pursuing reinstatement through STSS conciliation and the 
Labor Court.
716
  However, Kyungshin-Lear continues to unlawfully dismiss union leaders, 
having dismissed three leaders as recently as May 8, 2014.
717
 
c) Anti-union Reprisals, Discrimination, and Other Retaliation  
 
The Submission alleges that the STSS does not effectively enforce the provisions of the 
Honduran Labor Code protecting unions and their members from anti-union discrimination and 
other retaliation. As evidence, the Submission provided examples from nine workplaces: 
Petralex, Dickies, Ceiba Textiles, A.tion, Pinehurst, Kyungshin-Lear, Hanesbrands, FHIA, and 
Las Tres Hermanas. 
 
The Labor Code contains three main provisions that prohibit anti-union discrimination and 
retaliation.  Article 96(3) prohibits dismissal or other adverse action against workers due to their 
membership in a union or participation in lawful union activities.
718
 Article 469 establishes 
special fines of between 200 and 10,000 HNL (US $9.60 to $480) for any person who, through 
violence or threats, attempts in whatever form to impair the right of freedom of association.
719
  
Article 96(9) of the Labor Code prohibits employers from performing or authorizing any act that 
directly or indirectly infringes or restricts the rights granted by law to workers or offends their 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
rendering any unilateral dismissal of a protected union leader de facto illegal and reinstatement of the worker 
available as a remedy.  
712
 For example, OTLA interviews with Kyungshin-Lear workers, June 2014. 
713
 STSS Inspector General decision imposing fine on Petralex, June 8, 2009; GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific 
questions, page 1, August 22, 2012. 
714
 OTLA meeting with Maria Elena Sabillon, Solidarity Center, and Evangelina Argueta, CGT, October 23, 2013. 
715
 STSS certification of SITRAKYUNSHINLEAR legal registration, January 27, 2012.  
716
 OTLA meeting with STSS officials, May 20, 2013. 
717
 Email from the Solidarity Center to the US Embassy Official, May 21, 2014; US Government Official meetings 
with Maria Elena Sabillon, Solidarity Center; Evangelina Argueta, CGT; three SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR 
members; and Kyungshin-Lear management, June 10, 2014. 
718
 Labor Code, Article 96.  
719
 Labor Code, Article 469.   
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dignity.
720
  Additionally, Article 10 prohibits reprisals against workers for the sole purpose of 
impeding them from exercising their rights.
721
 Under Article 113(a) of the Labor Code, a 
wrongfully dismissed worker can either seek reinstatement or accept severance, but not both.
722
   
 
Despite being aware of alleged or previously identified violations of the protections afforded 
under Labor Code Articles 10, 96(3), or 96(9), the STSS did not conduct investigations in any 
instances reviewed by the OTLA, including at Petralex, Dickies, Ceiba Textiles, A.tion, 
Pinehurst, Kyungshin-Lear, FHIA, and Las Tres Hermanas.
723
   
 
Similar issues arose at Kyungshin-Lear.  SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR members requested that 
the STSS investigate Kyungshin-Lear for anti-union dismissals and threats on February 21, 
2012.
724
  Union members alleged that Kyungshin-Lear management was threatening them with 
dismissal and blacklisting and threatened to close the factory due to the presence of the union.  
On March 6, 2012, the STSS summoned Kyungshin-Lear to a conciliation hearing with 
SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR, but the available evidence suggests the conciliation hearing never 
took place.
725
  The STSS did not investigate the alleged anti-union dismissals and threats, even 
during a general inspection that took place the following September.
726 
  To date, the STSS has 
not compelled Kyungshin-Lear to comply with these laws protecting workers’ right to organize, 
and workers report intensified anti-union actions such as assigning union leaders to night shifts, 
not allowing workers to converse during breaks, and denying that the union exists.
727
  
 
Similarly, the OTLA review found evidence supporting the allegation that employers retaliated 
against union members by forcing them to resign.  Despite receiving complaints of such 
violations, it appears the STSS did not investigate any such cases.  The OTLA review found that 
soon after Ceiba Textiles workers notified management of their intent to form the 
SITRAMCETEX union in 2010, 41 of the 46 founding union members resigned.
728 
  The OTLA 
interviewed former Ceiba Textiles workers who said they had been coerced into resigning, when 
their employer told them they would be fired for cause and receive no severance payment if they 
did not “voluntarily” resign.729  Their employer instructed them to sign written resignation letters 
in order to receive some form of severance and warned that if they refused or continued to 
support the union, they could expect to be dismissed without severance.
730
  In total, 41 of the 46 
founding union members resigned and accepted severance.  Although the FITH, the national 
level union, complained to STSS and the STSS was aware from the Submission that the 
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 Labor Code, Article 96.  
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 Labor Code, Article 10.  
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 Labor Code, Article 113(a).  
723
 The OTLA did not receive any evidence to confirm that the STSS was aware of a nascent union at Hanesbrands 
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 SITRAKYUNGSHINLEAR request for labor inspection at Kyungshin-Lear, February 21, 2012. 
725
 STSS summons for Kyungshin Lear to appear for conciliation, March 6, 2012. 
726
 STSS record of inspection at Kyungshin-Lear, September 11, 2012. 
727
 OTLA interviews with Kyungshin-Lear workers, July 2012, December 2012, May 2013, and June 2014. 
728
 Resignation documents provided to OTLA by Ceiba Management. 
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 OTLA interview with SITRAMCETEX leader, July 2012. 
730
 OTLA interview with SITRAMCETEX leader, July 2012. 
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company had allegedly forced founding union members to resign and accept severance, the 
STSS did not follow-up on the allegations during its general investigation in September 2012.
731
   
 
Workers at several worksites indicated they accepted the severance largely because of a sense of 
the futility of pursuing reinstatement through the STSS.
732
  They reported that the STSS merely 
facilitated the payment of severance, rather than informing wrongfully dismissed workers of 
their right to reinstatement and enforcing Labor Code Article 113(a) that expressly affords them 
this right.
733
    
 
d) Union Dissolution by the Judiciary Relied on Illegal Dismissals  
 
The Submission alleges that the Labor Court approved the dissolution of the SITRAFHIA union 
at FHIA by relying on the illegal dismissals of 14 founding union members to justify the finding 
that the union did not contain the minimum number of members required under the Labor Code.  
Article 527 of the Labor Code identifies the circumstances under which a union may be 
dissolved, including through judicial order or if membership falls below 30 workers.
734
   
 
Between March 2008 and September 2008, FHIA dismissed 14 of SITRAFHIA’s founding 
members, who were covered by protección del estado.
735
  While the cases were under 
investigation by the STSS,
736
 on September 22, 2008, an attorney petitioned the Labor Court for 
dissolution of SITRAFHIA allegedly on behalf of six workers, claiming that, because union 
members had resigned, fewer than 30 SITRAFHIA members remained employed at FHIA.
737
 
SITRAFHIA had no representation in the proceedings because the Court improperly summoned 
the president of SITRAFHIA at his former workplace, rather than using the legal address 
provided by the union for all official notifications.  In addition, in an interview with the OTLA, 
former SITRAFHIA members indicated that at least one of the workers who was listed as a 
petitioner in the dissolution petition against SITRAFHIA was not even aware of the petition and 
was surprised to learn that that he was connected to the proceedings. However, one of the six 
workers stated unequivocally that he was not aware of such a filing and did not know the 
attorney of record.
738
  Despite the ongoing STSS investigations and plaintiffs’ lack of knowledge 
of the case, the Court relied on the contested dismissals to order the dissolution of SITRAFHIA 
on January 26, 2009, noting the union had fewer than 30 members at FHIA.
739
  The Court did not 
consult STSS records of inspections that documented the protección del estado or wait until the 
investigations were completed to issue its judgment.
740
  The Labor Court sent its decision to 
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 OTLA meeting with STSS officials, May 20, 2013; see also: General Report on Inspections of Companies in 
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handle the questioning of witnesses.  See:  Geoffrey C. Hazard,  Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law 
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dissolve SITRAFHIA to the STSS Division of Social Organizations, which holds the legal 
registration of all unions, so they would remove SITRAFHIA from the register.
741
  The STSS did 
not object to the removal, despite its ongoing investigations of the dismissals. The STSS 
inspectorate later determined the dismissals that formed the basis for the Labor Court’s holding 
were indeed illegal, but the union had already been dissolved by the court order and the workers 
who had lawfully organized and formed SITRAFHIA were left without their organization.
742
  
This case demonstrates a lack of coordination between the STSS and Labor Courts and its 
adverse impact on workers’ efforts to exercise their rights.   
e) Employer Interference  
 
The Submission alleges that the STSS fails to effectively enforce the Labor Code’s prohibition 
on employer interference, direct or indirect, with workers’ exercise of their right to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, specifically through the use of collective pacts, understood 
as contracts between management and a group of non-unionized workers, and employer-
dominated unions. As evidence, the Submission provided examples from four workplaces: Ceiba 
Textiles, Pinehurst, Hanesbrands, and Las Tres Hermanas.   
 
(1) Employer-Controlled Collective Pacts 
 
Labor Code Article 72 establishes that collective pacts are governed by the Labor Code 
provisions for collective bargaining agreements,
743
 including the requirement that there be only 
one collective agreement in effect per workplace.
744
  The STSS does not appear, however, to 
have procedures to ensure that collective pacts do not arise from negotiations between 
management and employer-dominated worker committees.  As a result, it appears that the STSS 
registers employer-controlled collective pacts that could undermine collective bargaining by 
independent unions, in apparent violation of Labor Code protections, including Article 96(9), of 
workers’ right to freedom of association and collective bargaining.745   
 
In the case of Ceiba Textiles, the STSS registered a collective pact on August 26, 2008,
746
  but 
according to interviews conducted by the OTLA, the worker committee that negotiated the pact 
was selected by and took direction from Ceiba Textiles management, rather than acting as an 
independent entity.
747
  Likewise, at Hanesbrands, the STSS registered collective pacts at multiple 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Jurisdictions, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1017, 1025 (1998), available from: 
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol73/iss4/4 (stating that “The concept that the judiciary properly controls the 
quest for evidence in civil litigation is…fundamental in the civil law system”); Scott N. Carlson, Intro to Civil Law 
Legal Systems, page 13 (May 2009), available from: 
http://inprol.org/sites/default/files/publications/2011/cr09002.pdf (indicating that in civil law systems “judges guide 
and conduct the gathering of evidence as a rule”). 
741
 Supreme Court communication to STSS regarding SITRAFHIA, January 26, 2009. 
742
 STSS notification report of inspection at FHIA, July 28, 2009. 
743
 Labor Code, Article 72.  
744
 Labor Code, Article 53.   
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 Labor Code, Art 96(9). 
746
 Ceiba textiles collective pact, March 10, 2008; STSS registration of Ceiba Textiles collective pact, August 26, 
2008.  
747
 OTLA interview with Ceiba Textiles workers, July 2012.  
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Hanesbrands factories that were negotiated between management and workers’ representatives, 
who Hanesbrands acknowledged were selected directly by Hanesbrands management.
748
 
 
At Hanesbrands factories, the selection of worker committee representatives, the negotiation of 
collective pacts, the reading of the pacts to workers, and the signing of the pacts by workers were 
all completed in the course of one day.
749
  The collective pacts differed in only a few provisions 
and largely codified existing non-contractual benefits that workers already received.
750
  Although 
an STSS representative was, according to Hanesbrands management,
751
 present at each of the 
factories when the pacts were concluded, and despite significant evidence that the pacts were 
employer-controlled, the STSS registered all pacts and did not investigate the process for 
potentially adverse impact on workers’ rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining 
under the Labor Code, including under Article 96(9).   
 
At Ceiba Textiles, on February 15, 2010, 46 workers founded the independent Ceiba Textiles 
Worker’s Union (SITRAMCETEX).  On March 17, 2010, management met with the workers 
who had been on the committee that negotiated the collective pact and drafted an extension of 
the pact that allowed workers to resign and still receive severance payments, normally due only 
upon dismissal.
752
  In the five days following the extension of this pact, between March 17 and 
21, 89 percent of the union’s founding members allegedly resigned.753  As discussed in the 
previous section on Forced Resignations, the OTLA interviewed former SITRAMCETEX 
members who said they felt pressured to resign from their jobs under the new provisions of the 
collective pact.   
 
The law’s limitation that only one collective bargaining agreement can be in place at any given 
establishment and its equal treatment of union-negotiated collective bargaining agreements and 
employer-dominated collective pacts, appear to have allowed Ceiba to use the collective pact to 
block the efforts of the newly forming union, in potential violation of Article 96(9).
754
     
 
In September 2012, when the STSS conducted general inspections of the companies in the 
Submission, the STSS noted no violations at Ceiba.  They also informed the OTLA that the 
STSS did not inspect for compliance with laws protecting the rights of freedom of association 
and collective bargaining,
755
  though they were on notice of allegations of employer interference 
in violation of Article 96(9).  
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In its review, the OTLA found evidence of employers using collective pacts to undermine 
workers’ right to associate and collectively bargain and the STSS failing to enforce Labor Code 
provisions protecting those rights, including at Ceiba Textiles and Hanesbrands. 
(2) Employer-Dominated Unions 
 
Additionally, the OTLA also found that the STSS failed to investigate allegations that Las Tres 
Hermanas and Pinehurst used employer-dominated unions to undermine independent organizing 
in apparent violation of Article 96(9).  In the case of Pinehurst, evidence existed of employer 
retaliation against a previously founded union and the presence of a management representative 
on the executive board of the new, employer-dominated union.
756
 At Las Tres Hermanas, 
workers founded the SITRAINBA union in September 2012.  In October, a second union, 
SITRAFMARIA, formed.  SITRAINBA members interviewed by the OTLA alleged that Las 
Tres Hermanas management was behind the creation of SITRAFMARIA,
757
 though Las Tres 
Hermanas management vehemently denied this allegation.
758
  Las Tres Hermanas filed an appeal 
with the STSS challenging SITRAINBA’s legal personality, but the STSS denied the appeal.  
Despite the denial, Las Tres Hermanas refused to engage in collective bargaining with 
SITRAINBA, preferring to engage only with SITRAFMARIA.
759
    
 
The STSS told the OTLA that it was aware of the allegations that SITRAFMARIA was an 
employer-dominated union being used to thwart the independent SITRAINBA.  The STSS did 
not respond to these allegations or investigate the potential violation of the Article 96(9) ban on 
employer interference in the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining.  Instead, 
the STSS asserted to the OTLA that its role in approving the legal personality (personería 
jurídica) of a union is limited to determining whether the union meets the standard criteria.
760
    
 
 
CONCLUSIONS ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:  
 
The OTLA review identified at least 200 workers from five workplaces (Kyungshin-Lear, 
Dickies, Petralex, FHIA, and the ENP) attempting to form or lead a union who were dismissed in 
violation of their protected status under protección del estado or fuero sindical.
761
  The OTLA 
found that the STSS rarely intervened in these cases; and when it did, often failed to inform 
workers of their right to reinstatement and instead facilitated their acceptance of severance 
payments and forfeiture of their reinstatement rights during conciliation sessions.  The STSS 
only fined one employer for violating protección del estado or fuero sindical and never required 
an employer to pay the union the damages required by Labor Code Article 516.  In addition, the 
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STSS failed to ensure that workers were paid back wages due, and where workers refused 
severance, the STSS failed to ensure compliance with remediation orders.  
 
The OTLA did not receive any evidence of STSS efforts to enforce the protections under Labor 
Code Articles 96 and 10 of workers’ right to organize free from employer discrimination or 
retaliation at the following workplaces: Kyungshin-Lear, Dickies, Ceiba Textiles, A.tion, 
Pinehurst, Petralex, Las Tres Hermanas, FHIA and the ENP.
762
  In one case (FHIA), the OTLA 
found that the GOH dissolved a union for failure to meet the minimum number of affiliates based 
on the reduction in employees that resulted from the illegal dismissals of union members.  
Further, the OTLA did not find any evidence that the STSS investigated allegations that 
employers used employer-controlled collective pacts and employer-dominated unions to interfere 
with workers’ rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining in violation of Labor 
Code Article 96 at Hanesbrands, La Ceiba, Las Tres Hermanas, and Pinehurst. 
 
Based on its review of the evidence, the OTLA has serious concerns regarding the STSS’s 
enforcement of Honduran laws with respect to the right of association and the right to organize 
and bargain collectively.   
 
2. Minimum Age for the Employment of Children and the Prohibition and 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor 
 
The Submission alleges that the STSS failed to effectively enforce Honduran laws pertaining to 
child labor at two workplaces, specifically: Sur Agro and Agroexportadora Dome, and in the 
coffee and melon sectors, generally.  This review first examines the legal framework for the 
minimum age for the employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of the worst 
forms of child labor.  It then examines the specific cases in the Submission, including an 
additional workplace, Okra Sur, where the OTLA review found evidence of child labor.  Lastly, 
it looks at nation- and sector-wide evidence of child labor in Honduras.  
 
a) Legal Framework 
 
The definition of “labor laws” in Article 16.8 of the CAFTA-DR includes statutes and 
regulations, or provisions thereof, that are directly related to the minimum age for the 
employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor.
763
  
The Honduran Constitution, Labor Code, Code on Childhood and Adolescence, and government 
regulations address the minimum age for employment.
764
  The Constitution states that children 
under the age of 16 may not work unless it is necessary to sustain their families and does not 
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interfere with school.
765
  Honduran statutes supplement the protections in the Constitution.  
Articles 32 of the Labor Code and 120 of the Code on Childhood and Adolescence (Código de 
Niñez) both state that no one under the age of 14 may work under any circumstances.
766
  All 
children ages 14-17 must receive permission from the STSS in order to lawfully work.
767
  Even 
when a minor receives permission from the STSS, the law limits the number of hours per day 
that a minor may work.  Children who are 14 and 15 may work a maximum of four hours per 
day, while children who are 16 and 17 may work a maximum of six hours per day.
768
  Fines for 
child labor are higher than for other Labor Code violations; up to 25,000 HNL (US $1,201) for 
the first violation and 50,000 HNL (US $2,402) for repeated violations.
769
  
 
Honduran laws on child labor include a list of the hazardous activities prohibited for children and 
a list of services that the GOH must provide to child laborers.
770
  In 2008, the STSS updated its 
list of hazardous child labor.
771
  The hazardous activities prohibited for children include certain 
activities in agriculture, such as the application of chemicals and carrying heavy loads, among 
others.
772
  Children ages 16 and 17 may legally perform hazardous work, but only if they receive 
both accredited technical training and STSS certification.
773
 
 
The Procedure for Comprehensive Service to Children and Adolescent Workers by the STSS 
(Procedimiento para la Atención Integral a la Niñez y Adolescencia Trabajadora desde la STSS) 
establishes the protocol STSS inspectors must follow when they encounter children in the 
workplace, which includes notifying the Inspector General of Labor and notification to the 
General Directorate of Social Welfare (Dirección General de Previsión Social) of the violation 
within 24 hours.
774
  The protocol also includes procedures for the STSS national office, the 
regional offices, and other agencies, including the General Directorate of Social Welfare and the 
Program for Eradication of Child Labor (Programa de Erradicación de Trabajo Infantil).  This 
protocol (unlike protocols covering other issues) is incorporated into the current inspection 
manual that labor inspectors are to follow.
775
  
 
The Roadmap to Eliminate Child Labor, developed by the GOH and the ILO, specifies the 
responsibility of each government agency in combating child labor.  It states that the STSS is 
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responsible for preventive actions, monitoring, and removal of child laborers from their work.
776
  
In 2011, the GOH developed the National Action Plan to Eradicate Child Labor (2008-2015), 
which delineates the STSS’s specific enforcement responsibilities, including strengthening the 
labor inspection system and inter-institutional coordination on combatting child labor.
777
  
 
b) Specific Cases 
 
The Submission raised two specific cases of child labor in agriculture.  At SurAgro, the STSS 
documented eight children, aged 17, working without STSS permission.
778
 Although the law 
only permits 17 year olds to work up to six hours per day, the STSS found that six of the eight 
children were working over six hours, and further, that they were not getting paid for all hours 
worked.
779
  The company was re-inspected and fined 25,000 HNL (US $1,201) for the illegal 
employment of children, but not for their illegally long shifts.
780
   The company paid the fine and 
appears to have eliminated the employment of children.
781
  
 
The STSS also found that Agroexportadora Dome employed 60 children for 11-hour shifts.
782
  
The STSS notified the company of various labor law violations, including the use of child labor, 
and conducted a re-inspection.  The corresponding inspection report stated that the child labor 
violation had been partially corrected but referenced remediation of a different violation in 
coming to that conclusion.
783
  It does not appear that the STSS attempted to pursue any sanctions 
against the company, but the company closed within a few months of receiving notice of the 
STSS’s finding.784  
 
Additionally, during its review, OTLA found that at Okra Sur, inspectors conducting an OSH 
inspection on April 9, 2010, also documented the use of child labor.
785
  The STSS inspectors 
found 17 year olds working without permission from the STSS for longer than the six hours per 
day permitted by law.
786
  The OTLA requested, but did not receive, any evidence of STSS 
follow-up, including re-inspection or sanctions, or any evidence that the STSS followed the 
elements of the protocol established by the Procedure for Comprehensive Service to Children 
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and Adolescent Workers by the STSS.
787
  During OTLA’s July 2012 fact-finding mission to 
Honduras, workers reported that Okra Sur continued to use child labor; however, the STSS did 
not find any children working in violation of the law during its September 2012 inspection.
788
  A 
union leader noted that STSS’ inspectors may not be finding the children who allegedly work at 
Okra Sur, as the children are temporarily removed from the worksite during an inspection.
789
   
 
c) Nation- and Sector-wide Prevalence 
 
Despite the numerous government policies to promote and coordinate the enforcement of laws 
related to child labor, child labor is common in Honduras.
790
  Numerous reports, including 
reports from the GOH, indicate that child labor is a major problem, particularly in the 
agricultural sector.
791
  Government officials such as the Special Prosecutor for Children’s Issues 
claim that relevant government authorities have failed to even reflect on how to combat the 
issue.
792
   
 
In 2013, the National Commission for Human Rights (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos 
Humanos, CONADEH) stated that approximately 412,000 children between the ages of five and 
17 work;
793
 although the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, INE) 
data from 2013 show a lower number, 372,578.
794
  Data from the INE shows that 359,617 
children between the ages of five and 17 were working in 2011.
795
  The same year, 224,209 
children, or 62.3 percent of working children between the ages of five and 17, worked in 
agriculture, hunting, and forestry.
796
  The STSS stated that in 2013 it only authorized 550 
children to work.
797
  
 
The USDOL List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor includes child labor in the 
production of melon, coffee, and lobsters in Honduras.
798
  The 2013 USDOL Report on Findings 
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on the Worst Forms of Child Labor also found child labor in the production of sugarcane.
799
  
Children working in agriculture may use dangerous tools, carry heavy loads, be exposed to 
extreme temperatures, and handle harmful pesticides.
800
    
 
 
CONCLUSIONS ON THE MINIMUM AGE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE PROHIBITION 
AND ELIMINATION OF THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR:  
 
Based on its review of individual cases and nation- and sector-wide reports of child labor, the 
OTLA has concerns regarding the enforcement of labor laws with respect to the minimum age 
for employment of children and the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor, 
especially in the agricultural sector.   
 
3. Acceptable Conditions of Work 
 
The definition of “labor laws” in Article 16.8 of the CAFTA-DR includes statutes or regulations, 
or provisions thereof, that are directly related to acceptable conditions of work with respect to 
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health (OSH).  The Submission 
alleges that the STSS failed to effectively enforce Honduran laws with regard to acceptable 
conditions of work, particularly in the agriculture and port sectors.  
 
a) Minimum Wages and Hours of Work 
 
The Submission alleges that the STSS does not effectively enforce provisions of Honduran labor 
law that provide for acceptable conditions of work with regard to minimum wages and hours of 
work. As evidence, the Submission provided examples from 10 workplaces: Pinehurst, SurAgro, 
Las Tres Hermanas, Okra Sur, Agroexportadora Dome, Agripac, La Pradera, Plantas 
Ornamentales, Azucarera la Grecia, and the Port of Cortés (ENP). 
 
Under the Honduran Labor Code, employers are obligated to pay workers as provided by 
contract (individual or collective) or the minimum stipulated by law, whichever is greater.
801
  
Article 381 defines the minimum wage, which is set by a tripartite commission.
802
  The 
minimum wage varies depending on the industry, the size of the employer, and the location of 
the workplace.
803
  Article 322 establishes that ordinary hours of daytime work are not to exceed 
eight hours per day and 44 hours per week and limits night hours to six per day and 36 per 
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week.
804
  Article 330 provides for a 25 percent premium for overtime worked during daytime 
hours.
805
  Article 325 exempts agricultural workers from the eight-hour maximum per day and 
provides for a 12-hour maximum.
806
   
 
In its response to the OTLA’s general questions on Honduran labor law, the STSS indicated that 
overtime premiums do not apply to agricultural workers because their maximum regular work 
day is 12 hours, rather than eight.
807
  STSS officials explained that the daily minimum wage is 
based on an eight hour day and that agricultural workers must be compensated at the regular 
hourly rate (daily minimum wage divided by eight hours) for all hours worked up to 12.
808
  
Minimum wage violations are often referred to as overtime violations in the agricultural sector; 
the OTLA considers them together as one issue, despite the differing terminology. 
 
The OTLA received documentation of 15 inspections where inspectors evaluated companies’ 
compliance with laws on minimum wages and hours of work.  In the majority of those 
inspections, STSS inspectors found violations but failed to impose fines or take action to ensure 
remediation of the violations (see Table 4 below). 
 
In the cases reviewed by the OTLA, as a result of its inspections, the STSS confirmed a failure to 
pay the minimum wage at least 12 times at eight different companies.  In the course of those 
inspections, the STSS also confirmed failure to pay the correct overtime wages at least five times 
at five of the companies.  However, the STSS imposed fines in only three of the 15 instances 
where it found such violations. 
 
In all cases where the STSS imposed fines, the OTLA received no evidence that the STSS 
continued to pursue enforcement actions once the employers paid the fines, even though the 
employers failed to pay back wages owed to workers, as ordered by the STSS.   For example, at 
SurAgro, STSS inspectors identified minimum wage violations during a March 8, 2007, 
inspection and ordered the company to pay the minimum wage and back wages owed to 
workers.
809
  The STSS imposed a fine on October 14, 2008,
810
 which the employer paid on 
October 22, 2008.
811
  However, on November 14, 2008, the STSS closed the case without 
verifying whether the company had remediated the violations.
812
  During inspections conducted 
on November 19, 2009, and March 1, 2010, STSS inspectors found ongoing minimum wage 
violations at SurAgro.
813
  The STSS regional office in Choluteca forwarded the inspectors’ 
findings to the STSS Inspector General in Tegucigalpa to request the application of fines,
814
 but 
                                                          
804
 Labor Code, Article 322.  
805
 Labor Code, Article 330. 
806
 Labor Code, Article 325. 
807
 GOH responses to the OTLA’s general questions, page 17, July 20, 2012. 
808
 OTLA interview with STSS Choluteca Director, July 12, 2012. 
809
 STSS report of inspection at SurAgro, July 9, 2007; Request for inspection and STSS order to conduct inspection 
at SurAgro, March 8, 2007; STSS notification report of inspection at SurAgro, November 2, 2007.  
810
 STSS notice of sanction to SurAgro, October 14, 2008.  
811
 SurAgro receipt for payment of 90,000 HNL (US $4,323) fine, October 22, 2008. 
812
 STSS document closing SurAgro case, November 14, 2008.  
813
 STSS notification report of inspection at SurAgro, page 2, March 1, 2010; Report on Labor Inspections at 
Foreign-owned plantations in Choluteca, March 25, 2010, STSS Choluteca Director.  
814
 Report on Labor Inspections at Foreign-owned plantations in Choluteca, March 25, 2010, STSS Choluteca 
Director.  
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the STSS did not take further steps on the matter.
815
  A December 2012 report provided to the 
OTLA by the STSS noted that the minimum wage violations continue; this was again confirmed 
by STSS officials in May 2013.
816
  In May 2014, workers reported that the company continues to 
pay less than the minimum wage.
817
  Despite finding SurAgro to be violating minimum wage 
laws for over six years, the STSS has still not taken effective action to ensure remediation or stop 
the unlawful practices.  
 
Table 4: STSS Investigations of Failure to Enforce Minimum Wage and Overtime Laws 
Company Violation(s) 
Alleged 
Confirmed 
by STSS 
Evidence of Sanction Evidence of 
Remediation 
Pinehurst Yes Yes – 10/5/10 Fine and ordered to 
pay back wages 
Paid fine but never paid 
the 453,433 HNL (US 
$21,779) in back wages. 
SurAgro Yes Yes – 3/8/07 Fine and ordered to 
pay back wages 
Paid fine but evidence 
indicates that minimum 
wage violations continue, 
never paid the 2,702,821 
HNL (US $129,818) in 
back wages. 
SurAgro Yes Yes - 11/09 None None 
SurAgro Yes Yes – 09/12 None None 
Las Tres Hermanas Yes No – 9/12 N/A N/A 
Okra Sur Yes Yes – 2/26/10 None No, evidence indicates 
that minimum wage 
violations continue. 
Agroexportadora Dome Yes Yes – 3/10 None None 
Agripac Yes Yes – 3/5/10 None  None 
La Pradera Yes No inspection N/A N/A 
Plantas Ornamentales Yes Yes – 3/18/11 None Back wages paid to 
workers still employed 
on 1/26/12
818
 but 
violations have not been 
remediated. 
Plantas Ornamentales Yes Yes – 9/11/12 None None 
Azucarera La Grecia No Yes – 1/30/13 None None 
     
Puerto Cortés –   
Stevedores 
Yes No (no 
inspection) 
N/A N/A 
ENP - Security Guards Yes Yes – 
overtime 
violations 
confirmed: 
10/22/10 
Fine and ordered to 
pay back wages 
Paid fine. ENP now pays 
workers correct overtime 
amount, but has never 
paid the back wages.  
ENP – Fork Lift 
Operators 
Yes Yes – 5/5/12  None None 
Total - 12 3 -  
                                                          
815
 The OTLA requested all relevant documents from the GOH, OTLA questions to the GOH, June 11, 2012.  
816
 STSS Report on follow-up inspections at workplaces named in the CAFTA-DR complaint, Dec. 18, 2012; OTLA 
meeting with STSS officials, May 20, 2013.  
817
 USG representatives meeting with SurAgro workers, May 2, 2014.  
818
 STSS notification report of inspection at Plantas Ornamentales, November 21, 2011 (documenting which workers 
received back wages during a January 26, 2012 re-inspection). 
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At Pinehurst, STSS inspectors identified overtime violations during an October 5, 2010 
inspection and ordered remediation on December 7, 2010.
819
  On February 9, 2011, the STSS 
conducted a re-inspection and found that the employer had not corrected the original violations 
or terminated the practice of failing to pay overtime wages.
820
  The STSS imposed a fine on 
October 26, 2011,
821
 which the employer paid on May 2, 2012.
822
  The GOH did not provide any 
information to indicate whether the company had paid the back wages in accordance with the 
STSS order or the STSS had closed the case without payment verification; however, in July 
2012, CDM reported to the OTLA that Pinehurst had not yet paid the back wages required under 
the STSS 2010 order.
823
   
 
Similarly, the STSS identified overtime violations with respect to the security guards at the ENP 
during an October 22, 2010 inspection.
824
  The STSS imposed a fine on July 7, 2011, which the 
company paid on February 6, 2012.
825
  However, in July 2012, ENP security guards reported to 
the OTLA that, while the ENP was now paying them the correct amount in overtime wages, they 
had not yet been paid any back wages.
826
      
 
Based on its review of the evidence, the OTLA has serious concerns regarding the STSS’s 
enforcement of Honduran laws with respect to minimum wages and hours of work.   
 
b) Occupational Safety and Health  
 
The Submission alleges the STSS does not effectively enforce provisions of Honduran labor law 
that provide for acceptable conditions of work with regard to OSH. As evidence, the Submission 
provided examples from the agricultural sector and at the Port of Cortés (ENP).   
 
Article 128.6 of the Honduran Constitution establishes the obligation of employers, including 
agricultural employers, to comply with OSH legal provisions.
827
  Labor Code Title V on the 
Protection of Workers during the Performance of Work and the General Regulation on 
Preventative Measures for Workplace Accidents and Work-Related Illnesses (Reglamento 
General de Medidas Preventivas de Accidentes de Trabajo y Enfermedades Profesionales, OSH 
Regulation) include the main provisions that define OSH requirements under Honduran law.
828
   
 
                                                          
819
 STSS notification report of inspection at Pinehurst, December 7, 2010. 
820
 STSS notification report of inspection at Pinehurst, December 7, 2010; STSS Legal Services decision regarding 
Pinehurst, March 23, 2011; STSS report of re-inspection at Pinehurst, February 9, 2011. 
821
 Decision of the STSS inspector general imposing fine on Pinehurst, IL-100914050107210, October 26, 2011. 
822
 Pinehurst receipt for payment of 10,000 HNL (US $480) issued by the Treasury of Honduras, May 2, 2012.  
823
 OTLA interview with CDM, July 17, 2012. 
824
 STSS record of inspection at ENP regarding hours of work, October 22, 2010; STSS record of inspection at ENP 
regarding wages, October 22, 2010. 
825
 Resolution issued by the Labor Inspector General regarding the ENP, July 7, 2011; ENP receipt for payment of 
10,000 HNL (US $480) fine, February 6, 2012. 
826
 OTLA interviews with ENP workers, July 2012. 
827
 Honduran Constitution Article 128.6.   
828
 OSH Regulation, Article 1.  
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The OSH Regulation contains articles establishing employers’ responsibility to provide a safe 
and healthy workplace.  For example, OSH Regulation Article 436 lists the personal protective 
equipment that employers must provide to agricultural sector workers, including: a) a wide-
brimmed hat, b) overalls or long-sleeved shirts, c) rubber boots, d) waterproof gloves, e) safety 
glasses or face shields, and f) masks.
829
  OSH Regulation Article 68.1 states that all workplaces 
must have an adequate supply of potable water that is proportionate to the number of workers, 
easily accessible, and available close to work stations.
830
  OSH Regulation Article 9(d) states that 
all employers must affiliate their employees to the IHSS to protect the rights conferred by law to 
workers affected by occupational risks.
831
 
 
Labor Code Article 617(c) and Article 2 of the OSH Regulation explicitly empower STSS 
inspectors to inspect for OSH violations.
832 
 The STSS General Directorate of Social Welfare has 
a specialized corps of inspectors that exclusively conduct OSH inspections.
833
  Labor Code 
Article 435 requires that employers report workplace accidents to the STSS Inspector General 
and the corresponding labor court within 24 hours and specific information about the accident 
within three days.
834
  Article 4 of Legislative Decree Number 39 establishes fines from 50 to 500 
HNL (US $2.40 to $24) for employer failure to comply with OSH laws and regulations.
835
  
Generally, the STSS appears to give employers 60 business days to correct OSH violations and 
does not impose a fine during this period.
836
   
   
The OTLA received documentation of eight inspection reports regarding five workplaces where 
inspectors evaluated companies’ compliance with OSH laws and regulations.  In all eight cases, 
the STSS inspectors found OSH violations.  Despite OTLA requests for all relevant documents, 
the OTLA received no documentation indicating that the STSS followed up to ensure 
remediation of the violations or impose fines for continuing violations (see Table 5).
837
   
 
Table 5: STSS Investigations of Occupational Safety and Health Violations 
Company OSH Violation(s) 
Confirmed by the 
STSS 
Evidence of a Sanction Evidence of Remediation 
SurAgro Yes – 3/8/07 None None 
SurAgro Yes – 3/6/08 None None 
Okra Sur Yes – 4/9/10 None None 
Okra Sur Yes – 9/12/12 None None 
Agroexportadora Dome Yes – 3/11/10 None None 
Agripac Yes – 3/5/10 None None 
Agripac Yes – 9/12/12 None None 
Azucarera la Grecia Yes – 1/6/11 None None 
Total 8 0 0 
                                                          
829
 OSH Regulation, Article 436.  
830
 OSH Regulation, Article 68.1.  
831
 OSH Regulation, Article 9.   
832
 Labor Code, Article 617; OSH Regulation, Article 2:. 
833
 STSS website, http://www.trabajo.gob.hn/organizacion/dgt-1/direccion-generla-de-prevision-social. 
834
 Labor Code, Article 435.  
835
 Decree No. 39, Article 4.   
836
 See: STSS report of inspection at Agripac, March 5, 2010; STSS report of inspection at Okra Sur, April 9, 2010; 
STSS OSH notification receipt regarding SurAgro, July 2, 2007. 
837
 OTLA’s specific questions to the GOH, June 11, 2012.  
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In many instances, the STSS did not re-inspect or take any other follow-up measures to 
determine whether employers had corrected OSH violations identified, despite giving notice to 
employers that the STSS would impose fines if employers failed to correct the violations within 
specified timeframes.  In inspections of Agripac in March 2010 and Okra Sur in April 2010, 
STSS inspectors identified 20 OSH violations at each company, including failure to provide 
personal protective equipment and access to potable water and failure to report OSH incidents to 
the proper authorities.
838
  In each instance, the STSS informed the employer that it had 60 
business days to correct the violations or face a penalty ranging from 50 to 500 HNL (US $2.40 
to $24).  The evidence provided by the GOH to the OTLA suggests the STSS did not take any 
actions including following routine procedures such as conducting re-inspections of these 
companies after the 60-day period to determine whether the employers had corrected the 
violations and did not assess fines.
839
  In September 2012, the STSS again identified OSH 
violations at both Agripac and Okra Sur;
840
 however, a December 18, 2012 STSS report on these 
inspections makes no mention of any STSS intentions to order sanctions or remediation.
841
         
 
In the few instances when the STSS did conduct re-inspections and found that the violations 
continued, the STSS took no actions to follow up including imposing fines on the employers for 
failure to remedy the violations.  During a March 8, 2007 inspection of SurAgro, the STSS 
identified 18 OSH violations, including SurAgro’s failure to provide personal protective 
equipment and access to potable water and failure to report OSH incidents to the proper 
authorities.
842
  On July 9, 2007, the STSS informed SurAgro that it had 60 business days to 
correct the violations and that it would impose a penalty ranging from 50 to 500 HNL (US $2.40 
to $24) if the company failed to comply.
843
  The STSS re-inspected a year later, at which time it 
found that SurAgro had not corrected 15 of the 18 identified OSH violations, including the 
violations related to personal protective equipment and potable water.
844
  At that time, the STSS 
did not fine SurAgro.  Rather, it gave the company another 60 business days to correct the 
violations and reiterated that the STSS would impose a fine if SurAgro failed to comply.  The 
OTLA requested any evidence that the STSS ever levied a fine against SurAgro for the OSH 
violations, but the GOH did not provide any.
845
  In July 2012, over five years after the initial 
violations of important OSH standards at SurAgro were first reported, workers told the OTLA 
                                                          
838
 STSS notification report of inspection at Agripac, March 25, 2010; Report on Labor Inspections at Foreign-
owned plantations in Choluteca, March 25, 2010, STSS Choluteca Director; STSS report of inspection at Okra Sur, 
April 9, 2010. 
839
 OTLA’s specific questions to the GOH, June 11, 2012.  
840
 STSS record of inspection at Okra Sur, September 12, 2012; STSS record of inspection at Agripac, September 
12, 2012. 
841
 STSS report on follow-up inspections at workplaces named in the CAFTA-DR complaint, December 18, 2012. 
842
 STSS OSH notification receipt regarding SurAgro, July 2, 2007. 
843
 STSS OSH notification receipt regarding SurAgro, July 2, 2007. 
844
 STSS report of re-inspection at SurAgro, March 6, 2008.  The report was silent as to the three other violations, 
including the violation pertaining to enrollment of workers in the IHSS.   
845
 GOH answers to the OTLA’s specific questions, August 20, 2012, page 23; documents received by the OTLA 
from the GOH, July 20, 2012 (these volumes of documents include the OSH inspection reports and other 
documentation related to the inspection and sanction process but no evidence of a fine being levied or collected).  
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that SurAgro continued to fail to provide personal protective equipment and access to potable 
water.
846
     
 
The STSS failed to sanction any of these five companies for OSH violations found during 
inspections conducted over the period March 2007 – September 2012 (see Table 5).  Despite 
prior findings of OSH violations, it also appears that the STSS did not investigate OSH 
conditions during the September 2012 inspections of SurAgro and Azucarera la Grecia.
847
      
 
Based on its review of the evidence, the OTLA has serious concerns regarding the STSS’s 
enforcement of Honduran laws with respect to occupational safety and health.   
      
 
CONCLUSIONS ON ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK 
 
The OTLA found repeated failures by the STSS: 1) to take legally required actions to ensure 
remediation of minimum wage and/or overtime violations at seven workplaces (Pinehurst, 
SurAgro, Okra Sur, Agroexportadora Dome, Agripac, Plantas Ornamentales, and the ENP); 2) to 
sanction for minimum wage and/or overtime violations in accordance with the law at seven 
workplaces (Agripac, Agroexportadora Dome, Azucarera La Grecia, Plantas Ornamentales, Okra 
Sur, SurAgro, and the ENP);  3) to take legally required actions to ensure remediation of OSH 
violations at five workplaces (SurAgro, Okra Sur, Agroexportadora Dome, Agripac, and 
Azucarera la Grecia); and, 4) to sanction for OSH violations in accordance with the law at five 
workplaces (SurAgro, Okra Sur, Agroexportadora Dome, Agripac, and Azucarera La Grecia).  
  
Based on its review of the evidence, the OTLA has serious concerns regarding the STSS’s 
enforcement of Honduran laws with respect to acceptable condition of work, including minimum 
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.  
 
IV. The Government of Honduras’ Actions during the OTLA’s Review 
 
Throughout the review process, the GOH demonstrated a willingness to engage with the OTLA 
concerning the issues raised in the Submission.  In response to the OTLA’s questions related to 
the Submission, the STSS conducted an internal audit to collect information and provided the 
OTLA with a substantial amount of organized documentation.
848
  High-level STSS officials 
facilitated private and confidential OTLA interviews with eight inspectors, as well as three 
regional STSS office supervisors.  The OTLA further notes GOH officials’ willingness to discuss 
the problems OTLA identified with the enforcement of Honduran labor laws. 
 
During the course of the review, some of the submitters, including unions and NGOs, formed a 
commission (the Follow-Up Commission) to monitor the submission process.  Senior GOH 
                                                          
846
 OTLA interviews with SurAgro workers, July 2012; OTLA interview with COSIBAH (Choluteca), July 11, 
2012. 
847
 STSS report on follow-up inspections at workplaces named in the CAFTA-DR complaint, December 18, 2012. 
848
 However, the GOH provided no judicial documents to the OTLA. For example, the OTLA specifically requested 
court documents relevant to the case brought by SITRAPETRALEX union leaders, but because the STSS had no 
knowledge of the case, they could not provide the OTLA with the requested documents.    
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officials met with the Follow-Up Commission and agreed to develop a coordinated plan 
containing recommendations intended to address several of the concerns raised in the 
Submission.
849
  Union and NGO representatives on the Follow-Up Commission produced a 
report, “Recommendations for a remediation plan for the State of Honduras to achieve labor law 
compliance related to the CAFTA-DR complaint,” developed with the support of the Solidarity 
Center and AFL-CIO, which they presented to the GOH on January 6, 2013.  The OTLA 
participated in a meeting with the Follow-Up Commission on May 20, 2013, in which the STSS 
presented its responses to specific recommendations made by the unions and NGOs.  The OTLA 
has carefully reviewed the Follow-Up Commission’s report’s recommendations and the GOH 
response.  
 
In addition, after the OTLA’s mission and meetings in July 2012, the STSS conducted 
inspections of 14 workplaces noted in the Submission, from September 7 to 13, 2012.
850
  This 
increased activity is welcome and essential to the resolution of the issues identified.  
Nonetheless, to date, the OTLA has not seen measurable systemic improvement in Honduras to 
address the concerns raised in the Submission, including the concerns with respect to the 
effective enforcement of labor laws.       
 
V. Conclusions 
 
The OTLA conducted a thorough and detailed review of all information obtained related to the 
allegations raised in the Submission to evaluate the GOH’s efforts, including the enforcement of 
its labor laws in light of its commitments under the CAFTA-DR.   
 
Based on that review, the OTLA has serious concerns regarding the effective enforcement of 
labor laws regarding the right of association and the right to organize and bargain collectively, 
specifically related to protección del estado, fuero sindical, anti-union retaliation, union 
dissolution, and employer interference with the right to associate and bargain collectively; and 
acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational 
safety and health.  Additionally, the OTLA review raises concerns regarding the effective 
enforcement of laws related to the minimum age for the employment of children and the 
prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor, especially in the agricultural sector. 
 
The OTLA also finds evidence that raises serious concerns with respect to the GOH’s capacity to 
prevent, identify, and remedy violations of law.  Such concerns include the STSS’s failures to: 
(1) respond to verbal inspection requests; (2) gain access to worksites; (3) inspect for all alleged, 
potential, or previously identified violations; (4) calculate, impose, and collect fines to deter 
future violations; and (5) ensure remediation of identified violations. 
 
                                                          
849
 Recommendations for a remediation plan for the State of Honduras to achieve labor law compliance related to the 
DR-CAFTA complaint, January 6, 2013, available from: 
http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/66811/1761401/Honduras+CAFTA+Recommendations+January+2013+En
glish.pdf.  
850
 The STSS did not conduct inspections at any of the Hanes factories, nor did it inspect at La Pradera or 
Agroexportadora Dome, which were no longer in business. Additionally, the FHIA inspection was conducted in July 
2012.  
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VI. Recommendations 
 
A. Recommendations to the Secretary of Labor 
 
The OTLA recommends to the Secretary of Labor that the U.S. government engage with the 
Government of Honduras to address the concerns identified in this report and the 
recommendations to the Government of Honduras set forth above, and that the U.S. government 
continue its cooperative engagement with the Government of Honduras to develop a Monitoring 
and Action Plan, with the intention to develop time-bound steps and benchmarks to measure 
progress, taking into consideration the accompanying recommended actions to address the 
underlying systemic problems.  
 
The OTLA recommends to the Secretary of Labor that the U.S. government initiate consultations 
through the contact points designated in the CAFTA-DR Labor Chapter under Article 16.4 to 
develop the Monitoring and Action Plan described above.  
 
The OTLA recommends to the Secretary of Labor that the U.S. government convene a meeting 
of the representatives from Honduras and the United States of the CAFTA-DR Labor Affairs 
Council to discuss the findings and recommendations of the report and the outcome of the 
consultations, at the level of Trade and Labor Ministers or their designees.  
 
The OTLA, in consultation with the U.S. Trade Representative and the U.S. Department of State, 
will review the progress of this engagement and any efforts by the Government of Honduras to 
address the concerns identified in this report, within 12 months after the report’s publication, and 
will consider appropriate action under the CAFTA-DR, including a recommendation by OTLA 
to the Secretary of Labor that the United States request Cooperative Labor Consultations under 
Article 16.6 the Labor Chapter. 
 
B. Recommendations to the Government of Honduras  
 
The OTLA has undertaken a review of the Submission in light of the commitments the GOH 
made under the CAFTA-DR, including those under Article 16.2.1.  As a result, the OTLA makes 
the following recommendations to facilitate compliance by the GOH with its Chapter 16 (Labor) 
commitments.  The recommendations include seven core recommendations, accompanied by 
concrete actions to address the underlying systemic problems reviewed in the Submission 
Report.    
 
 
1. Ensure that STSS inspectors respond to written and verbal requests for inspections, 
in accordance with the applicable laws and internal protocols.
851
   
                                                          
851
 The STSS has nonbinding protocols for inspectors to follow when investigating for possible labor law violations 
related to freedom of association, child labor, and OSH.  The protocols provide a set of guidelines and 
recommendations on methodologies and techniques to facilitate STSS investigations of employers with regard to 
these three issue areas.  However, these protocols are optional and, with the exception of the child labor protocol, the 
protocols are not explicitly linked to the inspection manual’s recommended inspection procedures. 
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 Train STSS inspectors to respond to both verbal and written inspection requests as 
required under Labor Code Article 618; 
 Allocate STSS resources and inspectors to the regional and central offices according 
to the incidence of worker complaints received (complaint-driven) and industries and 
regions with a high incidence of labor law violations (targeted, high-risk); and    
 Develop and implement a system to document each inspection request and track and 
monitor the STSS response. 
 
2. Ensure that relevant institutions develop a procedure or mechanisms to assist STSS 
inspectors to take appropriate steps to compel access to worksites, and impose fines 
and notify Labor Courts when access is denied, in accordance with the applicable 
laws and internal protocols. 
 Train STSS inspectors on the appropriate steps to take when denied access to 
worksites; 
 Clarify what is meant by “unjustified resistance” in Labor Code Article 617(b) so that 
inspectors understand the circumstances under which they should report denials of 
access to the Labor Courts;   
 Clarify what is meant by “immediate action” and “under their responsibility” in Labor 
Code Article 617(b) so that inspectors understand the circumstances under which they 
may call on the police for assistance to gain access to worksites upon denial of 
entry;    
 Develop and implement an outreach program to inform employers of their obligation 
to grant inspectors access to their worksites and the consequences of failure to do so, 
including clarifying that the absence of management from the premises at the time of 
an inspection is not a legitimate grounds for denial of access.    
 
3. Ensure that STSS inspectors investigate known violations of law and, upon receipt 
of notice, all alleged, potential, or previously identified violations, in accordance 
with the applicable laws and internal protocols.  
 Develop and implement a process to ensure that inspectors are adequately prepared 
for inspections, in particular to investigate all alleged, potential, or previously 
identified violations; 
 Train STSS inspectors on general, on-site investigation techniques; 
 Develop and implement a process to ensure regular and systemic coordination among 
general inspectors and between general inspectors and OSH inspectors to facilitate 
sharing of information on all alleged, potential, or previously identified violations of 
labor law at specific worksites.  
 
4. Ensure that the STSS imposes sanctions for labor law violations, in accordance with 
applicable laws, calculates fines that create appropriate penalties to deter violations, 
and collects fines in a timely fashion. 
 Clarify the application and calculation of fines “according to the particular 
circumstances of each case” under Labor Code Article 625 to ensure that the amount 
of fines calculated is more proportionate to the violations, including by: 
o Clarify that the calculation and imposition of sanctions regarding minimum wage, 
occupational safety and health, overtime, and illegal firing of protected union 
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leaders and founding union members must be based on the number of workers or 
union members affected by each violation; and 
o Clarify that fines must be increased for repeated or flagrant violations.    
 
5. Ensure that STSS inspectors enforce their remediation orders and compel employer 
compliance.  
 Re-inspect workplaces until remediation of labor law violations identified is verified, 
even if fines have been paid; and 
 Develop and implement a mechanism to compel full payment of back wages and 
other compensation owed to workers.    
 
6. Improve the enforcement of laws related to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining. 
 Train STSS inspectors on enforcing laws related to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining, specifically on conducting investigations of alleged unlawful 
dismissal of founding union members and union leaders, employer interference in 
associational activity, and anti-union reprisals, discrimination, and other retaliation; 
 Implement the Inspection Protocol for Freedom of Association, particularly in San 
Pedro Sula and at the new regional offices located near Export Processing Zones;
852
  
 Develop and implement alternative means for the STSS to notify employers of 
workers’ intent to form a union and of the identities of the founding union members 
protected from dismissal to prevent employer refusal or denial of such notification 
(e.g., by electronic notification);  
 Develop and implement criteria and procedures for the STSS to register collective 
pacts to prevent their use to undermine worker’s right to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining; 
 Develop and implement an outreach program, for employer associations and unions, 
to inform them of legal protections for founding union members and union 
leadership, including the process that employers must follow to legally dismiss 
workers under these protections and the consequences for illegal firings;   
 Inform all workers unlawfully dismissed while under legal protections for founding 
union members and union leadership of their right to reinstatement, the loss of this 
right upon acceptance of severance, and the steps the STSS will take if they choose to 
assert their right to reinstatement; this should occur, at a minimum, when the STSS 
provides information to such workers seeking calculation of their severance benefits; 
 Order reinstatement for eligible founding union members or union leaders unlawfully 
dismissed who choose to assert this right and conduct re-inspections to verify 
compliance; and  
 Fine employers six months’ salary of a union leader for dismissing that leader without 
prior judicial approval, calculate and impose the fine for every union leader dismissed 
without such approval, and collect the fines in a timely fashion.  
 
                                                          
852
 Colección de Protocolos de Inspección – Honduras, Protocolo Libertad de Asociación. This protocol was 
produced by the USDOL-funded Comply and Win (Cumple y Gana) project with consensus from the government, 
workers, and employers.  
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7. Improve enforcement of laws related to child labor 
 Implement the Roadmap to Eliminate Child Labor and the National Plan of Action 
for the Prevention and Elimination of Child Labor (2008-2015);  
 Ensure that children who work have proper authorization from the STSS, as required 
by law; 
 Increase resources for inspections in areas where exploitative child labor occurs, such 
as in rural areas and indigenous communities, where hazardous activities in 
agriculture and other activities exist and implement targeted programs to address 
child labor in these areas; and 
 Make information publicly available on child labor inspections and sanctions, 
including information on fine collection and remediation of violations identified. 
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Annex 1 - Chronology of USG Engagement with the GOH on CAFTA Labor Issues   
 
2012 
 April 12 - Staff from OTLA, USTR, and the Department of State met with officials from 
the Embassy of Honduras to discuss the Submission process.  
 June 11-  
o The OTLA sent questions (a set of general questions and a set of specific 
questions) pertaining to the Submission to the GOH via Vice Minister of Labor 
Carlos Montes.    
o OTLA staff met with Ambassador Alcerro and staff at the Embassy of Honduras 
reiterating that it had sent questions to the GOH and to discuss concerns about the 
decision to accept earlier in the 60 day period than for any other submission.     
 June 20- Staff from USDOL (OTLA, OCFT, and Office of the Solicitor) and USTR met 
with Vice Minister Montes and Vice Minister of Commerce Melvin Redondo in 
Washington, DC to discuss the Submission process. 
 July 10-  
o The USDOL (OTLA and Office of the Solicitor) delegation to Honduras met with 
Tomas Arita Valle, President of the Labor Chamber of the Supreme Court of 
Honduras to learn about the Honduran judicial system. 
o The USDOL delegation met with Vice Minister Montes and senior staff at the 
Ministry of Labor (STSS) in Tegucigalpa to learn about general enforcement 
efforts of the STSS.  
 July 12- The USDOL delegation met with Regional Director of the Choluteca STSS 
Walter Pineda, Chief Inspector, Labor Inspectors, and Conciliators to discuss specific 
cases from the Submission in Choluteca.  
 July 13- The USDOL delegation met with Honduran Minister of Labor Avila, STSS 
Legal Advisor Mario Villanueva, and U.S. Ambassador to Honduras Lisa Kubiske in 
Tegucigalpa to discuss the Submission generally.  
 July 16 – The USDOL delegation met with Regional Director of the San Pedro Sula 
STSS Norman Portillo, Chief Inspector, Labor Inspectors, and Conciliators to discuss 
specific cases from the Submission in San Pedro Sula.  
 July 19 – The USDOL delegation met with Regional Director of the Puerto Cortés STSS 
Alejandro Hilsaca Coto and Labor Inspectors to discuss specific cases from the 
Submission in the Port of Cortes.  
 July 20- Vice Minister Montes, Legal Advisor Mario Villanueva, and Legal Advisor 
Suyapa Thumann met with the USDOL delegation in San Pedro Sula to discuss 
USDOL’s review, provide USDOL with written responses to the general questions sent 
by OTLA on June 11, and deliver four volumes of documents relevant to the Submission.  
 August 1 – Vice Minister Montes sent the OTLA a letter to follow up on the USDOL 
delegation to Honduras in July. 
 August 14 – The OTLA sent a response to Vice Minister Montes’ August 1 letter. 
 August 22 – The Embassy of Honduras delivered the GOH’s responses to the OTLA’s 
June 11 set of specific questions.  
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 September 4 –Mario Villanueva sent the OTLA documents pertaining to a tripartite 
dialogue in Honduras to address the issues raised in the Submission, a chart reporting the 
status of the investigations of violence against unionists listed in the Submission, and a 
summary of a new draft inspection law.  
 September 12 – Vice Minister Montes sent the OTLA a letter urging OTLA not to 
request consultations in its public report.  
 September 17-19 – Mario Villanueva sent the OTLA records from inspections conducted 
during September 2012 of 15 of the 17 companies named in the Submission as well as a 
schedule for re-inspecting some of the companies.  
 November 2 – The OTLA sent Vice Minister Montes a letter informing the STSS of the 
OTLA’s decision to extend the period of review.  
 November 6 – Vice Minister Montes sent the OTLA a letter regarding the extension of 
the 180 deadline and reiterating his belief that the public report should conclude that the 
GOH has fulfilled its obligations under CAFTA.  
 November 15 –  
o The OTLA sent Vice Minister Montes a letter thanking him for the STSS’s 
collaboration and encouraging further sharing of information, including the final 
September 2012 inspection reports.  
o Mario Villanueva sent the OTLA the GOH’s plan for the tripartite dialogue 
referenced in his September 4 email.  
 December 12 – OTLA delegation to Honduras (Monitoring and Enforcement of Trade 
Agreements Division Chief Paula Albertson and International Relations Officer Halima 
Woodhead) and the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa’s Labor Officer met with Minister 
Avila, Vice Minister Montes, and Mario Villanueva in Tegucigalpa to ask for status 
updates on the September inspections.  
 December 18 – Mario Villanueva sent the OTLA a chart listing violations found in the 
September 2012 inspections of companies named in the Submission.  
 
2013 
 January 9 – U.S. Embassy Labor Officer attended a meeting between civil society and the 
GOH in Tegucigalpa in which civil society delivered its recommendations for a plan of 
action to address the issues raised in the Submission.  
 May 20 –  
o Paula Albertson, Halima Woodhead, and U.S. Embassy Labor Officers met with 
Minister Avila, Vice Minister Montes, and other senior STSS officials in 
Tegucigalpa to discuss the outcomes of the September 2012 inspections and the 
January 9 civil society recommendations. 
o Paula Albertson, Halima Woodhead, and U.S. Embassy Labor Officers met with 
the follow-up commission of unions, NGOs, and STSS officials.  Topics 
addressed included the September 2012 inspections, allegations of ongoing 
violations, civil society recommendations, and the STSS’s response to those 
recommendations.  
 May 21 – Paula Albertson, Halima Woodhead and U.S. Embassy Labor Officers met 
with Vice Minister Montes and Mario Villanueva to encourage continued dialogue with 
the follow-up commission. 
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 August 19 – Ambassador Kubiske met with Minister of Labor Jorge Bogran Perdomo to 
discuss the STSS’ plans to address ongoing labor law violations at Kyungshin-Lear.  
 September 18 – Paula Albertson and Halima Woodhead met with Mario Villanueva in 
Washington, DC.  
 September – U.S. Embassy Labor Officer met with the STSS and Kyungshin-Lear 
representatives to discuss the ongoing freedom of association issues at Kyungshin-Lear.  
 October 24 –  Deputy Chief of Mission Julie Schechter-Torres spoke at a public forum 
“Promoting a Culture of Dialogue through New Relationships for the Respect of Rights 
and Obligations of Workers and Employers” in San Pedro Sula with the submitters, 
private sector, and GOH, also attended by the OTLA. 
 
2014 
 January 26 – Secretary of Labor Thomas Perez and Acting Associate Deputy 
Undersecretary for International Labor Affairs Eric Biel met with Ambassador Kubiske, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson, outgoing 
Minister of Labor Bogran, Mario Villanueva, and civil society representatives to discuss 
opportunities for tripartite solutions to labor issues in Honduras.  
 March 21 – Halima Woodhead met with the STSS Regional Director in San Pedro Sula, 
Bessy Lara. 
 April 7-8  – Halima Woodhead and U.S. Embassy Economic Officer met with ENP 
management, Port Police (UPP) management, and Puerto Cortes Regional STSS Director 
and an inspector to discuss workers’ complaints about anti-union discrimination, 
dismissals of union members, threats to union leaders, and future restructuring; and 
encourage cooperative problem-solving. 
 April 28 – Ambassador Kubiske and Halima Woodhead met with Minister of Labor 
Carlos Madero to inquire about the new Minister’s priorities, discuss the CAFTA 
complaint, threats and violence against labor leaders, Kyungshin-Lear, privatization of 
the Port of Cortes, potential legal reforms related to labor laws, and DOL’s 
announcement of a $7 million grant to reduce child labor and improve working 
conditions in Honduras.   
 June 10 – Halima Woodhead met with STSS Regional Director in San Pedro Sula Bessy 
Lara to discuss the May 2014 dismissals of 3 union leaders from Kyungshin-Lear.   
 September 29 – Halima Woodhead met with Mario Villanueva to discuss the report. 
 October 16 – Deputy Undersecretary Carol Pier met with Minister Madero and Mario 
Villanueva in Lima, Peru to discuss the report.  
 December 15 – Halima Woodhead met with the follow-up commission in Tegucigalpa, 
Honduras.  
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Annex 2 – National Plan for Employment by Hours 
 
In November 2010, the Honduran Congress passed the National Plan for Employment by Hours 
(Plan Nacional de Empleo por Hora), establishing a hiring scheme for temporary workers.
853
 
Originally a temporary measure, the Honduran Congress made it permanent law in January 2014. 
It replaces many of the benefits guaranteed to permanent workers under the Labor Code with a 
20 percent pay premium for temporary workers employed by companies enrolled in the 
program.
854
  The Submission alleges that this program infringes on these temporary workers’ 
right to freedom of association.  
 
To date, there have been no formal complaints to the GOH regarding this program.  The CUTH, 
CTH, and CGT filed a complaint with the ILO, arguing, inter alia, that the National Plan for 
Employment by Hours has a potential negative impact on freedom of association, specifically 
that temporary workers are more vulnerable and less likely to form unions. The ILO Committee 
on Freedom of Association (CFA), however, issued a decision in June 2012, stating that the 
National Plan for Employment by Hours is not “incompatible per se with the principles of 
freedom of association.”855  
 
The OTLA notes workers’ concerns, including that temporary workers often face challenges 
exercising their right to freedom of association; however, the current oversight system contains 
provisions to promote job creation while also protecting labor rights.  In particular, companies 
participating in this program, in contrast to other similar programs, must demonstrate to the 
STSS, through an inspection, their compliance with Honduran labor laws.   
The STSS has committed resources to register employers that participate in the program and 
ensure compliance with the strict requirements of the law and its implementing regulation, 
including a prohibition on replacing permanent workers with workers hired under the National 
Plan for Employment by Hours.  STSS oversight includes audits prior to registration, in which 
the STSS examines current payroll records and compares them to records from the time that the 
decree was passed, and again after implementing the program to ensure that employers are not 
firing permanent workers and substituting temporary workers. Additionally, the program requires 
that a minimum of 60 percent of employees must be permanent staff.  Notably, the one instance 
in which OTLA’s review found that the STSS successfully ordered the payment of back wages 
owed to some workers was the result of an inspection under the National Plan for Employment 
by Hours at Plantas Ornamentales. 
 
 
 
                                                          
853
 National Plan for Employment by Hours, Decree No. 230-2010, La Gaceta 32,358 (A.10), November 5, 2010; 
Regulation for the National Plan for Employment by Hours, Acuerdo No. STSS-002-2011, January 21, 2011.  
854
 This premium is roughly equivalent to the amount of vacation and the 7
th
 day, 13
th
 month, 14
th
 month bonuses 
due to permanent workers by law.  
855
 Definitive report, ILO Committee on Freedom of Association. Case No. 2899, June 15, 2012. Paragraph 570. 
Unofficial Translation 
96 
 
Annex 3 – Honduran Labor Laws   
A. Código del Trabajo  (Labor Code) 
Título I: Disposiciones Generales (Title I: General Provisions) 
Capítulo Único: Disposiciones Generales (Only Chapter: General Provisions) 
 
Representantes de los patronos (definición)  (Employer Representatives [definition]) 
Art. 6. Se consideran representantes de los patronos y en tal concepto obligan a éstos en sus 
relaciones con los demás trabajadores: los Directores, Gerentes, Administradores, Capitanes de 
Barco y en general las personas que en nombre de otro, ejerzan funciones de dirección o de 
administración. (“The following are considered employer representatives, and as such, are 
bound by the same obligations as employers in their interactions with other workers: Directors, 
Managers, Administrators, Ship Captains, and in general, people who, on behalf of another, 
perform management or administrative functions.”) 
 
Indemnidad   (Indemnity) 
Art. 10. Se prohíbe tomar cualesquiera clase de represalias contra los trabajadores con el 
propósito de impedirles parcial o totalmente el ejercicio de los derechos que les otorguen la 
Constitución, el presente Código, sus reglamentos o las demás leyes de trabajo o de previsión 
social, o con motivo de haberlos ejercido o de haber intentado ejercerlos. ( “Any type of reprisal 
against a worker designed to impede, partially or completely, the exercise of the rights granted 
to them by the Constitution, this Labor Code and its regulations, or any other labor or social 
security laws, or as a result of the worker exercising or attempting to exercise those rights, is 
prohibited.”) 
 
Título II: Contratos de Trabajo  (Title II: Labor Contracts) 
Capítulo I: Contrato individual de trabajo  (Chapter I: Individual Labor Contracts) 
Definición y normas generales (Definitions and General Rules) 
 
Inexistencia de contrato: presunción  (Lack of labor contract: presumption) 
Art. 30. La inexistencia del contrato escrito exigido por este Código es imputable al patrono. El 
patrono que no celebre por escrito los contratos de trabajo, u omita alguno de sus requisitos, hará 
presumir, en caso de controversia, que son ciertas las estipulaciones de trabajo alegadas por el 
trabajador, sin perjuicio de prueba en contrario. (The employer bears the burden for the lack of a 
written contract as required by this [Labor] Code. When an employer fails to sign written labor 
contracts or omits any of the contract’s stipulations, in the case of a dispute, it will be presumed 
that the conditions of work alleged by the worker are true, notwithstanding evidence to the 
contrary.”) 
 
Título II, Capítulo II: Capacidad para contratar  (Title II, Chapter II: Ability to Contract) 
 
Trabajadores menores de edad
856
 (Working Minors) 
Art. 32. Los menores de catorce (14) años
857
 y los que habiendo cumplido esa edad, sigan 
sometidos a la enseñanza en virtud de la legislación nacional, no podrán ser ocupados en ninguna 
                                                          
856
 See: Code on Childhood and Adolescence, page 125 of this report.  
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clase de trabajo. Las autoridades encargadas de vigilar el trabajo de estos menores podrán 
autorizar su ocupación cuando lo consideren indispensable para la subsistencia de los mismos, o 
de sus padres o hermanos, y siempre que ello no impida cumplir con el mínimo de instrucción 
obligatoria. (“Minors fourteen (14) years old and younger, continue to be subject to education 
requirements provided for in national legislation and may not engage in any type of work. The 
authorities in charge of monitoring child labor may permit minors to work if they consider it 
essential for the subsistence of the child or his/her parents or siblings, as long as the work does 
not interfere with fulfilling the law’s minimum educational requirements.”) 
 
Art. 34. Si se estableciere una relación de trabajo con un menor sin sujeción a lo preceptuado en 
el artículo anterior, el presunto patrono está sujeto al cumplimiento de todas las obligaciones 
inherentes al contrato, pero el respectivo funcionario del trabajo puede, de oficio o a petición de 
parte, ordenar le cesación de la relación y sancionar al patrono con multas. (“If a work 
relationship is formed with a minor that is not in compliance with the previous article, the 
presumed employer must comply with all of the inherent obligations of the contract, but a 
Secretariat of Labor official may, of their own accord or by or request, order termination of the 
relationship and fine the employer.”) 
 
Contrato por tiempo indefinido: presunción  (Indefinite Period Contracts: Presumption) 
Art. 47. Los contratos relativos a labores que por su naturaleza sean permanentes o continuas en 
la empresa, se considerarán como celebrados por tiempo indefinido aunque en ellos se exprese 
término de duración, si al vencimiento de dichos contratos subsisten la causa que le dio origen o 
la materia del trabajo para la prestación de servicios o la ejecución de obras iguales o análogas.  
(“Contracts related to work that is permanent or continuous by nature in a company are 
considered valid for an indefinite period, even for cases in which the contract establishes a 
duration, if at the time that said contracts expire, the circumstances which gave rise to the need 
for the employment or the purpose for the services or the execution of the same or analogous 
work still exist.”) 
 
El tiempo de servicio se contará desde la fecha de inicio de la relación de trabajo, aunque no 
coincida con la del otorgamiento del contrato por escrito. (“Time of service shall count from the 
date of hire, even if it differs from when the written contract was signed.”) 
 
En consecuencia, los contratos a plazo fijo o para obra determinada tienen carácter de excepción 
y sólo pueden celebrarse en los casos en que así lo exija la naturaleza accidental o temporal del 
servicio que se va a prestar o de la obra que se va a ejecutar. (“As a consequence, contracts for a 
set period of time or for a specific job are an exception and can only be signed in cases in which 
the accidental or temporary nature of the service or job that is to be executed demand a 
temporary contract.”) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
857
 El Artículo 120, párrafo dos, del Decreto No. 73-96, que contiene el Código de la Niñez y la Adolescencia 
(Gaceta 28,053 del 5 de septiembre de 1996), prohíbe la autorización para trabajar a los menores de 14 años. 
(“Article 120, paragraph 2 of Decree No. 73-96, which contains the Children’s Code (Gazette 28,053 September 5, 
1996), prohibits the authorization to work for minors less than 14 years old.”) 
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Título II, Capítulo IV: Contrato colectivo de trabajo (Title II, Chapter IV: Collective 
Bargaining Agreements) 
 
Definición (Definition) 
Art. 53. Contrato Colectivo de Trabajo es todo convenio escrito relativo a las condiciones de 
trabajo y empleo celebrado entre un patrono, un grupo de patronos o una o varias organizaciones 
de patronos, por una parte, y, por otra, una o varias organizaciones de trabajadores, los 
representantes de los trabajadores de una o más empresas o grupos de trabajadores asociados 
transitoriamente. (“A collective bargaining agreement is any written agreement related to the 
conditions of work entered into between an employer, a group of employers or one or more 
employers’ organizations on the one hand, and, on the other, one or more workers’ 
organizations or representatives of the employees of one or more companies or transiently 
associated groups of workers.”) 
 
También se tendrán como convenciones colectivas de trabajo las resoluciones de las juntas de 
conciliación, cuando fueren aceptadas por las partes. (“The decisions of conciliation bodies will 
also be considered collective bargaining agreements when they are accepted by the parties”) 
 
No puede existir más de un contrato colectivo de trabajo en cada empresa. Si de hecho existieren 
varios vigentes, se entenderá que la fecha del primero es la de la convención única para todos los 
efectos legales. Los posteriores contratos que se hubieren firmado se considerarán incorporados 
en el primero, salvo estipulación en contrario. (“No more than one collective bargaining 
agreement may exist in a company. If, in fact, various agreements exist, it will be understood that 
the date of the contract signed first is the effective date of the only agreement for all legal effects. 
All written contracts signed after that date will be considered incorporated into that first 
contract, except for contradictory stipulations.”) 
 
 
Acuerdos con trabajadores no sindicalizados (Agreements with Non-unionized Workers, 
Collective Pacts) 
Art. 72. Los pactos entre patronos y trabajadores no sindicalizados se rigen por las disposiciones 
establecidas para las convenciones colectivas, pero solamente son aplicables a quienes los hayan 
celebrado o adhieran posteriormente a ellos. (“Collective Pacts between employers and non-
unionized workers are governed by the legal provisions for collective bargaining agreements but 
are only applicable to workers who previously signed or joined them.”) 
 
Registro y publicidad (Registration and Publication) 
Art. 78. Todo contrato colectivo deberá ser registrado en la Dirección General del Trabajo, 
mediante depósito del ejemplar a que se refiere el Artículo 58, a más tardar dentro de los (15) 
días siguientes. Cualquiera de las partes puede ser encargada de efectuar el depósito. Si la parte 
encargada no efectuare el depósito, la otra tendrá derecho a hacerlo en cualquier tiempo, 
haciendo entrega de su ejemplar, a la Dirección General del Trabajo, que le expedirá copia 
auténtica del convenio y constancia del registro y notificará a la otra parte. (“Any collective 
bargaining agreement shall be registered with the General Directorate of Labor within no more 
than 15 days by filing a copy as required in Article 58. Either party may assume responsibility 
for filing the agreement, but if the responsible party fails to file its copy, the other party  may, at 
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any time, file its copy with the General Directorate of Labor, who will then notify the other party 
and issue an authentic and certified copy.”) 
 
Por el hecho del depósito, el cumplimiento de todo contrato colectivo queda bajo la vigilancia de 
la Dirección General del Trabajo. La Dirección General del Trabajo podrá objetar cualquier 
disposición de un contrato colectivo de trabajo, cuando considere que es ilícita. (“Once filed, all 
collective agreements are under the supervision of the General Directorate of Labor, which may 
object to any stipulation of an agreement when it considers the stipulation to be contrary to the 
law.”) 
 
Publicidad del contrato colectivo: obligación empleador (Publication of Collective 
Bargaining Agreements: Employer Obligation) 
Art. 79. Los patronos comprendidos en un contrato colectivo estarán obligados a colocar, en 
lugares visibles del establecimiento o de fácil acceso a los trabajadores, copias del contrato, 
impresas o escritas a máquina. (“Employers bound by a collective bargaining agreement are 
required to post the contract in visible places within their establishment or to store printed or 
handwritten copies where workers have easy access.”) 
 
Publicación del contrato: STSS (Publication of Collective Bargaining Agreement: STSS) 
Art. 80. La Secretaría de Trabajo y Previsión Social, a pedido de la Dirección General del 
Trabajo, dispondrá la publicación de todo contrato colectivo, cuando ésta sea necesaria o 
conveniente, para el conocimiento de los interesados y para su cumplimiento. (“The Secretariat 
of Labor and Social Security, at the direction of the General Directorate of Labor, shall make 
any collective bargaining agreement available, when it is necessary and convenient for the 
information of interested parties and for compliance with the agreement.”) 
 
Formalidades variaciones del contrato (Formalities for Changing Collective Bargaining 
Agreements) 
Art. 81. Los instrumentos por los que se prorroguen, modifiquen o extingan contratos colectivos 
de trabajo, quedarán sujetos a las mismas formalidades de registro y publicidad establecidas para 
éstos. (“The means by which collective bargaining agreements are extended or modified and 
expire are subject to the same registration and publication formalities established for collective 
agreements.”) 
 
Título II, Capítulo VI: Obligaciones y prohibiciones de las partes (Title II, Chapter VI: 
Obligations and Prohibitions of the Parties) 
 
Obligaciones de los empleadores (Employer Obligations) 
Art. 95. Además de las contenidas en otros artículos de este Código, en sus reglamentos y en las 
leyes de previsión social, son obligaciones de los patronos: (“In addition to the obligations in the 
other articles in this [Labor] Code, its regulations and social security laws, employers are 
obligated to:”) 
 
1) Pagar la remuneración pactada en las condiciones, períodos y lugares convenidos en el 
contrato, o en los establecidos por las leyes y reglamentos de trabajo, o por los reglamentos 
internos o convenios colectivos, o en su defecto por la costumbre; (“Pay compensation in the 
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manner, period and location agreed in the contract, or in those established by labor laws and 
regulations, or by the internal regulations or collective agreements, or otherwise by custom;”) 
 
8) Permitir y facilitar la inspección y vigilancia que las autoridades de trabajo, sanitarias y 
administrativas, deban practicar en su empresa, establecimiento o negocio, y darles los informes 
que a ese efecto sean indispensables, cuando lo soliciten en cumplimiento de las disposiciones 
legales correspondientes; (“Permit and facilitate the inspections and monitoring that the labor, 
health and administrative authorities must perform within their company, establishment or 
business, and provide the necessary reports to carry out their work when requested in 
compliance with the  corresponding legal provisions;”)  
 
19) Llevar a cabo los reajustes de acuerdo con las estipulaciones  del contrato colectivo. A falta 
de éstas, respetarán los derechos de antigüedad y, en igualdad de condiciones, preferirán a los 
elementos sindicalizados para que sigan trabajando; (“Carry out modifications in accordance 
with the stipulations of the collective bargaining agreement. In the absence of such stipulations, 
seniority rights will be respected, and all else equal, preference will be given to unionized 
workers to continue working;”) 
 
Prohibiciones para los empleadores  (Employer Prohibitions) 
Art. 96. Se prohíbe a los patronos: (“It is prohibited for employers to:”) 
3) Despedir o perjudicar en alguna otra forma a sus trabajadores a causa de su afiliación sindical 
o de su participación en actividades sindicales lícitas; (“Dismiss or take any other adverse action 
against workers due to their membership in a union or their participation in legal union 
activities;”) 
 
5) Deducir, retener o compensar suma alguna del monto de los salarios y prestaciones en dinero 
que corresponda a los trabajadores, sin autorización previa escrita de éstos para cada caso, sin 
mandamiento judicial, o sin que la ley, el contrato o el reglamento lo autoricen. (“Deduct, retain 
or compensate any amount from workers’ salaries or severance, without previous written 
authorization from the worker for each case, without a judicial order, or without authorization 
by law, contract or regulation.”) 
 
9) Ejecutar o autorizar cualquier acto que directa o indirectamente vulnere o restrinja los 
derechos que otorgan las leyes a los trabajadores, o que ofendan la dignidad de éstos; (“Execute 
or authorize any act that directly or indirectly infringes or restricts the rights granted by law to 
workers or that undermines their dignity;”) 
 
10) Despedir a sus trabajadores o tomar cualquier otra represalia contra ellos, con el propósito de 
impedirles demandar el auxilio de las autoridades encargadas de velar por el cumplimiento y 
aplicación de las leyes obreras; (“Terminate their workers or to take any reprisals against them 
with the purpose of impeding workers from seeking help from the authorities in charge of 
safeguarding compliance with and implementation of labor laws.”) 
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Título II: Contrato de Trabajo   (Title II: Labor Contract) 
Capítulo VIII: Terminación del Contrato de Trabajo (Chapter VIII: Termination of the 
Labor Contract) 
 
Art 112. Causas justas que facultan al patrono para dar por terminado el contrato  (Just 
Causes that empower an employer to terminate a labor contract:) 
Son causas justas que facultan al patrono para dar por terminado el contrato de trabajo, sin 
responsabilidad de su parte: 
a) El engaño del trabajador o del sindicato que lo hubiere propuesto mediante la presentación de 
recomendaciones o certificados falsos sobre su aptitud. Esta causa dejará de tener efecto después 
de treinta (30) días de prestar sus servicios el trabajador; 
b) Todo acto de violencia, injurias, malos tratamientos o grave indisciplina, en que incurra el 
trabajador durante sus labores, contra el patrono, los miembros de su familia, el personal 
directivo o los compañeros de trabajo; 
c) Todo acto grave de violencia, injurias o malos tratamientos, fuera del servicio, en contra del 
patrono, de los miembros de su familia o de sus representantes y socios, o personal directivo, 
cuando los cometiere sin que hubiere precedido provocación inmediata y suficiente de la otra 
parte o que como consecuencia de ellos se hiciere imposible la convivencia o armonía para la 
realización del trabajo; 
d) Todo daño material causado dolosamente a los edificios, obras, maquinaria o materias primas, 
instrumentos y demás objetos relacionados con el trabajo, y toda grave negligencia que ponga en 
peligro la seguridad de las personas o de las cosas; 
e) Todo acto inmoral o delictuoso que el trabajador cometa en el taller, establecimiento o lugar 
de trabajo, cuando sea debidamente comprobado ante autoridad competente; 
f) Revelar los secretos técnicos o comerciales o dar a conocer asuntos de carácter reservado en 
perjuicio de la empresa; 
g) Haber sido condenado el trabajador a sufrir pena por crimen o simple delito, en sentencia 
ejecutoriada; 
h) Cuando el trabajador deje de asistir al trabajo sin permiso del patrono o sin causa justificada 
durante dos (2) días completos y consecutivos o durante tres (3) días hábiles en el término de un 
(1) mes; 
i) La negativa manifiesta y reiterada del trabajador a adoptar las medidas preventivas o a seguir 
los procedimientos indicados para evitar accidentes o enfermedades; o el no acatar el trabajador, 
en igual forma y en perjuicio del patrono, las normas que éste o su representante en la dirección 
de los trabajos le indiquen con claridad, para obtener la mayor eficacia y rendimiento en las 
labores que se están ejecutando; 
j) La inhabilidad o la ineficiencia manifiesta del trabajador que haga imposible el cumplimiento 
del contrato; 
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k) El descubrimiento de que el trabajador padece enfermedad infecciosa o mental incurable o la 
adquisición de enfermedad transmisible, de denuncia o aislamiento no obligatorio, cuando el 
trabajador se niegue al tratamiento y constituya peligro para terceros; y, 
l) Cualquier violación grave de las obligaciones o prohibiciones especiales que incumben al 
trabajador, de acuerdo con los Artículos 97 y 98, o cualquier falta grave calificada como tal en 
pactos o convenciones colectivas, fallos arbitrales, contratos individuales o reglamentos, siempre 
que el hecho esté debidamente comprobado y que en la aplicación de la sanción se observe el 
respectivo procedimiento reglamentario o convencional. 
(The following are just cause reasons for an employer to terminate the labor contract without 
any responsibility on their part: 
a) Deceit by a worker or the union that recommended the worker using falsified 
certifications or recommendations about the worker’s aptitude. This may only be used as 
a reason for just cause dismissal for the first thirty (30) days that the workers offers his 
or her service to the employer; 
b) Any act of violence, insult, mistreatment or insubordination perpetrated by the worker 
during the execution of his or her work against the employer, members of the employer’s 
family, management or coworkers; 
c) Any grave act of violence, insult, or mistreatment perpetrated by the worker outside the 
workplace against the employer, members of the employer’s family, representatives and 
associates of the employer or management, when the act is not preceded by sufficient, 
immediate provocation by other party or that, as a result, makes impossible a continued 
collegial working relationship or environment; 
d) Any intentional material harm to the building, worksite, machinery, raw material, 
instruments or other work-related objects and any grave act of negligence that endangers 
people and objects; 
e) Any immoral or criminal act that the worker commits in the workshop, establishment or 
workplace, when it is duly proven before a competent authority; 
f) Revealing technical or trade secrets or making confidential information known to harm 
the company; 
g) Condemnation of the worker to serve punishment for a crime or misdemeanor in an 
executed sentence; 
h) Worker failure to attend work without employer permission or just cause for two (2) full, 
consecutive workdays or three (3) business days over the course of one (1) month; 
i) Evident, repeated failure of the worker to adopt preventative measures or follow 
indicated protocols to avoid accidents or illness, or equally the worker’s failure to 
adhere, in a manner that harms the employer, to workplace regulations that are clearly 
expressed by the employer, employer’s representative or management to ensure the 
greatest efficiency and output in the job he or she is performing; 
j) Evident worker inability or inefficiency that makes completion of the work contract 
impossible; 
k) Discovery from a complaint or from involuntary commitment  that the worker suffers 
from an uncurable mental or infectious disease or has been infected with a transmittable 
disease when the worker denies treatment and presents a risk to third parties; and, 
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l) Any grave violation of special obligations or prohibitions to which the worker is bound in 
accordance with Articles 97 and 98 or any infraction found to be “grave,” such as those 
in collective bargaining agreements or collective pacts, arbitration decisions, individual 
contracts or workplace regulations, so long as the act is duly proven and the sanction is 
applied in accordance with the appropriate conventional or regulatory proceeding.)   
 
Dies a quo. Inicio de efectos del despido  (Carrying Out Dismissals) 
Art. 113. La terminación del contrato conforme a una de las causas enumeradas en el Artículo 
anterior, surte efectos desde que el patrono la comunique al trabajador, pero éste goza del 
derecho de emplazarlo ante los Tribunales de Trabajo, antes de que transcurra el término de 
prescripción, con el objeto de que le pruebe la justa causa en que se fundó el despido. Si el 
patrono no prueba dicha causa debe pagar al trabajador las indemnizaciones que según este 
Código le puedan corresponder y, a título de daños y perjuicios, los salarios que éste habría 
percibido desde la terminación del contrato hasta la fecha en que con sujeción a las normas 
procesales del presente Código debe quedar firme la sentencia condenatoria respectiva.
858
 
(“Termination of the [labor] contract in conformity with one of the enumerated causes in the 
previous article is effective from the time the employer notifies the worker, but the worker has 
the right to summon the employer before a Labor Court before the end of the statute of 
limitations to prove that the termination was based on just cause. Should the employer fail to 
prove just cause, the employer must pay the worker all severance due in accordance with this 
[Labor] Code and by way of damages the salary the worker would have received from the time 
of termination to the date a firm ruling that finds the employer responsible for unjust termination 
of a labor contract, subject to the procedural rules of the present Code.”)  
El trabajador puede demandar a su patrono el cumplimiento del contrato, para que se le reponga 
en su trabajo, por lo menos en igualdad de condiciones. El derecho del trabajador a exigir el 
cumplimiento del contrato se regula de la siguiente manera: (“The worker may sue his employer 
to comply with the contract, including reinstatement under the same working conditions at the 
very least. The worker’s right to demand compliance with the work contract is regulated in the 
following manner :”) 
 
a) El ejercicio del derecho es alternativo con el de reclamar las indemnizaciones a que hace 
referencia la primera parte de este artículo; y, (“Exercise of the right to reinstatement is an 
alternative to the right to demand the severance referenced in the first part of this article; and,”) 
                                                          
858
 Interpretado por el Decreto No. 89 (Gaceta No. 19,956 del 23 de diciembre de 1969) en el siguiente sentido: 
“Articulo 1.- Interpretar el párrafo primero del Artículo 113 del Código de Trabajo, en el sentido de que la 
percepción de salarios por parte del trabajador, con motivo de la obligación que corresponde al patrono, por causa de 
despido injusto, de pagar a título de daños y perjuicios los salarios que el trabajador habría percibido, se contará 
desde la terminación del Contrato, hasta la fecha en que con sujeción a las normas procesales del Código, debe 
quedar firme la sentencia condenatoria respectiva, de consiguiente los Tribunales de Justicia, no deben hacer 
deducción alguna del tiempo que dure el juico, ni limitar el pago de los salarios dejados de percibir.” (Interpreted by 
Decree No. 89 (Gazette No. 19,956 on December 23, 1969) to mean the following: “Article 1. – Interpret the first 
paragraph of Article 113 of the Labor Code to mean the payment of workers’ salary, corresponding to the 
employer’s obligation in a case of unjust dismissal, to pay penalty of damages and loss of pay that the worker would 
have received, shall be counted from the time of the contract’s termination until the date, subject to the procedural 
norms of the Code, that the respective condemnatory sentence remains firm, and the courts should not deduct any 
time for the duration of proceedings nor limit the payment of salaries that the worker did not receive as a result of 
unjust termination.”) 
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b) Si el juez declara en su fallo la reinstalación solicitada por el trabajador, éste no tiene derecho 
a las indemnizaciones correspondientes al despido, injustificado, pero sí a los salarios que 
hubiere dejado de percibir desde que ocurrió aquél, hasta que se cumpla con la reinstalación, y 
además en caso de negativa del patrono para cumplir con la sentencia, tiene derecho a exigir su 
cumplimiento por la vía de apremio. (“If the judge rules in favor of the reinstatement requested 
by the worker, the worker waives his right to severance pay for the unjustified dismissal, but not 
to the salary that was lost from the date of dismissal until his reinstatement takes effect; 
additionally, in cases where the employer fails to comply with the judgment, the worker has the 
right to demand compliance via court ordered collection procedures until reinstatement is 
completed”) 
 
Título IV: Jornadas, Descansos y Salarios  (Title IV: Shifts, Rest Periods and Salaries) 
Capítulo I: Jornadas de Trabajo (Chapter I: Work Shifts) 
 
Trabajos diurno, nocturno y jornada mixta  (Daytime, Nightime and Mixed Work Shifts) 
Art. 321. Trabajo diurno es el que se ejecuta entre las cinco horas (5 a. m.) y las diecinueve (7 p. 
m.); y nocturno, el que se realiza entre las diecinueve horas (7 p. m.) y las cinco (5 a. m.). (“A 
daytime shift is carried out between the hours of five in the morning (5 a.m.) and seven at night 
(7 p.m.); and a nighttime shift is work performed between seven at night (7 p.m.) and five in the 
morning (5 a.m.).”) 
 
Es jornada mixta, la que comprende períodos de tiempo de las jornadas diurna y nocturna, 
siempre que el período nocturno abarque menos de tres (3) horas, pues en caso contrario, se 
reputará como jornada nocturna. La duración máxima de la jornada mixta será de siete (7) horas 
diarias y de cuarenta y dos (42) a la semana. (“A mixed shift includes periods of daytime and 
nighttime work as long as the shift consists of no more than three (3) hours of nighttime work, 
otherwise the shift will be considered a nighttime shift. The maximum duration for a mixed work 
shift is seven (7) hours daily and forty-two (42) hours weekly.”) 
 
Límites para las jornadas ordinarias (Limitations on Overtime) 
Art. 322. La jornada ordinaria de trabajo diurno no podrá exceder de ocho (8) horas diarias y 
cuarenta y cuatro (44) a la semana, equivalentes a cuarenta y ocho (48) de salario. La jornada 
ordinaria de trabajo nocturno no podrá exceder de seis (6) horas diarias y treinta y seis (36) a la 
semana. (“An ordinary work shift may not exceed eight (8) hours daily and forty-four (44) a 
week, equivalent to forty-eight (48) hours of pay. The ordinary nighttime work shift may not 
exceed six (6) hours daily and thirty-six (36) a week.”) 
 
Estas disposiciones no se aplicarán en los casos de excepción, muy calificados, que determine 
este Código. (“These regulations will not apply to exceptional, very qualified cases determined 
by this Code.”) 
 
El trabajador que faltare en alguno de los días de la semana y no completare la jornada de 
cuarenta y cuatro (44) horas de trabajo, sólo tendrá derecho a recibir un salario proporcional al 
tiempo trabajado, con base en el salario de cuarenta y ocho (48) horas semanales. (“The worker 
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who does not work some days of the week and fails to complete a forty-four (44) hour work week 
will receive pay proportionate to time worked, based on a forty-eight (48) hour work week.”) 
 
Este principio regirá igualmente para la jornada ordinaria de trabajo efectivo nocturno y la 
mixta.
859
 (“This principle will also apply to the ordinary night and mixed work shifts.”) 
 
Trabajadores excluidos: regulación de jornadas máximas legales (Excluded Workers: 
Regulation of Maximum Shifts under Law) 
Art. 325. Quedan excluidos de la regulación sobre jornada máxima legal de trabajo los siguientes 
trabajadores: (“The following workers are excluded from the legal maximum work shift 
regulation:”) 
 
e) Los que realizan labores que por su propia naturaleza no están sometidas a jornadas de trabajo 
tales como las labores agrícolas, ganaderas y afines; y, (“Those who carry out work that by its 
very nature is not subject to shifts like agriculture, farming or related work; and,”) 
 
f) Los trabajadores remunerados a base de comisión y los empleados similares que no cumplan 
su cometido en el local del establecimiento o lugar de trabajo. (“The workers paid by commission 
and similar employees that do not carry out their work in the establishment or workplace.”) 
 
Sin embargo, tales personas no estarán obligadas a permanecer más de doce (12) horas diarias en 
su trabajo y tendrán derecho dentro de la jornada a un descanso mínimo de hora y media (1.30) 
que puede ser fraccionado en períodos no menores de treinta (30) minutos. (“Nevertheless, said 
persons will not be obligated to remain at work more than twelve (12) hours daily and will have 
the right to a minimum one and half hour (1.30) break during the work day that may be divided 
into periods no less than thirty (30) minutes.”) 
 
El Poder Ejecutivo, mediante acuerdos emitidos por conducto del Ministerio de Trabajo y 
Previsión Social, debe dictar los reglamentos que sean necesarios para precisar los alcances de 
este artículo.
860
 (“The Executive Power, through agreements issued by the Secretariat of Labor 
and Social Security, should impose all regulations necessary to enforce the scope of this 
article.”)  
 
 
 
                                                          
859
 Interpretado por el Decreto No. 96 (Gaceta No. 17,403 del 16 de junio de 1961), en el siguiente sentido: “e) Para 
los efectos del Artículo 322 del Código del Trabajo, el salario que corresponde a cuarenta y ocho horas semanales de 
las jornadas de trabajo diurno, será igual al salario de treinta y seis horas de la jornada nocturna y cuarenta y dos de 
la mixta.” (“Interpreted by Decree No. 96 (Gazette No. 17,403 of June 16, 1961), to mean the following: “e) The 
purpose of Article 322 of the Labor Code, the corresponding pay for a forty-eight hour daytime shift work week 
shall be equal to a thirty-six hour nighttime shift work week and a forty-two hour mixed shift work week.”)  
860
 Interpretado por el Decreto No. 21 (Gaceta No. 17,895 del jueves 7 de febrero de1963), en el siguiente sentido: 
“Artículo 1º. — Interpretar el Artículo 325 del Código de Trabajo en el sentido de que los celadores, cuidadores, 
serenos y vigilantes o wachimanes no se consideran empleados de confianza y que en consecuencia están sujetos a 
las disposiciones legales sobre jornadas ordinarias y extraordinarias de trabajo.” (“Interpreted by Decree No. 21 
(Gazette No. 17,895 on Thursday, February 7, 1963), in the following way: Article 1°. – Interpret Article 325 of the 
Labor Code to mean porters, caregivers, night watchmen, and security guards, are not considered trusted 
employees, and by consequence, are subject to the legal regulations of ordinary and exceptional work days.”) 
Unofficial Translation 
106 
 
Jornada reducida (Reduced Shifts) 
Art. 328. Los trabajadores permanentes que por disposición legal o por acuerdo con los patronos 
laboren menos de cuarenta y cuatro (44) horas en la semana, tienen derecho de percibir íntegro el 
salario correspondiente a la semana ordinaria diurna. (“Permanent workers, that by legal 
regulation or by agreement with their employers, work less than forty-four (44) hours a week, 
have the right to receive full pay corresponding to an ordinary daytime work week.”) 
 
Recargo por trabajo nocturno (Premium on Nighttime Work) 
Art. 329. El trabajo nocturno, por el solo hecho de ser nocturno, se remunera con un recargo del 
veinticinco por ciento (25%) sobre el valor del trabajo diurno. (“Nighttime work, for the mere 
fact of being at nighttime, will be paid with a twenty-five percent (25%) premium over the value 
of daytime work.”) 
 
Con el mismo recargo se pagarán las horas trabajadas durante el período nocturno en la jornada 
mixta. (“Nighttime hours worked during the mixed work shift will be paid with the same 
nighttime work premium.”) 
 
Jornada extraordinaria  (Overtime Shifts) 
Art. 330. El trabajo efectivo que se ejecute fuera de los límites que determinan los artículos 
anteriores para la jornada ordinaria, o que exceda de la jornada inferior, convenida por las partes, 
constituye jornada extraordinaria, y debe ser remunerado, así: (“Work performed outside the 
limits established in the previous articles for an ordinary work shift or that exceeds a short work 
shift as agreed by the parties, constitutes overtime, and must be paid as follows:”) 
 
1) Con un veinticinco por ciento (25%) de recargo sobre el salario de la jornada diurna cuando se 
efectúe en el período diurno; (“With a twenty-five percent (25%) premium over the daytime shift 
salary when performed during the day;”) 
 
2) Con un cincuenta por ciento (50%) de recargo sobre el salario de la jornada diurna cuando se 
efectúe en el período nocturno; y, (“With a fifty percent (50%) premium over the daytime shift 
salary when performed at night; and,”) 
 
3) Con un setenta y cinco por ciento (75%) de recargo sobre el salario de la jornada nocturna 
cuando la jornada extraordinaria sea prolongación de aquélla. (“With a seventy-five percent 
(75%) premium over the nighttime shift salary when the overtime  is a prolongation of a 
nighttime shift.”) 
 
Art. 332. La jornada extraordinaria, sumada a la ordinaria, no podrá exceder de doce (12) horas, 
salvo que por siniestro ocurrido o riesgo inminente peligren las personas, establecimientos 
maquinas o instalaciones, plantíos, productos o cosechas y que sin evidente perjuicio, no pueden 
substituirse los trabajadores o suspenderse las labores de que estén trabajando. (“ A shift, 
including overtime and an ordinary work shift, may not exceed twelve (12) hours, except by 
accidental occurrence or in cases of imminent risk endangering people, the establishment’s 
machines or facilities, crop planting, products or crops where workers cannot be substituted or 
have their work suspended without causing obvious damage.”) 
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Título IV, Capítulo II: Descansos Generales y Especiales 
 
Remuneración feriado laborado 
Art. 340. Si en virtud de convenio se trabajare durante los días de descanso o los días feriados o 
de fiesta nacional, se pagarán con el duplo del salario correspondiente a la jornada ordinaria en 
proporción al tiempo trabajado, sin perjuicio del derecho del trabajador a cualquier otro día de 
descanso en la semana conforme al Artículo 338. (“If by virtue of an agreement work is 
performed on holidays or days of rest or national celebration, double the salary of an ordinary 
daytime work shift will be paid in proportion to time worked, notwithstanding the worker’s right 
to any other day of rest in the week in accordance with Article 338.”) 
 
Título IV, Capítulo IV: Salarios  (Title IV, Chapter IV: Salaries) 
 
Integrantes del salario  (Salary Composition) 
Art. 361. Constituye salario no sólo la remuneración fija u ordinaria, sino todo lo que recibe el 
trabajador en dinero o en especie y que implique retribución de servicios, sea cualquiera la forma 
o denominación que se adopte, como las primas, sobresueldos, bonificaciones habituales valor 
del trabajo suplementario o de las horas extras, valor del trabajo en días de descanso obligatorio, 
porcentaje sobre ventas, comisiones o participación de utilidades. (“Salary constitutes not only a 
fixed or ordinary payment, but also, all everything received by the worker in money or in kind in 
payment for services rendered, in whatever form it may take, be it bonuses, extra pay, 
compensation packages valued for the supplemental work or for extra hours, value of work on 
obligatory days of rest, percentage of sales, commissions or profit-sharing.”) 
 
Principio de igualdad y no discriminación salarial  (Principle of Equality and Non-
Discrimination in Salary) 
Art. 367. Para fijar el importe del salario en cada clase de trabajo, se deben tomar en cuenta la 
intensidad y calidad del mismo, clima y condiciones de vida, y el tiempo de servicio del 
trabajador. A trabajo igual debe corresponder salario igual, sin discriminación alguna, siempre 
que el puesto, la jornada y las condiciones de eficiencia y tiempo de servicio, dentro de la misma 
empresa, sean también iguales, comprendiendo en este tanto los pagos hechos por cuota diaria 
como las gratificaciones, percepciones, habitación y cualquier otra cantidad que sea entregada a 
un trabajador a cambio de su labor ordinaria.  (“To determine the salary amount in each type of 
work, the intensity and quality of the work, climate and living conditions, and the worker’s time 
in service must be taken into account. Equal work must have equal pay, without any 
discrimination, as long as the position, the work day and the conditions of efficiency and time of 
service within the same company are also equal, including payments made for the daily rate like 
rewards, salary, room and board, and any other amount given to a worker in exchange for his 
standard labor.”)  
 
No pueden establecerse diferencias en el salario por razones de edad, sexo, nacionalidad, raza, 
religión, opinión política o actividades sindicales. (“Salary differences may not be implemented 
for reasons of age, sex, nationality, race, religion, political opinion or union activities.”) 
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Obligación de llevar el libro de salarios (Obligation to Maintain Pay Records) 
Art. 380. Todo patrono que ocupe permanentemente a diez (10) o más trabajadores deberá llevar 
un Libro de Salarios autorizado y sellado por la Dirección General del Trabajo, que se encargará 
de suministrar modelos y normas para su debida impresión. (“Every employer with ten (10) or 
more permanent workers must maintain a Salary Book authorized and stamped by the General 
Directorate of Labor, who will be in charge of supplying printed guides and rules for 
recordkeeping.”) 
 
Todo patrono que ocupe permanentemente a tres (3) o más trabajadores, sin llegar al límite de 
diez (10) está obligado a llevar planillas de conformidad con los modelos adoptados por el 
Instituto Hondureño de Seguridad Social. (“Every employer with three (3) or more permanent 
workers, without reaching the limit of ten (10), is obligated to maintain a payroll sheet in 
accordance with the guidelines adopted by the Honduran Institute of Social Security.”) 
 
Título IV, Capítulo V: Salario mínimo (Title IV, Chapter V: Minimum Wage) 
 
Definición (Definition) 
Art. 381. Salario mínimo es el que todo trabajador tiene derecho a percibir para subvenir a sus 
necesidades normales y a las de su familia, en el orden material, moral y cultural. (“Minimum 
wage is that which every worker has the right to receive to cover his and his family’s ordinary 
material, moral and cultural needs.) 
 
Título V: Protección a los Trabajadores Durante el Ejercicio del Trabajo (Title V: 
Protection of Workers at Work) 
Capítulo I: Higiene y Seguridad en el Trabajo  (Chapter I: Occupational Safety and Health) 
 
Acondicionamiento de locales y equipo (Maintenance of Workplace and Equipment) 
Art. 391. Todo patrono o empresa está obligado a suministrar y acondicionar locales y equipos 
de trabajo que garanticen la seguridad y la salud de los trabajadores. (“Every employer or 
business is obligated to provide and prepare work premises and equipment that guarantee the 
safety and health of workers.”)  
 
Para este efecto deberá proceder, dentro del plazo que determine la Inspección General del 
Trabajo y de acuerdo con el Reglamento o Reglamentos que dicte el Poder Ejecutivo, a 
introducir por su cuenta todas las medidas de higiene y de seguridad en los lugares de trabajo que 
sirvan para prevenir, reducir o eliminar los riesgos profesionales. (“To this effect, employers 
should, within the time period determined by the Inspector General of Labor and in accordance 
with the Regulation or Regulations emitted by the Executive Branch, introduce on their own, 
workplace safety and health measures that serve to prevent, reduce or eliminate occupational 
risks.”)  
 
Art. 392. Es también obligación de todo patrono acatar y hacer cumplir las medidas de 
prevención de riesgos profesionales que dicte la Secretaría de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. (“It is 
also every employer’s obligation to respect and comply with the prevention measures for 
occupational safety and health risks dictated by the Secretariat of Labor and Social Security.”) 
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Art. 400.  Corresponde al Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social, velar por el cumplimiento de 
las disposiciones de este Capítulo, atender las reclamaciones de patronos y obreros sobre la 
transgresión de sus reglas, prevenir a los remisos, y, en caso de reincidencia o negligencia, 
imponer sanciones, teniendo en cuenta la capacidad económica del transgresor y la naturaleza de 
la falta cometida. (“The Secretariat of Labor and Social Security is responsible for safeguarding 
compliance with the provisions of this Chapter, to attend to worker and employer complaints of 
transgressions of the Chapter’s rules, to prevent unwillingness, and in the case of reoccurence or 
negligence, impose sanctions, keeping in mind the economic capacity of the transgressor and the 
nature of the committed offense.”) 
 
Capitulo II: Riesgos Profesionales  (Chapter II: Occupational Hazards) 
 
Art. 435.  El patrono está obligado a dar aviso de los accidentes ocurridos, a la Inspección 
General del Trabajo o a sus representantes y al Juzgado de Letras del Trabajo que corresponda, 
dentro de las primeras veinticuatro (24) horas. Ya sea durante este término o dentro de los tres 
(3) días siguientes, proporcionará los datos y elementos de que disponga, para poder fijar la 
causa de cada accidente. (“The employer is obligated to inform the General Inspector of Labor 
or its representatives and the appropriate Labor Court about accidents that have occurred 
within twenty-four (24) hours. Either during this time period or within three (3) days of the 
occurrence the employer shall provide all available information and elements to determine the 
cause of the accident.”) 
 
Título VI: Organizaciones sociales  (Title VI: Social Organizations) 
Capítulo I: Disposiciones Generales (Chapter I: General Provisions) 
 
Art. 467. Las asociaciones de trabajadores de toda clase están bajo la protección del Estado, 
siempre que persigan cualquiera de los siguientes fines: . . . 4) Los demás fines que entrañen el 
mejoramiento económico y social de los trabajadores y la defensa de los intereses de su clase. 
(“Workers’ associations are under the protection of the State, as long as they pursue one of the 
following ends:…4) Any other aims that involve the workers’ economic and social  advancement 
and the defense of their interests.”) 
 
Título VI, Capítulo II: Sindicatos  (Title VI, Chapter II: Unions) 
 
Definición (Definition) 
Art. 468. Sindicato es toda asociación permanente de trabajadores, de patronos o de personas de 
profesión u oficio independiente, constituida exclusivamente para el estudio, mejoramiento y 
protección de sus respectivos intereses económicos y sociales comunes. (“A union is any 
permanent association of workers, employers or persons of a profession or independent trade, 
formed for the study, betterment and protection of their respective common economic and social 
interests.”) 
 
Protección del derecho de asociación  (Protection of the Right of Association) 
Prácticas desleales: sanciones  (Illegal Practices: Sanctions) 
Art. 469. Toda persona que por medio de violencias o amenazas, atente en cualquier forma 
contra el derecho de libre asociación sindical, será castigada con multa de doscientos a diez mil 
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lempiras (L. 200.00 a L. 10,000.00), que le será impuesta por la Inspectoría General del Trabajo, 
previa comprobación completa de los hechos atentatorios respectivos.
861
  (“Any person, who, 
through violence or threats, attempts in whatever form to impair the right of freedom of 
association, will be punished with a fine of two hundred to ten thousand lempiras (L. 200 to L. 
10,000), which will be imposed by the Inspector General of Labor, after complete verification of 
the respective facts of the incident.”) 
 
Sindicato de Empresa o de Base (Enterprise or Trade Unions) 
Art. 472. A los sindicatos de empresa o de base corresponde, de preferencia, la representación de 
los afiliados en todas las relaciones de trabajo; la presentación de pliegos de peticiones; la 
designación de comisiones disciplinarias o de reclamos y la de negociadores, de entre sus 
propios miembros; el nombramiento de conciliadores y de árbitros en su caso; y la celebración 
de contratos y de convenciones colectivas de trabajo; para cuya concierto deben ser consultados 
los intereses de las respectivas actividades de los asociados. Por lo mismo, dentro de una misma 
empresa, institución o establecimiento no pueden coexistir dos (2) o más sindicatos de empresa o 
de base de trabajadores; y si por cualquier motivo llegaren a coexistir, subsistirá el que tenga 
mayor número de afiliados, el cual debe admitir el personal de los demás sin hacerles más 
gravosas su condiciones de admisión. (“Company or trade unions are granted preference in 
representing their members in all work matters; submitting lists of demands; designating 
participants in disciplinary or appeals commissions and negotiators from among their own 
members; appointingconciliators and arbitrators in such cases; and executing collective 
bargaining agreements, which should be based on consultations with members to reflect their 
interests and respective activities. To this effect, within the same business, institution or 
establishment,  two (2) or more company or trade unions may not co-exist; and if for whatever 
reason more than one union were to co-exist, the union with the most members will remain and 
must accept members of the other union(s) without applying conditions of admission that are 
more arduous than those that apply to its original members.”) 
 
Titulo VI, Capítulo III: Organización  (Title VI, Chapter III: Organization) 
 
Art. 475. Todo sindicato de trabajadores necesita para constituirse o subsistir un número no 
inferior a treinta (30) afiliados; y todo sindicato patronal no menos de cinco (5) patronos 
independientes entre sí. (“All worker unions need at least thirty (30) members to form or 
continue functioning; and every employer association requires no less than five (5) independent 
employers between them.”) 
 
Titulo VI, Capítulo IV: Personería Jurídica (Title VI, Chapter IV: Legal Personality) 
 
Reconocimiento de personería jurídica (Recognition of Legal Personality) 
Art. 480. Las organizaciones sindicales se considerarán legalmente constituidas y con  
personalidad jurídica desde el momento en que se registren en la Secretaría de Trabajo y 
Previsión Social. (“Union organizations will be considered legally formed and have legal 
                                                          
861
 Artículo reformado por el Decreto No. 978 (Gaceta No. 23,130 del 6 de septiembre de 1980). (“Article modified 
by Decree No. 978 (Gazette No. 23,130 of September 6, 1980).”)  
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personality from the moment in which they are registered with the Secretariat of Labor and 
Social Security.”)  
 
Solicitud reconocimiento de personalidad jurídica  (Petition to Recognize Legal Personality) 
Art. 481. Para la inscripción y reconocimiento de la personería jurídica de los sindicatos, la 
Directiva Provisional, por sí o mediante apoderado especial, deberá elevar al Ministerio de 
Trabajo y Previsión Social, por conducto de la Dirección General del Trabajo, la solicitud 
correspondiente, acompañándola de los siguientes documentos, todo en papel común: (“For the 
registration and recognition of the union’s legal personality, the provisional board of directors, 
may directly or through a special legal representative, present the corresponding request to the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security via the General Directorate ofLabor, accompanied by the 
following documents in hard copy:”) 
 
1) Certificación del acta de fundación, con las firmas autógrafas de los asistentes, o de quienes 
firmen por ellos, y la anotación de sus respectivas tarjetas de identidad; (“Certification of the 
founding charter, with the signature of the founding participants (or those that signo n their 
behalf) and notation of their identity card numbers;”) 
 
2) Certificación del acta de la elección de la Junta Directiva Provisional, con los mismos 
requisitos del ordinal anterior; (“Certification of the election record of the Provisional Board of 
Directors, with the same requirements of the previous ordinal [Article 481(1)];”) 
 
3) Certificación del acta de la reunión en que fueron aprobados los estatutos; (“Certification of 
the minutes of the meeting during which the by-laws were approved;”) 
 
4) Carta poder de quien solicite el reconocimiento de la personería jurídica, cuando la solicitud 
no sea presentada por la Junta Directiva Provisional. El poder debe ser autenticado, ante 
autoridad competente; (“Proof of power of attorney of the person soliciting  legal personality, 
when the request is not presented by the Provisional Board of Directors. The power must be 
authenticated before a competent authority.”) 
 
5) Dos (2) certificaciones del acta de fundación, extendidas por el Secretario Provisional; (“Two 
(2) certified copies of the founding charter, issued by the Provisional Secretary;”) 
 
6) Dos (2) ejemplares de los estatutos del sindicato, extendidos por el Secretario Provisional; 
(“Two (2) copies of the union by-laws, issued by the Provisional Secretary;”) 
 
7) Nómina de la Junta Directiva Provisional, por triplicado, con indicación de la nacionalidad, la 
profesión u oficio, el número de la tarjeta de identidad y el domicilio de cada director; (“Three 
copies of a list of the Provisional Leadership Committee, indicating the nationality, profession or 
occupation, identification card number and address of each leader;”)   
 
8) Nómina completa del personal de afiliados, por triplicado, con especificación de la  
nacionalidad, sexo y profesión u oficio de cada uno de ellos; y, (“Three copies of the complete 
list of members,indicating each members’ nationality, sex and profession or occupation; and,”) 
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9) Certificación del correspondiente Inspector del Trabajo sobre la inexistencia de otro sindicato, 
si se tratare de un sindicato de empresa o de base que pueda considerarse paralelo; sobre la  
calidad de patronos o de trabajadores de los fundadores, en relación con la industria o actividad 
de que se trate o de su calidad de profesionales del ramo del sindicato; sobre la antigüedad, si 
fuere el caso, de los directores provisionales en el ejercicio de la correspondiente actividad, y 
sobre las demás circunstancias que estime conducentes. En los lugares en donde no haya 
Inspector de Trabajo, la certificación debe ser expedida por el respectivo Alcalde Municipal, y 
refrendada por el Inspector de Trabajo más cercano. Los documentos de que tratan los números 
1º, 2° y 3º pueden estar reunidos en un solo texto o acta. (“Certification from the corresponding 
Labor Inspector that no other union exists in the company, if it is a company union, or that no 
union that could be considered parallel exists if it is a trade union;; regarding the nature of the 
relationship of the founding employers or workers to the industry or activity of the union or of 
the nature of their relationship to the professional branch to which the trade union is related; 
regarding seniority, if it were the case, of the provisional directors in the exercise of the 
corresponding activity, and relating to the other circumstances considered relevant. In places 
where there is no Labor Inspector, the certification must be issued by the respective Municipal 
Mayor and endorsed by the nearest Labor Inspector. The documents required by numerals 1°, 
2°, and 3° [of this Article] may be collected in one single text or report.”) 
 
Plazo para remisión de solicitud: 15 días  (Timeframe for Response to Petition: 15 Days) 
Art. 482. Recibida la solicitud por la Dirección General del Trabajo, ésta dispondrá de un 
término máximo de quince (15) días para revisar la documentación acompañada, examinar los 
estatutos, formular a los interesados las observaciones pertinentes y elevar al Ministerio 
respectivo el informe del caso, para los efectos consiguientes. (“Once the General Directorate of 
Labor receives the request, they will have up to fifteen (15) days to review the accompanying 
documentation, examine the by-laws, formulate pertinent observations for the interested parties 
and present the case report to the respective Ministry to carry out any follow-up actions.”) 
 
Reconocimiento de personería jurídica  (Recognition of Legal Personality) 
Art. 483. El Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión Social reconocerá la personería jurídica, salvo el 
caso de que los estatutos del sindicato sean contrarios a la Constitución de la República, a las 
leyes o a las buenas costumbres o contravengan disposiciones especiales de este Código. El 
Ministerio, dentro de los quince (15) días siguientes al recibo del expediente, dictará la 
resolución sobre reconocimiento o denegación de la personería jurídica, indicando en el segundo 
caso las razones de orden legal o las disposiciones de este Código que determinen la negativa. 
(“The Secretariat of Labor and Social Security will recognize legal personality, except in cases 
where the union by-laws contradict the Constitution of the Republic, the law or good customs or 
contravene any special provisions of this Code. The Secretariat, within fifteen (15) days of 
receiving the file, will issue its decision to recognize or deny legal personality, indicating in the 
latter case the legal basis or the specific provisions of this Code upon which it based the 
denial.”) 
 
Plazo para ajustar solicitud o solicitar reconsideración  (Timeframe to Modify Petition or 
Petition for Reconsideration) 
Art. 484. Si los documentos mencionados no se ajustan a lo prescrito en el Artículo 481, se 
dictará resolución que indique sus errores o deficiencias para que los interesados, dentro del 
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término de dos (2) meses, los subsanen o pidan reconsideración de lo resuelto. En este caso, el 
término de quince (15) días hábiles señalado en el artículo anterior, comenzará a correr desde el 
día en que se presente la solicitud corregida. La reconsideración será resuelta dentro de los diez 
(10) días hábiles siguientes al de la interposición del recurso. (“If the documents mentioned do 
not conform to Article 481, the Secretariat will issue a notice to the interested parties indicating 
any errors or deficiencies so that they may, within a period of two (2) months, correct those 
errors or ask the Secretariat for reconsideration of its determination. In this case, the period of 
fifteen (15) business days stipulated in the previous article, will begin the day the corrected 
request is submitted. The reconsideration will be resolved within ten (10) business days of the 
filing of the appeal.”)   
 
Publicación y certificación (Publication and Certification) 
Art. 485. Hecha la inscripción respectiva, la Dirección General del Trabajo extenderá 
certificación de ella a solicitud de los interesados y ordenará que se publique gratuitamente un ex 
tracto de la misma, por tres (3) veces consecutivas, en el diario oficial “La Gaceta”, y surtirá sus 
efectos después de la última publicación. (“Once the registration is completed, the General 
Directorate of Labor will issue its certification at the request of interested parties, order for this 
[certification] to be published at no charge three (3) consecutive times in the official newspaper, 
“The Gazette,” and facilitate its taking effect after the last publication.”) 
 
Comunicación de cambios en la Junta Directiva (Communicating Changes in the Board of 
Directors) 
Art. 489. Cualquier cambio total o parcial, en la Junta Directiva de un sindicato, debe ser 
comunicado al Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión Social por conducto de la Dirección General 
del Trabajo, en los mismos términos indicados en el inciso 7 del Artículo 481. Mientras no se 
llene este requisito el cambio no surte ningún efecto. (“Any full or partial change to a union’s 
Board of Directors must be communicated to the Secretariat of Labor and Social Security 
through the General Directorate of Labor, via the same guidelines established  in section 7 of 
Article 481. The changes will not take effect until these requirements are met.”) 
 
Titulo VI, Capítulo VI: Libertad de Trabajo Prohibiciones y Sanciones (Title VI, Chapter 
VI: Freedom to Work, Prohibitions and Sanctions) 
 
Sanciones por incumplimientos (Sanctions for Failure to Comply) 
Art. 500. Cualquier violación de las normas del presente Título será sancionada así: (“Any 
violations of the provisions of the present Title will be sanctioned as follows:”) 
1) Si la violación es imputable al sindicato mismo, por constituir una actuación de sus directivas, 
y la infracción o hecho que la origina no se hubiere consumado, el Ministerio de Trabajo y 
Previsión Social prevendrá al sindicato para que revoque su determinación dentro del término 
prudencial que fije; (“If the violation is attributable to the union itself, consisting of an act by the 
directors, and the infraction or incident it originated from has not been carried out, the 
Secretariat of Labor and Social Security will warn the union to revoke their decision within a set 
reasonable period;”) 
 
2) Si la infracción ya se hubiere cumplido, o si hecha la prevención anterior no se atendiere, el 
Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social procederá, previa la suficiente comprobación, a 
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imponer la sanción o las sanciones siguientes, en su orden así: (“If the infraction has already 
been carried out, or if the above warning was not heeded, the Secretariat of Labor and Social 
Security will, upon sufficient verification, impose the following sanction or sanctions, in this 
order:”) 
 
a) Multa hasta de quinientos (500) Lempiras en primer término; (“A fine of five hundred 
(500) Lempiras in the first instance;”) 
 
b) Si a pesar de la multa el sindicato persistiere en la violación, impondrá otra multa 
equivalente al doble de la anterior; (“If, despite the fine, the union continues the violation, 
another fine will be imposed equal to double the previous fine [1,000 HNL];”) 
 
c) Según la gravedad del caso, podrá solicitar de la justicia del trabajo la suspensión, por 
el tiempo que la transgresión subsista, o la cancelación de la personalidad jurídica del 
sindicato y su consiguiente liquidación.
862
 (“Depending on the gravity of the case, 
suspension may be legally requested from the Labor Judge, as long as the transgression 
persists, or the cancellation of the union’s legal personality and its consequent 
liquidation.”) 
 
3) Las solicitudes de suspensión o de cancelación de personalidad jurídica y consiguiente 
liquidación se formularán ante el Juez de Letras del Trabajo del domicilio del Sindicato, o en su 
defecto, ante el Juez de Letras de lo Civil, de acuerdo con lo establecido en este Código.
 863
 
(“Requests for suspension or cancellation of the legal personality and consequent liquidation 
will be formulated before the Labor Court with jurisdiction over the union’s address, or in its 
absence, before the Civil Court, in accordance with that established in this Code.”) 
 
4) Las suspensiones de que trata la letra c) del inciso 2º de este artículo, se levantarán tan pronto 
como cesen las infracciones que les dieron origen; y, (“The suspensions mentioned in letter c) of 
paragraph 2° of this article, will be lifted as soon as the original infractions prompting legal 
action have ceased; and,”) 
 
5) Los miembros de la Directiva de un Sindicato que hayan originado la disolución de éste, no 
podrán ser miembros directivos de ninguna organización sindical hasta por el término de tres (3) 
años, según lo disponga el Juez en el fallo que decrete la disolución y en el cual serán declarados 
nominalmente tales responsables. (“The members of a Union’s Board of Directors responsible 
for its dissolution, cannot be board members of any union organization up to a period of three 
(3) years, according to the stipulations of the Court’s decision that orders the dissolution and in 
which those responsible will be indicated by name.”) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
862
 Incisos reformados por el Decreto No. 760 (Gaceta No. 22,811 del lunes 28de mayo de 1979). (“Paragraphs 
modified by Decree No. 760 (Gazette No. 22,811 on Monday, May 28, 1979).”) 
863
 Incisos reformados por el Decreto No. 760 (Gaceta No. 22,811 del lunes 28de mayo de 1979). (“Paragraphs 
modified by Decree No. 760 (Gazette No. 22,811 on Monday, May 28, 1979).) 
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Titulo VI, Capítulo VII: Régimen Interno (Title VI, Chapter VII: Internal Rules) 
 
Prohibición: representantes del empleador para ser directivos (Prohibition: Employer 
Representatives on Union Board of Directors) 
Art. 511. No pueden formar parte de la Junta Directiva de un sindicato de empresa o base, al ser 
designados funcionarios del sindicato, los afiliados que, por razón de sus cargos en la empresa, 
representen al patrono o tengan funciones de dirección o de confianza personal o puedan 
fácilmente ejercer una indebida coacción sobre sus compañeros. Dentro de este número se 
cuentan los gerentes, subgerentes, administradores, jefes de personal, secretarios privados de la 
junta directiva, la gerencia o la administración, directores de departamentos (ingeniero jefe, 
médico jefe, asesor jurídico, directores técnicos, etc.), y otros empleados semejantes. Es nula la 
elección que recaiga en uno de tales afiliados, y el que, debidamente electo, entre después a 
desempeñar alguno de los empleos referidos, dejará ipso facto vacante su cargo sindical.  
(“Members that, because of their position in the company, represent the employer or who have 
management functions or personal trust or who may easily exercise unjust coercion over 
coworkers, cannot be part of a trade or company union’s Board of Directors. Those prohibited 
include managers, assistant managers, administrators, supervisors, private secretaries of the 
board of directors, management or the administration, department directors (head of 
engineering, head of medical, legal advisor, technical directors, etc.), and other similar 
employees. The election of any such members to the Board is invalid, and, any duly elected 
member that assumes such a management function shall automatically vacate his union 
position.”) 
 
Fuero sindical (Protection of Elected Union Leaders) 
Art. 516. Los trabajadores miembros de la Junta Directiva de una organización sindical, desde su 
elección hasta seis (6) meses después de cesar en sus funciones, no podrán ser despedidos de su 
trabajo sin comprobar previamente ante el Juez de Letras del Trabajo respectivo o ante el Juez de 
lo Civil en su defecto, que existe justa causa para dar por terminado el contrato. El Juez actuando 
en juicio sumario, resolverá lo procedente. Esta disposición sólo es aplicable a la Junta Directiva 
Central, cuando los sindicatos estén organizados en secciones y subsecciones. (“Members of a 
union’s Board of Directors may not be dismissed from their jobs from their election until six (6) 
months after ceasing their role on the Board without previously proving just cause for 
terminating their contract before the respective Labor Court or, in its absence, before the Civil 
Court. The acting judge will issue a summary judgment as appropriate. This provision is only 
applicable to a union’s Central Board of Directors when the union is organized into sections or 
subsections.”) 
 
La violación de lo dispuesto en el párrafo anterior, sujetará al patrono a pagar a la organización 
sindical respectiva una indemnización equivalente a seis (6) meses de salario del trabajador, sin 
perjuicio de los derechos que a éste correspondan.  (“Violation of the provisions of the above 
paragraph will subject the employer to pay the respective union organization a compensation 
equivalent to six (6) months of the worker’s pay, notwithstanding their other rights.”) 
 
 Fuero sindical promotores   (Special Protection of the State for Union Founders) 
Art. 517. La notificación formal de treinta (30) trabajadores hecha a su patrono por escrito, 
comunicada a la Dirección General del Trabajo o a la Procuraduría de Trabajo de la jurisdicción, 
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de su propósito de organizar un sindicato, coloca a los firmantes de dicha notificación, bajo la 
protección especial del Estado. En consecuencia, desde la fecha de la notificación, hasta la de 
recibir la constancia de Personería Jurídica, ninguno de aquellos trabajadores podrá ser 
despedido, trasladado o desmejorado en sus condiciones de trabajo, sin causa justa, calificada 
previamente por la autoridad respectiva. (“Formal notification of thirty (30) workers of their 
intent to organize a union, made in writing to their employer and communicated to the General 
Directorate of Labor or the Attorney General of Labor of the jurisdiction, places the signers of 
said notification under a special State protection. Therefore, from the date of notification until 
the receipt of the certification of the union’s legal personality, none of these workers can be 
fired, transferred, or demoted in their working condition without just cause, only after just cause 
is determined by the respective authority.”) 
 
Obligaciones de sindicatos (Union Obligations) 
Art. 518. Los sindicatos están obligados: (“Unions are obligated to:”) 
 
1) A suministrar los informes que les pidan las autoridades de trabajo, siempre que se refieran 
exclusivamente a su actuación como tales sindicatos; (“Provide reports requested by labor 
authorities, whenever they are exclusively related to their union actions;”) 
 
2) A comunicar a la Dirección General del Trabajo, dentro de los quince (15) días siguientes a su 
elección, los cambios ocurridos en su Junta Directiva; (“Communicate any change in their Board 
of Directors to the General Directorate of Labor within the fifteen (15) days of an election;”) 
 
3) A enviar cada año a dicha Dirección una nómina completa de inclusiones y exclusiones de sus 
miembros; (“Send a complete roll of all members that have joined or left the union annually to 
said Directorate;”) 
 
4) A iniciar dentro de los quince (15) días siguientes a la celebración de la Asamblea General 
que acordó reformar los estatutos, los trámites necesarios para su aprobación legal, de acuerdo 
con lo dispuesto por el Artículo 487. (“Initiate the necessary processes for the legal approval of 
any changes to the by-laws by the union’sGeneral Assembly within the fifteen (15) days its 
meeting, in accordance with the provisions ofArticle 487.”) 
 
Titulo VI, Capítulo VIII: Disolución y Liquidación (Title VI, Chpater VIII: Dissolution and 
Liquidation) 
 
Formas de disolución: sindicato, federación o confederación (Means of Dissolution: Union, 
Federation or Confederation) 
Art. 527. Un sindicato o una federación o confederación de sindicatos solamente se disuelve: (“A 
union or federation or confederation of unions can only be dissolved:”) 
 
a) Por cumplirse cualquiera de los eventos previstos en los estatutos para este efecto; (“By 
completing any of the events stipulated in the by-laws to this effect;”) 
 
b) Por acuerdo, cuando menos, de las dos terceras partes de los miembros de la organización, 
adoptado en Asamblea General y acreditado con las firmas de los asistentes; (“By agreement of 
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at least two thirds of the union’s members, adopted in the General Assembly and verified with 
the meeting attendees’ signatures;”) 
 
c) Por sentencia judicial; y, (“By judicial order; and,”) 
 
d) Por reducción de los afiliados a un número inferior a treinta (30), cuando se trate de sindicatos 
de trabajadores. (“By a reduction in membership to less than thirty (30) workers in the case of 
worker unions.”) 
 
Cancelación de inscripción por disolución (Cancelling Union Registration after Dissolution) 
Art. 528. En todo caso de disolución, el Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión Social cancelará 
mediante nota marginal la correspondiente inscripción y hará publicar por tres (3) veces 
consecutivas en el periódico oficial “La Gaceta” un extracto de las actuaciones o hechos que 
causaron la disolución.
864
 (“In every dissolution case, the Secretariat of Labor and Social 
Security, will cancel the corresponding registration through a separate notice and publish three 
(3) consecutive times in the official newspaper “The Gazette” a summary of the actions or events 
that caused the dissolution.”) 
 
Título VI, Capítulo IX: Trabajadores Oficiales  (Title VI, Chapter IX: Public Sector 
Workers) 
 
Derecho de Asociación  (Right of Association) 
Art. 534. El derecho de asociación en sindicatos se extiende a los trabajadores de todo el servicio 
oficial, con excepción de los miembros del Ejército Nacional y de los cuerpos o fuerzas de 
policía de cualquier orden . . . (“The right of association in unions extends to all public sector 
workers, with the exception of members of the National Military and any kind of police bodies or 
forces  whatsoever …”) 
 
Título VIII: Organización administrativa de trabajo (Title VIII: Administrative 
Organization of Labor Authorities) 
Capítulo III: De la Inspección General del Trabajo (Chapter III: Of the Inspector General 
of Labor) 
  
Art. 610. La Inspección General del Trabajo, por medio de su cuerpo de inspectores y visitadores 
sociales, debe velar porque patronos y trabajadores cumplan y respeten todas las disposiciones 
legales relativas al trabajo y a previsión social. (“The Inspector General of Labor, through its 
bodies of inspectors and social workers, must oversee that employers and workers fulfill and 
respect all legal provisions related to work and social welfare.”) 
 
En lo referente a la Ley Orgánica del Instituto Hondureño de Seguridad Social y a sus 
reglamentos, debe prestar auxilio y la colaboración que le soliciten los Inspectores al servicio de 
este último. (“In regard to the organic law of the Honduran Institute of Social Security and its 
regulations, the IHSS must provide assistance and collaboration requested by the inspectors to 
facilitate these duties.”) 
                                                          
864
 Reformado por el Decreto No. 760 (Gaceta No. 22,811 del lunes 28 de mayo de 1979). (“Modified by Decree 
No. 760 (Gazette No. 22,811 of Monday 28, 1979).”) 
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Atribuciones de la IGT 
Art. 614. Corresponde a la Inspección General del Trabajo: 
I) Vigilar el cumplimiento del Código del Trabajo, sus reglamentos, contratos colectivos y demás 
disposiciones obligatorias, que comprende: 
a) Inspección de centros de trabajo; 
b) Inspección especial del trabajo familiar, del trabajo a domicilio y de las industrias; 
c) Estudiar las actas de inspección para proponer las medidas procedentes; 
d) Reinspección para averiguar si se han subsanado las deficiencias encontradas con 
anterioridad; y, 
e) Formular informes con los resultados de las inspecciones, proponiendo las medidas 
que sean necesarias para la protección general de los trabajadores. 
II) Auxiliar a las demás oficinas de la Secretaría, practicando, por medio de sus inspectores, las 
diligencias que se le encomienden; 
III) Intervenir conciliatoriamente, por medio de sus inspectores, en los conflictos obrero-
patronales; 
IV) Vigilar la integración de las comisiones de seguridad; 
V) Cooperar en la revisión de contratos colectivos, investigando para tal efecto, las condiciones 
de vida de los trabajadores y la situación económica de las empresas; 
VI) Personal residente en el Distrito Central y en los Departamentos, que comprende: 
a) Adscripción y movimiento de inspectores, visitadoras y demás personal; 
b) Inspecciones y control de actividades; y, 
c) Sanciones y menciones laudatorias. 
VII) Celebrar cada seis (6) meses reuniones públicas a las que asistirá obligatoriamente todo su 
personal, las trabajadoras sociales, enfermeras visitadoras y demás cuerpos similares, con el 
objeto de estudiar los problemas comunes relacionados con el cumplimiento de la legislación 
social. Cada sindicato podrá enviar a estas reuniones un delegado con derecho a voz y voto; y, 
además, tendrá la facultad de exigir la convocatoria a tales reuniones en la oportunidad arriba 
señalada.   
 
Powers of the IGT 
Section 614. The General Inspectorate is responsible for: 
I) Ensuring compliance with the Labor Code, its regulations, collective bargaining agreements 
and other mandatory provisions through: 
a) Inspection of work places; 
b) Special inspection of family work, household work and industry; 
c) Studying inspection reports to propose appropriate remedial measures; 
d) Re-inspection to verify if employers have corrected previously-identified deficiencies 
and, 
e) Formulation of reports on the results of inspections that propose necessary measures 
for the general protection of workers. 
II) Assisting other Secretariat offices, participating, through its inspectors, in other proceedings 
as required; 
III) Intervening in a conciliatory manner, through its inspectors, in labor-management disputes; 
IV) Monitoring the formation of safety committees; 
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V) Cooperating in the review of collective bargaining agreements, investigating for such 
purposes, the living conditions of workers and the economic situation of enterprises; 
VI) Personnel residing in the Central District and Departments, comprising: 
a) Assignment and movement of inspectors, social workers, and other staff; 
b) Inspection and management of activities and, 
c) Disciplinary actions and laudatory mentions. 
VII) Hold compulsory public meetings every six (6) months attended by all staff, social workers, 
nursing social workers and other similar bodies, in order to study common problems related to 
the implementation of social legislation. Each union may send a delegate to these meetings with 
the right to speak and vote and also has the power to demand the convening of such meetings as 
provided above. 
 
Facultades y obligaciones: inspectores y visitadores sociales (Powers and Obligations: 
Inspectors and Social Workers) 
Art. 617. Los Inspectores de Trabajo y las Visitadoras Sociales son autoridades que tienen las 
obligaciones y facultades que se expresan a continuación: (“Labor Inspectors and Social 
Workers are authorities that have the powers and obligations expressed below:”) 
 
a) Pueden revisar libros de contabilidad, de salarios, planillas, constancias de pago y cualesquiera 
otros documentos que eficazmente les ayuden a desempeñar su cometido; (“They may inspect 
accounting books, salary records, pay slips, proof of pay and whatever other documents that 
help them to effectively carry out their work;”) 
 
b) Siempre que encuentren resistencia injustificada deben dar cuenta de lo sucedido al Tribunal 
de Trabajo que corresponda y, en casos especiales, en los que su acción deba ser inmediata, 
pueden requerir, bajo su responsabilidad, el auxilio de las autoridades o agentes de policía, con el 
único fin de que no se les impida o no se les creen dificultades en el cumplimiento de sus 
deberes; (“Whenever they encounter unjustified resistance they must report the occurrence to the 
corresponding Labor Court, and in certain cases where immediate action is called for, they can, 
at their own discretion, request the help of the authorities or police;”) 
 
c) Pueden examinar las condiciones higiénicas de los lugares de trabajo y las de seguridad 
personales que éstos ofrezcan a los trabajadores, y, muy particularmente, deben velar porque se 
acaten todas las disposiciones en vigor sobre prevención de accidentes de trabajo y enfermedades 
profesionales; (“They may inspect workplace personal safety and health conditions offered to the 
workers, and, very particularly, they must safeguard compliance with all the legal provisions in 
effect regarding prevention of workplace accidents and occupational illnesses;”) 
 
d) Deben intervenir en todas las dificultades y conflictos de trabajo de que tengan noticia, sea 
que se presenten entre trabajadores y patronos, sólo entre aquellos o sólo entre éstos, a fin de 
prevenir su desarrollo o lograr su conciliación extrajudicial, si ya se han suscitado; (“They must 
intervene in all labor difficulties and conflicts about which they have notice, whether they arise 
between workers or employers, only among workers or only among employers, with the end of 
preventing further development of the conflict or to achieve the out-of-court conciliation for 
conflicts that  have already arisen;”) 
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g) Las actas que levanten y los informes que rindan en materia de sus atribuciones, tienen plena 
validez en tanto no se demuestre en forma evidente su inexactitud, falsedad o parcialidad; y, 
(“The records and the reports that they produce in carrying out their responsibilities have full 
validity so long as there is no evident form of inaccuracy, falsehood or bias; and,”) 
 
h) Los Inspectores cuidarán especialmente de que se respeten todos aquellos preceptos cuyo 
cumplimiento garantice las buenas relaciones entre patronos y obreros. Asimismo vigilarán que 
se cumpla la prohibición sobre trabajo nocturno para menores, poniendo en conocimiento de 
quien corresponda, las faltas que anoten para que sean castigados. Por último, están obligados a 
acatar las instrucciones relacionadas con el desempeño de su cargo, que reciban de sus superiores 
jerárquicos. (“The Inspectors shall especially ensure respect for compliance with all precepts 
that guarantee good worker-employer relations. Additionally, they will safeguard against night 
time work for minors, notifying the appropriate authority of the offenses they observe so that 
such violators are punished. Finally, they are obligated to obey the instructions related to the 
performance of their job that they receive from their superiors.”) 
 
Visitas a empresas por inspectores  (Inspector Visits to Companies) 
Art. 618. Los Inspectores de Trabajo, para los efectos del artículo anterior podrán visitar, previa 
identificación, las empresas a toda hora del día y de la noche, siempre y cuando se haga 
necesario; podrán igualmente interrogar al personal de los establecimientos, sin la presencia del 
patrono ni de testigos y solicitar toda clase de documentos y registro a que obliga este Código. 
Harán constar los Inspectores en acta que al efecto levanten, si se encontraren irregularidades en 
la empresa visitada. Esas actas las enviarán a la autoridad de que dependan, y ésta impondrá, con 
vista de ellas, las sanciones correspondientes y ordenará la ejecución de las medidas que 
procedan conforme a la ley. Los Inspectores de Trabajo tendrán, la obligación de practicar las 
investigaciones a que se refiere este artículo, siempre que verbalmente o por escrito reciban 
queja de alguna de las partes, respecto de violaciones de este Código o de los reglamentos de 
trabajo, en el seno de la empresa de que se trate. (“The Labor Inspectors, for the effects of the 
preceding article, may visit companies after showing identification at all times of the day and 
night, whenever it proves necessary; they may equally interview the personnel of the 
establishments without the presence of the employer nor any witness and request all types of 
documentation and records that this Code requires. The Inspectors will document any 
irregularities they identify in the visited company in an inspection report. Those reports will be 
sent to the legal entity with authority to act, and that authority, in light of the irregularities 
identified, will impose the corresponding sanctions and order the execution of measures as 
required by law. Whenever they receive a written or verbal complaint from any party with 
respect to violations of this Code or to labor regulations, Labor Inspectors are obligated to carry 
out the inspections referred to by this article at the company to which the complaint is related.”) 
 
Lectura y presentación del acta (Reading and Presentation of Inspection Reports) 
Art. 619. El acta deberá ser leída al patrono o su representante y al trabajador o trabajadores 
causantes de la infracción, debiendo firmarla conjuntamente con los infractores. Si alguno de 
ellos no pudiere o no quisiere firmar, el inspector dejará constancia de ello. Las actas que 
levanten los inspectores deberán ser presentadas al Jefe de la Sección, dentro del día hábil 
siguiente o en el plazo que la Inspección General establezca. (“The report must be read to the 
employer or its representative and to the worker or workers responsible for the infraction to be 
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signed jointly with the offender. If one of them is unable or unwilling to sign, the inspector will 
attest to that effect. The Inspector’s report must be presented to the Section Manager within one 
working day or the timeframe set by the Inspector General.”) 
 
Acta de intimación o notificación de sanción  
Art. 620. Si la Inspección General resuelve imponer sanción, ordenará que el Inspector levante 
una segunda acta que se denominará de intimación o notificación de sanción. El presunto 
infractor podrá formular sus descargos en la primera acta o exponer por escrito dentro de tercero 
día a la Inspección General del Trabajo, lo que considere conveniente a su derecho antes de que 
se dicte resolución. Los plazos para interponer los recursos legales contra la resolución del 
Inspector General imponiendo sanciones, se contarán desde el día siguiente al del acta de 
intimación o notificación. 
 
Report of Notification of Sanction  
Article 620. If the Inspector General decides to impose a penalty, it shall order the Inspector to 
file a second notifiction of sanction report. The alleged offender may make their defense in the 
first inspection report or provide written appeal within three days to the Inspector General of 
Labor, which will consider the appeal before making any ruling. The timeframes for seeking 
legal remedies against the decision of the Inspector General to impose a fine shall be counted 
from the day following the [second] inspection repor of notiice of sanction. 
 
Recursos de reposición y apelación  
Art. 621. Contra las decisiones imponiendo multas, los interesados podrán interponer el recurso 
de reposición ante la Inspección General del Trabajo, y el de apelación ante el Ministerio de 
Trabajo y Previsión Social. Los recursos de reposición y de apelación se interpondrán y 
sustanciarán entro de los plazos y en la forma establecida en el Código de Procedimientos 
Administrativos, otorgándose en su caso el término de la distancia. 
 
Resources and appeal  
Article 621. For decisions imposing fines, interested parties may request a rehearing from the 
Inspector General of Labor and lodge an appeal before the Secretariat of Labor and Social 
Security. The rehearing and appeals requests must be lodged and substantiated within the 
timeframes and in the manner delineated in the Code of Administrative Procedure, granting the 
distance term. 
 
Requisitos actas 
Art. 622. Las actas de constatación o de hechos y las de intimación o notificación, se ajustarán a 
las fórmulas que establezca la Dirección General del Trabajo, pero harán en todo caso mención 
expresa, la primera, del derecho de formular descargos en el acta o por escrito dentro de tercero 
día, y la segunda, de los recursos consagrados en este Código y el plazo para ejercitarlos. 
("Reports of observation or facts and reports of summons or notification of penalty, shall 
conform to the formulas established by the General Directorate of Labor, but shall in all cases 
expressly state, first, the right to express dissent in the inspection report or in writing within 
three days, and second, the means of recourse codified in this Code and the deadline by which to 
exercise such recourse.”) 
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Inspectores de trabajo: agentes de ley 
Art. 623. Los Inspectores de Trabajo, como agentes de la ley, evitarán entrar en discusiones 
sobre los propósitos concretos o determinados de su presencia e invocarán solamente la 
representación que invisten. ("Labor inspectors, as agents of the law, shall avoid entering into 
discussions regarding concrete or specific purpose of their presence and shall invoke only the 
office they hold.”) 
 
Continuidad de procedimiento  (Ongoing Procedings) 
Art. 624. Los Inspectores de Trabajo, una vez iniciado un procedimiento, no podrán dejarlo sin 
efecto, sin conocimiento y autorización de sus superiores. (“Labor Inspectors may not leave any 
procedure that has been initiated unresolved without the knowledge or authorization of their 
superiors.”) 
 
Sanciones y multas a infractores (Sanctions and Fines for Violators) 
Art. 625. Se sancionarán con multas de L. 50.00 hasta L. 5,000.00, de acuerdo con las 
circunstancias particulares de cada caso, su reiteración y capacidad económica de la empresa 
infractora, las siguientes infracciones: (“The following infractions will be sanctioned with fines of 
50.00 to 5,000.00 Lempiras, according to the particular circumstances of each case, if the 
infraction is reoccuring and the economic capacity of the offending company:”) 
 
a) La desobediencia a las disposiciones impartidas por los inspectores de trabajo, dentro del 
límite de sus atribuciones legales, (“Disobedience with legal provision as instructed by labor 
inspectors within the limits of their legal power,”) 
 
b) La obstrucción del cumplimiento de los deberes que legalmente corresponden a los 
inspectores de trabajo, (“Obstruction of an inspector’s ability to carry out their legal duties,”) 
 
c) La agresión física, o moral hacia la persona de los inspectores de trabajo, (“Physical or moral 
aggression towards a labor inspector,”) 
 
d) La violación, por parte de los patronos, de cualquiera de las garantías mínimas que establece 
este Código, que no tengan sanción pecuniaria especial. (“Employer violationof any of the 
minimum guarantees established by this Code that do not have a special pecuniary sanction.”) 
 
Estas sanciones se entienden sin perjuicio de cualquier acción, penal, civil o laboral que 
corresponda conforme la justicia ordinaria. (“These sanctions are understood to be applicable 
notwithstanding any labor, penal or civil action that may apply in accordance with ordinary 
legal proceedings.”) 
 
Las multas las impondrá el Inspector General del Trabajo, tanto a la persona directamente 
responsable de la infracción como al patrono en cuya empresa, industria, negocio o 
establecimiento, se hubiere cometido la falta, a no ser que éste demostrare su desconocimiento o 
no participación en la misma. Si el culpable fuere una compañía, sociedad o institución pública o 
privada, las penas se aplicarán contra quien figure como patrono, director, gerente o jefe de la 
empresa, establecimiento, negocio o lugar donde el trabajo se preste pero la respectiva persona 
jurídica, quedará obligada solidariamente con estos a cubrir toda clase de responsabilidades de 
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orden pecuniario. (“The fines will be imposed by the Inspector General of Labor, both on the 
person directly responsible for the infraction and on the employer in whose company, industry, 
business or establishment, the offense was committed, unless the employer demonstrates his lack 
of awareness or participation in the infraction. If the culprit is a company, association or private 
or public institution, the punishment will apply against whomever acts as the employer, director, 
manager or head of the company, establishment, business or place where the work is performed, 
but the respective legal entity will be jointly liable for all types of pecuniary responsibilities.”) 
 
Denuncia de infracciones (Complaints about Infractions)  
Art. 628 Toda persona puede dar cuenta a los Inspectores o a las Vistadoras Sociales de 
cualquier infracción que cometan patronos o trabajadores en contra de las leyes de Trabajo o de 
Seguridad Social. (“Any person may inform Inspectors or Social Workers of any infraction that 
employers or workers commit in violation of Labor or Social Security Laws.”) 
 
Supervisores: potestades  (Supervisors: Functions) 
Art. 630 Los supervisores son funcionarios que tienen por especial cometido supervisar el trabajo 
de los Inspectores en la forma que disponga la Inspección General. Los supervisores están 
investidos, para el cumplimiento de su cometido, de los mismos poderes y facultades que los 
Inspectores de Trabajo. Su tarea consiste esencialmente en verificar si las inspecciones 
dispuestas se han cumplido y, en caso afirmativo, si lo han sido en el tiempo y forma dispuestos, 
efectuar inspecciones de comprobación y cumplir cometidos especiales o particularmente 
importantes. (“The supervisors are functionaries with the special task of supervising the work of 
Inspectors as stipulated by the Inspector General. To carry out this task, supervisors are 
endowed with the same powers and authorities as the Labor Inspectors. Their task consists 
essentially of verifying that inspections were executed—and if so that they were executed in the 
correct time and manner, carrying out oversight inspections, and fulfilling special or 
particularly important tasks.”) 
 
Los supervisores informarán directamente a la Inspección General de Trabajo de los resultados 
de las misiones que se les encomienden o de las tareas normales de supervisión y darán cuenta en 
particular de toda anormalidad que comprometa el prestigio del cuerpo inspectivo. Los 
supervisores tratarán en todo caso de conocer las quejas de los trabajadores o patronos sobre la 
forma en que se cumplan o hayan cumplido las inspecciones. (“Supervisors will report the 
results of the missions they are entrusted with or of their normal supervisory duties directly to 
the Inspector General of Labor and will note in particular all abnormalities that might 
compromise the good standing of the inspectorate. The supervisors will try in all cases to know  
the worker’s or employer’s complaints regarding the way in which the inspections are being or 
have been carried out.”) 
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Título IX: Jurisdicción Especial de Trabajo  (Title IX: Special Labor Jurisdiction) 
Capítulo I: Organización y Competencia de los Tribunales de Trabajo (Chapter I: 
Organization and Functions of Labor Courts) 
Sección I: Disposiciones Generales  (Section I: General Provisions) 
 
Ámbito material  (Purview) 
Art. 665. La jurisdicción del trabajo está instituida para decidir los conflictos jurídicos que se 
originen directa o indirectamente del contrato de trabajo. (“The Labor Jurisdiction was 
established to resolve legal conflicts that originate directly or indirectly from the labor 
contract.”) 
 
Título X: Procedimiento en los Juicios del Trabajo  (Title X: Labor Court Procedings) 
Capítulo XIII: Procedimientos en laResolución de los Conflictos Colectivos de Carácter 
Económico Social  (Chapter XIII: Procedings for Resolving Socio-Economic Collective 
Conflicts) 
Sección I: Arreglo Directo  (Section I; Direct Arrangement) 
 
Iniciación de Conversaciones  (Initiating Conversations) 
Art. 791.  El dueño del establecimiento o empresa o su representante están en la obligación de 
recibir la delegación de los trabajadores dentro de las veinticuatro (24) horas siguientes a la 
presentación oportuna del pliego de peticiones, para iniciar conversaciones. Si la persona a quien 
se presentare el pliego considerare que no esta autorizada para resolver sobre el, debe hacerse 
autorizar o dar traslado al patrono dentro de las veinticuatro (24) horas siguientes a la 
presentación del pliego, avisándolo así a los trabajadores. En todo caso, la iniciación de las 
conversaciones en la etapa de arreglo directo no puede diferirse por más de cinco (5) días hábiles 
a partir de la presentación del pliego.  (“The owner of the establishment or business or its 
representative, is obligated to receive the delegation of workers within twenty-four (24) hours 
following the timely presentation of the statement of demands to initiate conversations. If the 
person to whom the statement is presented considers that he or she is not authorized to resolve 
the matter, he or she must obtain authorization or the statement of demands must be transferred 
to the employer within twenty-four (24) hours following the presentation of the statement, and 
the workers must be advised. In any case the initiation of conversations in the direct settlement 
stage cannot be deferred for more than five (5) business days from the presentation of the 
statement.”) 
 
Título XI: Disposiciones Varias (Title XI: Various Provisions) 
Capítulo Único (Only Chapter) 
Prescripción (Statutes of Limitations) 
 
Art. 864. Los derechos y acciones de los trabajadores para reclamar contra los despidos 
injustificados que se les hagan o contra las correcciones disciplinarias que se les apliquen, 
prescriben en el término de dos (2) meses contados a partir de la terminación del contrato o 
desde que se les impusieron dichas correcciones, respectivamente. (“Workers’ rights and ability 
to make a legal claim against unjustified dismissals or against disciplinary corrections , expire 
within two (2) months of the event, starting from termination of the contract or from the 
application of the corrections, respectively.”) 
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Art. 868. El término de prescripción se interrumpe: (“The statute of limitations is suspended:” 
 
(a) Por demanda o gestión ante la autoridad competente; (“By lawsuit or the filing of 
paperwork before a competent authority;”) 
(b) Por el hecho de que la persona a cuyo favor corre la prescripción reconozca 
expresamente, de palabra o por escrito, o tácitamente por hechos indudables, el 
derecho de aquél contra quien transcurre el término de prescripción. Quedan 
comprendidos entre los medios expresados en este inciso el pago o cumplimiento de 
la obligación del deudor, sea parcial o en cualquier otra forma que se haga; y, (“By 
express acknowledgment by the person in whose favor the limitation runs, orally or in 
writing, or implicitly by unquestionable events, the right of the one whose expiration 
time goes against. It remains to be understood between the expressed means in this 
paragraph the pay or compliance of the obligation of the debtor, be it partial or in 
any other way made; and,”) 
(c) Por fuerza mayor o caso fortuito debidamente comprobados. (“By force majeure or by 
chance, when duly confirmed.”) 
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B. Código de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia   (Code on Childhood and 
Adolescence) 
Capítulo V: De la Protección de los Niños  
Contra la Explotación Económica (Chapter V: On the Protection of Children against 
Economic Exploitation) 
 
Sección II: De la Autorización para el Trabajo  (Section II: On Labor Authorization) 
 
Art. 119. El empleo de niños en cualquier actividad retribuida estará sujeto a lo prescrito por el 
artículo 128 numeral 7 de la Constitución de la República y requerirá de la autorización previa de 
la Secretaría de Estado en los Despachos de Trabajo y Previsión Social a solicitud de los padres, 
de los hermanos o del representante legal. Igual autorización requerirán los niños que se 
propongan realizar trabajos independientes, esto es, aquellos en que no medie una remuneración 
ni un contrato o relación de trabajo. (“The employment of children in any type of compensable 
activity will be subject to in the conditions established in numeral 7 of Article 128 of the 
Constitution of the Republic and will require previous authorization from the Secretariat of 
Labor and Social Security at the request of a child’s parent, sibling or legal representative. 
Authorization is also required for a child working independently, that is, working for no pay or 
without a contract or work relation.”)   
 
Para extender tal autorización dicha Secretaría de Estado deberá realizar un estudio socio-
económico y del estado físico y mental de los niños de que se trate. (“To extend such 
authorization the Secretariat [of Labor and Social Security] must study the socio-economic and 
physical and mental state of said children.”) 
 
La autorización se concederá cuando, a juicio de la mencionada Secretaría de Estado, el niño no 
sufrirá perjuicio aparente, físico, moral o educativo por el ejercicio de la actividad de que se 
trate. (“The authorization will be granted when, in the judgment of said Secretariat [of Labor 
and Social Security], the child will suffer no apparent, physical, moral or emotional damage 
from the given work activity.”) 
 
Concedida la autorización, el niño podrá recibir directamente el salario y, llegado el caso, 
ejercitar, con el auxilio de un apoderado legal, las acciones pertinentes. (“Once the authorization 
is granted, the child will be able to directly receive a salary and, if need arises, take pertinent 
actions with help from a legal representative.”) 
 
Art. 120. Las autorizaciones para trabajar se concederán a título individual y deberán limitar la 
duración de las horas de trabajo y establecer las condiciones en que se prestarán los servicios. 
(“Work authorizations will be granted on an individual basis and must limit the duration of the 
work hours and establish the conditions under which services are offered.”) 
 
En ningún caso se autorizará para trabajar a un niño menor de catorce (14) años. (“In no case 
will a child younger than fourteen (14) years old be authorized to work.”) 
 
Art. 122. Los niños no podrán desempeñar labores insalubres o peligrosas aun cuando sean 
realizadas como parte de un curso o programa educativo o formativo. La insalubridad o 
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peligrosidad se determinará tomando como base lo dispuesto en este Código, en el Código de 
Trabajo y en los reglamentos que existan sobre la materia. (“Children may not carry out 
unhealthy or dangerous work even when it is part of an educational or training program or 
course. The unhealthiness or dangerousness will be determined based on the dispositions of this 
Code, the Labor Code and existing regulations on the subject.”) 
 
Tomando en cuenta lo anterior, los niños no podrán realizar labores que: (“Taking the preceding 
into account, children shall not do work that;”) 
 
a) Impliquen permanecer en una posición estática prolongada o que deban prestarse en andamios 
cuya altura exceda de tres (3) metros; (“Involves remaining in a prolonged static position or 
where they must being supported by scaffolding exceeding three (3) meters in height;”) 
 
b) Tengan que ver con sustancias tóxicas o nocivas para la salud; (“Has to do with substances 
that are toxic or harmful to health;”) 
 
c) Expongan al tráfico vehicular; (“Exposes them to vehicular traffic;”) 
 
ch) Expongan a temperaturas anormales o deban realizarse en ambientes contaminados o con 
insuficiente ventilación; (“Exposes them to abnormal temperatures or must be carried out in 
environments that are contaminated or lack sufficient ventilation;”) 
 
d) Deban realizarse en túneles o subterráneos de minería o en sitios en los que confluyan agentes 
nocivos tales como contaminantes, desequilibrios térmicos, deficiencia de oxígeno a 
consecuencia de la oxidación o de la gasificación; (“Is carried out in tunnels or underground 
mining or in places where harmful agents such as contaminants, thermal instability, and oxygen 
deficiency as a consequence of oxidation or gasification are found;”) 
 
e) Los expongan a ruidos que excedan de ochenta (80) decibeles; (“Exposes them to noise levels 
exceeding eighty (80) decibels;”) 
 
f) Impliquen la manipulación de sustancias radioactivas, pinturas luminiscentes, rayos  o 
impliquen la exposición a radiaciones ultravioletas o infrarrojas y a emisiones de radio 
frecuencia; (“Involves handling radioactive substances, luminescent paint, rays or exposes them 
toultraviolet or infrared radiation and radioactive frequency emissions;”) 
 
g) Impliquen exposición a corrientes eléctricas de alto voltaje; (“Involves exposure to high-
voltage electrical currents;”)  
 
h) Exijan la inmersión en el mar; (“Requires immersion in the sea or ocean;”) 
 
i) Tengan que ver con basureros o con cualquier otro tipo de actividades en las que se generen 
agentes biológicos patógenos; (“Has to do with trash collecting or any other type of activity that 
generates biological pathogens;”) 
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j) Impliquen el manejo de sustancias explosivas, inflamables o cáusticas; (“Involves handling 
explosive, flammable or caustic substances;”) 
 
k) Sean propios de fogoneros en los buques, ferrocarriles u otros bienes o vehículos semejantes; 
(“Employs them as (fire) stokers on ships, trains or other similar machines or vehicles;”) 
 
l) Sean propios de la pintura industrial y entrañen el empleo de albayalde o cerusa, de sulfato de 
plomo o de cualquier otro producto que contenga dichos elementos; (“Involves handling 
industrial paint, white lead, lead sulfate or any other product containing said elements;”) 
 
ll) Se relacionen con máquinas esmeriladoras, de afilado de herramientas, muelas abrasivas de 
alta velocidad o con ocupaciones similares; (“Relates to grinding machines, tool sharpening and 
cutting, abrasive or high-speed grinding equipment or similar occupations;”) 
 
m) Se relacionen con altos hornos, hornos de fundición de metales, fábricas de acero, talleres de 
laminación, trabajos de forja o en prensas pesadas; (“Relates to blast furnaces, metal furnaces, 
steel factories, lamination workshop, forge work or heavy press;”) 
 
n) Involucren manipular cargas pesadas; (“Involves handling heavy loads;”) 
 
ñ) Se relacionen con cambios de correas de transmisión, de aceite o engrase y otros trabajos 
próximos a transmisiones pesadas o de alta velocidad; (“Relates to changing transmission belts, 
oil or grease and other jobs in proximity to heavy or high-speed transmissions;”) 
 
o) Se relacionen con cortadoras, laminadoras, tornos, fresadoras, troqueladoras y otras máquinas 
particularmente peligrosas; (“Relates to cutters, laminators, lathes, drills, milling machines, die 
cutters and other particularly dangerous machines;”) 
 
p) Tengan relación con el vidrio o con el pulido y esmerilado en seco de vidrio o con operaciones 
de limpieza por chorro de arena o con locales de vidriado y grabado; (“Relates to glass, glass 
grinding or polishing, sand blasting, glaze and engraving;”) 
 
q) Impliquen soldadura de cualquier clase, cortes con oxígeno en tanques o lugares confinados o 
en andamios o molduras precalentadas; (“Involves any kind of welding, oxygen tanks or confined 
places with scaffolding or preheated molding;”) 
 
r) Deban realizarse en lugares en los que se presentan altas temperaturas o humedad constante; 
(“Is carried out in places with high temperatures or constant humidity;”) 
 
s) Se realizan en ambientes en los que se desprenden vapores o polvos tóxicos o que se 
relacionen con la producción de cemento; (“Is carried out in environments containing toxic 
vapors or dust or related to the production of cement;”) 
 
t) Se realicen en la agricultura o en la agroindustria que impliquen alto riesgo para la salud; (“Is 
carried out in agriculture or agroindustry and involves a high health risk;”) 
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u) Expongan a un notorio riesgo de insolación; y (“Exposes them to obvious risk of sunstroke or 
sun exposure; and,”) 
 
v) Señalen en forma específica los reglamentos que sobre la materia emita la Secretaría de 
Estado en los Despachos de Trabajo y Previsión social. (“Is specifically delineated in regulations 
emitted by the Secretariat of Labor and SocialSecurity.”) 
 
La mencionada Secretaría de Estado podrá autorizar a niños mayores de dieciséis (16) años y 
menores de dieciocho (18) para que puedan desempeñar alguna de las labores señaladas en este 
artículo si se prueba a satisfacción de la misma que han concluido estudios técnicos en el 
Instituto Nacional de Formación Profesional o en un instituto técnico especializado dependiente 
de la Secretaría de Estado en el Despacho de Educación Pública. Aquella entidad, en todo caso, 
verificará que los cargos pueden ser desempeñados sin peligro para la salud o la seguridad del 
niño. (“The Secretariat [of Labor and Social Security] may authorize children older than sixteen 
(16) and younger than eighteen (18) to perform some of the categories of work outlined in this 
article if proven to the satisfaction of the Secretariat that technical studies have been completed 
by the National Institute of Professional Training or by a specialized technical institute affiliated 
with the Secretariat Public Education. That entity [STSS], regardless, will verify that the 
category of work can be carried out without endangering the health or safety of the child.”) 
 
Art. 125. La duración máxima de la jornada de trabajo de los niños estará sujeta a las siguientes 
reglas: (“The maximum work day duration for children will be subject to the following rules:”)  
 
a) El mayor de catorce (14) años y menor de dieciséis (16) sólo podrá realizar trabajos en 
jornadas que no excedan de cuatro (4) horas diarias; (“Children older than fourteen (14) 
and younger than sixteen (16) may only work shifts that do not exceed four (4) hours 
daily;”) 
b) El mayor de dieciséis (16) años y menor de dieciocho (18) sólo podrá trabajar en jornadas 
que no excedan de seis (6) horas diarias y, (“Children older than sixteen (16) and 
younger than eighteen (18) may only work shifts that do not exceed six (6) hours daily; 
and,”) 
c) Queda prohibido el trabajo nocturno para los niños trabajadores. No obstante, los 
mayores de dieciséis (16) años y menores de dieciocho (18) podrán ser autorizados para 
trabajar hasta las ocho (8) de la noche siempre que no se afecte su asistencia regular a un 
centro docente ni se  cause con ello perjuicio para su salud física y moral. (“It is 
prohibited for children to work in the nighttime. Nevertheless, children older than sixteen 
(16) and younger than eighteen (18) may be authorized to work until eight (8) o’clock at 
night as long as such work does not affect regular attendance at school or the child’s 
physical or moral health.”)  
 
 
Art. 128. La Secretaría de Estado en los Despachos de Trabajo y Previsión Social inspeccionará 
regular y periódicamente a las empresas para establecer si tienen a su servicio niños trabajadores 
y si están cumpliendo las normas que los protegen. (“The Secretariat of Labor and Social 
Security will regularly and periodically inspect companies to determine if they employ children 
and if they are complying with the regulations that protect children.”) 
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Quienes violen dichas normas serán sancionados con multa de cinco mil (Los. 5,000.00) a 
veinticinco mil lempiras (Lps. 25,000.00). La reincidencia será sancionada con el doble de la 
multa anterior, aunque el  máximo no podrá exceder de la última cifra señalada. (“Whoever 
violates said regulations will be sanctioned with a fine of five thousand (5,000.00) to twenty-five 
thousand (25,000.00) lempiras. Reoccurrence will be sanctioned with double the previous fine, 
although the maximum may not exceed the latter amount [25,000 HNL].”) 
 
Cuando se trate de una empresa que haya puesto en peligro la vida de un niño o haya atentado 
contra la moral o las buenas costumbres con daño del mismo, además de la multa se le aplicarán 
las sanciones civiles y penales a que haya lugar. (“When a company has endangered the life of a 
child or has violated moral or good custom causing harm to a child, in addition to the fine, civil 
and penal sanctions will be applied as required.”) 
 
C. Reglamento sobre Trabajo Infantil (Regulation on Child Labor) 
Acuerdo Ejecutivo N. STSS-211-01, October 10, 2001 (Executive Decree No. STSS-211-01) 
 
Capítulo V: Medidas Correctivas y Sanciones Administrativas (Chapter V: Corrective 
Measures and Administrative Sanctions) 
Sección I: De las Medidas Correctivas (Section I: On Corrective Measures) 
 
Art. 27. La Secretaría de Estado en los Despachos de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, podrá previo o 
de manera simultánea a la imposición de sanciones administrativas, ordenar medidas correctivas 
a aquellos empleadores que no brinden las condiciones laborarles a adolescentes trabajadores(as) 
de conformidad con las normas legales que regulan la materia. (“The Secretariat of Labor and 
Social Security may previously or simultaneously impose administrative sanctions and order 
corrective measures to those employers that do not afford adolescent workers working 
conditions in compliance with the legal rules that govern the subject.”) 
 
Art. 28. La imposición de medidas correctivas debe realizarse por escrito mediante una acta 
preventiva, en la cual, se estipulará la o las infracciones que el empleador está cometiendo; 
concediéndole al infractor un plazo máximo de quince (15) días calendarios para su 
cumplimiento y corrección de la falta señalada; y, advirtiéndole las consecuencias de su 
incumplimiento. (“Corrective measures must be imposed in writing via a preventive report, 
which will delineate the employer’s infraction or infractions; allowing the offender a maximum 
term of fifteen (15) calendar days to come into compliance and correct the identified infractions; 
and, warning the employer of the consequences of non-compliance.”)  
 
Sección II: De las Sanciones Administrativas 
Art. 29. Todas las sanciones administrativas previstas en este Reglamento se aplicarán sin 
perjuicio de otras responsabilidades previstas por la Ley, especialmente lo prescrito en el 
Artículo 134 del Código de la Niñez y de la Adolescencia. (“All of the administrative sanctions 
in this regulation will be applied notwithstanding the application of the other responsibilities 
contemplated by the Law, especially those prescribed in Article 134 of the Code on Childhood 
and Adolescence.”) 
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Art. 30. Las sanciones establecidas en el Libro II, Título I, Capítulo V del Código de la Niñez y 
de la adolescencia se aplicarán cada vez que fueren necesarias, aumentándose en el doble por 
cada vez se reincida, hasta alcanzar el máximo de 25,000 lempiras previsto en la Ley.  (“The 
sanctions established in Book II, Title I, Chapter V of the Code on Childhood and Adolescence 
shall apply each time it is necessary, doubling for each reoccurrence up to the maximum of 
25,000 HNL fine established in the Law.”) 
 
Art. 32. Todas las sanciones administrativas de las infracciones cometidas conforme lo dispuesto 
en el Libro II, Título I, Capítulo V del Código de Niñez y de la Adolescencia y de este 
Reglamento, serán aplicadas por la Secretaría de Estado en los Despachos de Trabajo y 
Seguridad Social. Tales sanciones no obstarán para que se deduzcan las responsabilidades civiles 
y penales que correspondan. (“All of the administrative sanctions for infractions committed with 
respect to the stipulations in Book II, Title I, Chapter V of the  Code on Childhood and 
Adolescence and of this regulation will be applied by the Secretariat of Labor and Social 
Security. Such sanctions will not prevent the deduction of applicable civil or penal 
responsibilities.”)  
 
Art. 34. Una vez firme la resolución mediante la cual se sanciona a un empleador, el pago por 
concepto de multas deberá hacerlo efectivo dentro del plazo de tres (3) días hábiles contados a 
partir del día hábil siguiente al notificación y se enterará en las instituciones u oficinas 
autorizadas para recaudar el Impuesto Sobre la Renta. (“Once the decision to sanction an 
employer is finalized, the fine must be paid within three (3) business days counting from the next 
working day after notification and the institutions or authorized offices will be notified to collect 
the Income Tax.”)  
 
La falta de pago dentro del plazo antes estipulado se sancionará con un recargo del dos por 
ciento (2%) diario por cada día de retraso, dicho valor se calculará sobre el monto de la multa y 
no será acumulativo. (“Failure to pay within the term previously stipulated will be sanctioned 
with an added  two percent (2%) daily late fee, the value of which will be calculated over the 
amount of the fine and will not be cumulative.”) 
 
D. Constitution of Honduras, 1982   
CAPITULO III  DE LOS TRATADOS  (Chapter III on Treaties) 
 
Artículo 16. Todos los tratados internacionales deben ser aprobados por el Congreso Nacional 
antes de su ratificación por el Poder Ejecutivo.  
Los tratados internacionales celebrados por Honduras con otros Estados, una vez que entran en 
vigor, forman parte del derecho interno.  
 
Article 16. All international treaties must be approved by Congress before ratification by the 
Executive. International treaties concluded by Honduras with other countries, once they enter 
into force, are part of domestic law. 
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CAPITULO V  
DEL TRABAJO (Chapter V on Labor) 
 
Artículo 128. Las leyes que rigen las relaciones entre patronos y trabajadores son de orden 
público. Son nulos los actos, estipulaciones o convenciones que impliquen renuncia, disminuyan, 
restrinjan o tergiversen las siguientes garantías:  
[…] 
 
7. Los menores de (16) diez y seis años y los que hayan cumplido esa edad y sigan sometidos a 
la enseñanza en virtud de la legislación nacional, no podrán ser ocupados en trabajo alguno:  
No obstante, las autoridades de trabajo podrán autorizar su ocupación cuando lo consideren 
indispensable para la subsistencia de los mismos, de sus padres o de sus hermanos y siempre que 
ello no impida cumplir con la educación obligatoria;  
Para los menores de diecisiete (17) años la jornada de trabajo que deberá ser diurna, no podrá 
exceder de seis (6) horas diarias ni de (30) treinta a la semana, en cualquier clase de trabajo;  
[…] 
 
14. Los trabajadores y los patronos tienen derecho, conforme a la ley, a asociarse libremente para 
los fines exclusivos, de su actividad económico-social, organizando sindicatos o asociaciones 
profesionales; y,  
 
15. El Estado tutela los contratos individuales y colectivos, celebrados entre patronos y 
trabajadores.  
 
Article 128. The laws governing the relationship between employers and workers are in the 
public interest. All acts, stipulations or agreements that renounce, diminish, restrict or distort 
the following guarantees are invalid: 
[…] 
 
7. Minors under age sixteen (16) and minors above sixteen that remain subject to education 
requirements under national legislation shall not be employed in any work.  Nevertheless, 
Secretariat of Labor authorities may authorize employment of such minors when they consider it 
indispensable for the survival of the child or their parents or brothers and only when such work 
does not impede complying with compulsory education requirements.  For minors age seventeen 
(17) and younger, work shifts must be daytime shifts and must not exceed six (6) hours per day 
nor thirty (30) hours per week, for any type of work.  
[…] 
 
14. Workers and employers have the right, under the law, to associate freely for the sole 
purpose, according to their socio-economic activity, of organizing unions or professional 
associations; and 
 
15. The State shall maintain guardianship of individual and collective agreements concluded 
between employers and workers. 
